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G. K. Chesterton is often dismissed as a superficial optimist who failed to comprehend 
the painful reality of existence. Yet this perspective itself fails to appreciate the 
theological context within which Chesterton's optimistic outlook needs to be 
understood. This thesis explores the theological context underlying Chesterton's 
optimism, and focuses upon his concept of evil. It does so by looking at Chesterton's 
fiction, which offers a unique insight into his theology. 
The concept of evil raises two essential and interrelated questions: What is evil? and 
Why does it occur? The thesis begins by addressing the first of these, and examines 
Chesterton's understanding of the nature of evil. In this respect, Chesterton can be 
located within the privative tradition. However, this raises a further question: If evil is a 
privation, then how should it be imagined or depicted? Chesterton engaged with this 
predicament through his use of the grotesque. The thesis explores the way in which he 
understood this technique and comments on the different uses of it to be found within 
his fiction. 
The second question to be addressed is normally referred to as the problem of evil. 
Chesterton's emphasis on the centrality of free will led him to answer this problem with 
reference to the Free Will Defence. The extent to which this theodicy provides a 
satisfactory answer to the problem of evil is considered, as is the way in which 
Chesterton integrated it with an appeal to mystery. 
Having looked at the way in which Chesterton's fiction reveals an acute theological 
understanding of the concept of evil, the thesis concludes by reflecting on his apparent 
optimism. Chesterton's optimism does not constitute an attempt to ignore the painful 
reality of existence. Instead, it should be seen as Chesterton's response to the evil that 
he found in the world. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Gilbert Keith Chesterton continues to generate a wide range of response from those 
who read him. This is partly the result of his vast output which covers a multitude of 
subjects. Faced with so many opinions and ideas, most readers can find something with 
which they either agree or disagree. Although a variety of different themes can be 
found in Chesterton's writings, there is one theme in particular that permeates all of his 
work. Chesterton viewed `mere existence' as a wonderful gift, and thought that we 
needed to rediscover the joy of being alive. In the conclusion to Orthodoxy, he 
suggested that joy, "is the gigantic secret of the Christian". ' Elsewhere, he explained 
that: "This way of looking at things... [involved] a sort of mystical minimum of 
gratitude... "2 
Chesterton's emphasis on the joy of existence challenges his readers to look at the 
world in a new way. It also threatens to ignore, or at least marginalise, the suffering that 
we find in the world. Thus it is hardly surprising that many people have responded to 
this aspect of Chesterton's writing with considerable hostility. In their minds, 
Chesterton is little more than a superficial optimist who failed to comprehend the 
painful reality of existence. As Michael Mason acknowledged: "Some critics have 
accused Chesterton of a truly infantile unawareness of the dark side of life. "3 Charles 
Frederick Gurney Masterman (1874-1927) voiced the opinion of many in his review of 
The Defendant: "Mr Chesterton is convinced that the Devil is dead. A children's 
epileptic hospital, a City dinner, a suburban at home, a South African charnel camp, or 
any other examples of cosmic ruin fail to shake this blasphemous optimism. "4 Henry 
Murray (183 7-1915) levelled a similar criticism in his own review of Chesterton: 
The real paradox about Mr Chesterton... is that, with a tender and overflowing 
affection for all sentient things, he seems almost completely ignorant of the 
existence of sorrow or suffering. . .1 cannot 
imagine that he has ever given one 
' G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908; repr. London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1927), p. 296. 
G. K. Chesterton, . Autobiography 
(1936: repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 91. 
Michael Mason, The Centre of Hilarity (London: Sheed & Ward, 1959), p. 239. 
C. F. G. Masterman, "The Blasphemy of Optimism", The Speaker 26 April 1902, p. 116. 
solitary individual a moist eye or a lump in the throat. Pathos and tragedy are 
notes, or rather entire octaves, lacking from his keyboard. His boisterous 
optimism will not admit that there is anything to sorrow over in this best of all 
possible worlds. ' 
In response to such criticism, various supporters have rushed to Chesterton's defence 
and written a number of books defending his optimistic outlook. Sister Marie 
Virginia's, G. K. Chesterton 's Evangel, provides a prime example of this sort of 
uncritical approach. The closing pages bear more resemblance to a homily than to a 
critical assessment of Chesterton: "Before we turn the last pages of this book, let us pay 
our loving tribute to the memory of Mr Chesterton. For him, Christ's crusader and Our 
Lady's minstrel, we shall often pray. His lips have been hushed by the Divine Master 
whom he served so well with his pen, but his works will live... "6 A similar example of 
uncritical devotion can be found in Patrick Braybrooke's comment: "What is 
Chesterton's worst book? There is but one answer. The book he has not yet written, the 
book he will never write. "7 The problem with many of these uncritical works is that 
they have had the adverse effect of confirming the belief of many, that anyone with the 
ability to think critically must conclude that Chesterton was ignorant of the reality of 
evil. 
One of the reasons that people often react with such hostility to Chesterton's optimism 
is that they fail to see it within the necessarily theological context. This results in an 
interpretation of the word optimism that is quite different from Chesterton's. Charles 
Williams alluded to this point in his discussion of Chesterton's poetry: ``Mr Chesterton 
has been called an optimist and a medievalist and many other things. But it is because 
the things for which he has fought, carelessly considered, have a certain superficial 
resemblance to what is usually meant by those carelessly employed terms. "8 
The intention of my thesis is to examine the theological context within which 
Chesterton's optimistic outlook should be understood, and the focal point of this 
Henry Murray. "Gilbert Keith Chesterton" The Bookman May 1910, pp. 64-5. 
6 Sister Marie Virginia, C. K. Chesterton's Evangel (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1937), p. 239. 
Patrick Braybrooke, The 11sdom of G. K. Chesterton (London: Cecil Palmer, 1929), p. 240. 
8 Charles Williams, Poetry at Present (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 1 12. 
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discussion will be Chesterton's concept of evil. Although Chesterton is universally 
recognised as a theological writer, 9 there is a noticeable lack of theological writing on 
him. Many of the books on Chesterton only mention his theology in passing, preferring 
to focus upon his general thoughts and ideas. Of course, there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with such approaches: books such as Thomas Peters', Battling for the . 11odern 
Mind: A Beginners Chesterton (1994) for example, offer a useful introduction to 
Chesterton's thought; but these general approaches often lack detail, and can quickly 
become repetitive. Chesterton's theology needs to be explored in much greater detail if 
we are to penetrate the mind of Chesterton and seek a proper understanding of his 
deepest concerns. 
Despite the apparent shortage of theological interest in Chesterton, some useful work 
has been done in this regard. A number of short, interesting articles can be found in 
journals such as The Chesterton Review. Longer works include the book by Quentin 
Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher without Portfolio (1988), which provides the 
reader with an interesting analysis of Chesterton's philosophy. The only criticism of 
Lauer's otherwise excellent book is that it remains too wide-ranging. Hugh Kenner 
offers a helpful analysis of the theological dimension of Chesterton's paradoxes in 
Paradox in Chesterton, 10 while Thomas N. Hart's unpublished PhD dissertation, G. K. 
Chesterton 's Case for Christianity (1974), looks in considerable detail at various 
aspects of Chesterton's apologia for the Christian faith. Of less value is the book by K. 
Dwarakanath, G. K. Chesterton: A Critical Study (1986). This book addresses a number 
of theological themes within Chesterton's writings, but the quality of the theological 
discussion is poor: superficial in its understanding of the issues involved, and heavily 
dependent on unsubstantiated generalisations. 
In view of the paucity of work dealing with Chesterton's theology, it is hardly 
surprising that his understanding of evil is an area that has been left relatively 
untouched. At the same time, various critics have acknowledged the importance of this 
theme within Chesterton's work. In an extended introduction (96 pages) to his 
" Whether or not Chesterton is primarily a theologian, rather than a journalist or writer, is irrelevant to 
the point that I am making here. I simply mean that his writings contain a great deal of theology. 
10 Also see Yves Denis, G. K. Chesterton: Paradoxe et Catholicisme (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978). 
3 
collection of Chesterton's writings, Prophet of Orthodoxy: The Wisdom of UK. 
Chesterton (1997), Russell Sparkes entitles one section, The Problem of Evil". 
Unfortunately, this amounts to little more than a few scattered thoughts on Chesterton's 
interest in the Book of Job. Emile Cammaerts is equally brief when he devotes three 
pages of The Laughing Prophet: The Seven Virtues and G. K. Chesterton (1937). to 
Chesterton's understanding of good and evil. " A more promising analysis of 
Chesterton and evil can be found in Christopher Hollis' work, The Mind of Chesterton 
(1970). Hollis recognises the centrality of evil to much of Chesterton's thought. yet 
because he is more concerned with writing an intellectual biography than a theological 
treatise, many of the issues that he alludes to are not explored in further detail. In a 
similar vein is the work by Gary Wills, Chesterton: Man & Mask (1961). This excellent 
literary appreciation of Chesterton explores the dark side to his writings, but lacks any 
theological depth. Michael Mason touches upon certain theological issues related to 
evil in his book, The Centre of Hilarity (1960), which examines the function of laughter 
in both Chesterton and T. S. Eliot. In my concluding chapter, I will discuss the relevant 
sections of this book in further detail. 
The connection between Chesterton and evil is commented upon more briefly 
elsewhere. All of Chesterton's biographers highlight the encounter with evil that he had 
during his time at the Slade School of Art. In addition, numerous critical writings that 
deal with specific works, such as the Father Brown stories, include references to evil. 
(These will be discussed further in the relevant chapters of my thesis. ) One of the 
earliest books on Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton: A Criticism (1908), written by his 
brother Cecil and published anonymously, illustrates both of these approaches. It 
discusses Chesterton's growing awareness of the reality of evil as a young man, as well 
as the significance of this theme in The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare (1908). 
Perhaps the most sustained discussion of Chesterton's concept of evil can be found in 
the unpublished PhD thesis by Gillian Cross, G. K Chesterton and the Decadents (The 
University of Sussex, 1973). Cross' thesis considers Chesterton's emphasis on reality 
as a response to the Decadents. Chapter Five is entitled: "Spiritual Reality: (i) Good 
' Emile Cammaerts, The Laughing Prophet: The Seven t "rrtues and G. K. Chesterton (London: Methuen 
& Co Ltd, 1937), pp. 20-3. 
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and Evil". Cross distinguishes between Chesterton's early treatment of evil as an 
external force, and his later emphasis on sin (after 1914). Although her chapter is quite 
incisive, it seems to me that her understanding and use of the first of these two 
categories is confused. Discussing Chesterton's early work, she writes: "... by 
externalising all the dark and terrifying aspects of evil, he tends to minimize the full 
force of the doctrine of the Fall which implies, among other things, that one must 
confront evil and terror within one's own soul. "12 Yet this is not necessarily the case. 
Cross offers no reason as to why an externalised evil cannot be responsible for the sin 
that is found "within one's own soul". Cross seems to confuse the question of what evil 
is, with the question of why we commit evil. Admittedly, Cross is not writing a 
theological work, but the subject of evil cannot be successfully understood outside of 
its theological context. A further problem concerns her use of The Man who Was 
Thursday: A Nightmare as evidence of Chesterton's early tendency to, "treat evil 
largely as a force external to man. " 13 This novel (which I discuss in chapter six and 
chapter eight) stems from the solipsism that Chesterton struggled with as a young man. 
Hence, as I hope to demonstrate, it is more accurate to describe the evil within the 
novel as internal rather than external. 
A Biographical Sketch 
Before going on to examine Chesterton's concept of evil, it is useful to recall briefly 
some of the salient details surrounding his life and writings. If nothing else, this will 
have the effect of reminding us that Chesterton personally experienced a degree of 
suffering and evil during his life. (For a more detailed look at Chesterton's life, the 
Gillian Cross, G. K. Chesterton and the Decadents (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Sussex University, 
1973), p. 108. 
13 Ibid., p. 102. 
5 
reader is referred to Chesterton's Autobiography. as well as the many biographies that 
have been written about him. 14) 
Gilbert Keith Chesterton was born in 1874. His childhood was not particularly 
dramatic, although his eight year old sister, Beatrice, died when he was only three years 
old. ' 5 In January 1887, he made the move from Colet Court preparatory school to St 
Paul's public school, where he stayed as a day boarder until 1892. He acquired a 
reputation at school as being something of an oddity, which was partly caused by his 
ungainly appearance. It was some time before Chesterton's potential was recognised. 
and much of his time was spent daydreaming at the back of the class, and doodling in 
his notebooks. He also read widely from his earliest years. While he was at St Pauls, 
Chesterton formed a close friendship with Edmund Clerihew Bentley, and became 
involved with a group of other boys who discussed literature together and called 
themselves the J. D. C. (Junior Debating Club). 
In 1893, Chesterton began to attend the Slade School of Art, which was linked to 
University College London, and registered for courses in Art, Latin, French, and 
English Literature. ' 6 John Coates tells us that: "His time there, the unhappiest and most 
troubled in his life, was of great significance in the development of his thought. A 
number of experiences, both intellectual and emotional convinced him of the reality of 
evil. 5,17 It was an introspective period for Chesterton, during which he wrestled with 
feelings of isolation and solipsism. This was partly explained by the departure of his 
closest friends from St Paul's to Oxford University. Another factor was the 
Impressionism that he encountered at Slade. The significant effect that this had upon 
Chesterton is something that I will examine in more detail in chapter six. By the time 
14 See Maisie Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1944); Dudley Barker, C. K. Chesterton (1974); Alzina 
Stone Dale, The Outline of Sanity: A Life of G. K. Chesterton (1982); Michael Ffinch, C. K. Chesterton: ,4 
Biography (1986); Michael Coren, Gilbert: The Man who was G. K. Chesterton (1989); and Joseph 
Pearce, Wisdom and Innocence: A Life of G. K. Chesterton (1996). 
Chesterton's family struggled to come to terms with their grief. After the death, Chesterton's father 
refused either to look at photographs of his daughter, or to hear her name being spoken. 
1' Amid some confusion among Chesterton's biographers, Denis Conlon has argued that Chesterton 
actually registered for a course as a book illustrator at UCL. See Denis Conlon, "A Book Review of 
Prophet of Orthodoxy", The G. K. Chesterton Quarterly No. 6 (Spring 1998), p. 14. 
17 John Coates, Chesterton and the Edn'ardian Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull University Press, 1984), pp. 5- 
6. 
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that Chesterton left Slade in 1895,18 he had emerged from his dark and morbid period 
with a new sense of hope: 
In truth, the story of what was called my Optimism was rather odd. When I had 
been for some time in these, the darkest depths of the contemporary pessimism. 
I had a strong inward impulse to revolt; to dislodge this incubus or thro\\ off 
this nightmare. But as I was still thinking the thing out by myself. with little 
help from philosophy and no real help from religion, I invented a rudimentary 
and makeshift mystical theory of my own. It was substantially this: that even 
mere existence, reduced to its most primary limits, was extraordinary enough to 
be exciting. 19 
Upon leaving Slade, Chesterton decided to pursue a literary career, and spent the next 
six years in publishing. His first job was at a small publishers called Redways. He soon 
left Redways for Fisher Unwin, where he worked as an illustrator and reader until 
1901. In 1896 he met Frances Blogg, the secretary of a debating club that met in 
Bedford Park, and he subsequently married her in 1901. 
In 1900, Chesterton published two collections of poetry, Greybeards at Play and The 
Wild Knight. In the years that followed, he combined his writing with a career in 
journalism. As we have already noted, Chesterton's output was prolific, and a number 
of his writings might be considered significant. 20 
18 Although Chesterton did not take his degree at UCL, he did complete his course of studies there. Denis 
Conlon notes that this was "common practice except for those destined for Teaching, the Civil Service or 
the Church". Conlon, "A Book Review of Prophet of Orthodoxy", The C. K. Chesterton Quarterly, p. 14. 
19 Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 91 
'0 Listed below are the publications that I consider to be Chesterton's most significant in this context. 
The list also includes certain works that are significant only in terms of my thesis: The Defendant (1901); 
Robert Browning (1903); The Napoleon of Notting Hill (1904); The Club of Queer Trades (1905); 
Heretics (1905); Charles Dickens (1906); "Introduction" to The Book of Job (1907); The Man who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare (1908); Orthodoxy (1908); The Ball and the Cross (1910; but first serialised in 
1905-6); What's Wrong with the World (1910); The Innocence of Father Brown (191 1): The Ballad of 
the White Horse (1911); Manalive (1912); The Victorian Age in Literature (1913); Magic (191-3)). The 
Flying Inn (1914); The Wisdom of Father Brown (1914); The Man who Knew Too Much (1922). - Tales of 
the Long Bow (1925); The Everlasting Man (1925); The Incredulity of' Father Brown (1926): The 
Catholic Church and Conversion (1927); The Return of Don Quixote (1927; but first serialised in 1925- 
6); The Secret of Father Brown (1927); The Poet and the Lunatics (1929); The Thing (1929): Four 
Faultless Felons (1930); St Thomas Aquinas (19) 3); The Scandal of Father Broltn (193 5 ); 
Autobiography (1936); The Paradoxes of Ah- Pond (1937); The Coloured Lands (1938); The Surprise 
(1952). 
7 
Chesterton's fictional output began to tail off after 1914. In many respects, this marked 
a turning point for Chesterton. At the end of 1914 he fell seriously ill and slipped into a 
coma for several months. When he recovered, he took over the editorship of the . \eli' 
Witness (formerly The Eye-Witness) from his brother Cecil, who was fighting in the 
First World War. Cecil's death in 1918 had a devastating effect on Gilbert, who 
subsequently felt obliged to take over the editorship of the New Witness on a permanent 
basis. In 1925, this weekly journal was renamed G. K. 's Weekly. Editing this journal 
required much of Chesterton's time and energy, as well as his financial support. It led 
to a changing emphasis in Chesterton's interests, from the literary, to the socio- 
2 economic and political .1 
Chesterton was finally received into the Catholic Church in 1922. There was a certain 
inevitability about this decision, and it did not involve a significant change in his 
thinking. In many ways, the church into which he was received was not noticeably 
different from the Anglo-Catholic tradition from which he had come. Furthermore, a 
clear statement of Chesterton's Christian belief had been visible back in 1908 when he 
published Orthodoxy. In the introductory chapter he explained: "These essays are 
concerned only to discuss the actual fact that the central Christian theology (sufficiently 
summarized in the Apostles' Creed) is the best root of energy and sound ethics. "22 
While Chesterton's faith can be traced back to an early point in his career, his interest 
in religious matters continued to increase as his life unfolded. Many of the most 
significant books he wrote during his later years were overtly religious, including: The 
Everlasting Man, The Thing, and St Thomas Aquinas. Chesterton died at his home in 
Beaconsfield in 1936. 
2! 1 do not mean to suggest that Chesterton lost interest in literature, but rather that his interest decreased 
as other interests grew. Chesterton wrote a number of works of fiction after 1914, including mans of the 
Father Brown stories. He also published a study of Robert Louis Stevenson in 1927, and a study of 
Chaucer in 1932. 
22 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p. 18. 
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Outline Of The Thesis 
In the chapters that follow, I will look at Chesterton's concept of evil by locating it 
within a specifically theological context. This will involve looking at the work of man)' 
writers with whom Chesterton is not typically associated. For example. in chapters 
seven and eight, I will draw on the work of a number of contemporary philosophers of 
religion who have written on the problem of evil. This is a deliberate attempt on my 
part to try and locate Chesterton within the academic mainstream. It is virtually 
impossible to assess Chesterton's concept of evil if we do not relate it to the extensive 
work that already exists on evil in general 
The large amount of material that could be included in any study of Chesterton and evil 
means that a number of things have to be left out. It is not my intention simply to 
catalogue every example of evil in Chesterton's writings. Such an approach would not 
be the most effective way of understanding Chesterton's thought on the subject. One 
area that I will not cover in detail concerns the evils that Chesterton identified within 
his society. Books such as Heretics (1905) and What's Wrong With the World (1910) 
are particularly concerned with addressing these social and political evils, although 
similar themes recur throughout the rest of Chesterton's work. There are two reasons 
for avoiding this approach. The first is that various books already exist which discuss 
some of the social evils that Chesterton was trying to explore. These include Ian 
Boyd's, The Novels of G. K. Chesterton: A Study in Art and Propaganda (1975) which 
focuses upon Chesterton's socio-economic and political views; and John Coates, 
Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis (1984) which looks at the intellectual 
milieu of the period. The second reason is that the term `evil' is primarily a theological 
concept and can quickly become too broad when interpreted in this manner. 
As the title of this thesis suggests, I plan to examine Chesterton's concept of evil by 
looking at his fiction. This raises a wide range of questions about the relationship 
between religion and literature. I will address some of these in chapter two, where I 
intend to explain my reasons for adopting this methodological approach. 
The concept of evil raises two essential and interrelated questions: What is evil? and 
Why does it occur? Obviously there are a number of other questions that «e might 
9 
consider, but these two seem to cover most of the issues that we might wish to think 
about. Thus chapter three examines the first of these two questions, and explores the 
theological predicament of how evil can be defined and understood. This has been a 
source of constant difficulty for Christian theologians over the years. In responding to 
this question, we can locate Chesterton within a particular theological tradition. 
Chesterton's understanding of the nature of evil raises a further question as to how evil 
should be represented in literary form. This becomes the subject of chapters four. five, 
and six, which look at Chesterton's use of the grotesque as a literary device by which 
evil can be portrayed. 
Although interest in the grotesque has increased in recent years, it remains a 
notoriously difficult subject to define. My own understanding of the grotesque as a 
technique for representing evil, is not the only position that is held. For example, 
Rudolf Matthias Fabritius in his book, Das Komische im Erzählwerk G. K (7hestertons 
(1964), describes Chesterton's use of the comic in terms of the grotesque. There is 
clearly a considerable diversity among critics as to how the grotesque should be 
understood. Therefore, chapter four will begin by surveying the theoretical work on the 
subject, before going on to explore Chesterton's own understanding of it. Chapters five 
and six will then focus on the different ways in which Chesterton used the grotesque to 
represent evil in his fiction. 
In chapter seven I move on to consider the second of our two questions concerning evil: 
Why does it occur? This question is usually described as the problem of evil. The 
problem of evil challenges every religious and philosophical system because of the way 
in which suffering is such an integral part of our human experience. The theologian 
Hans Kung explains: "It is a history in which all identity, significance and value of 
reality and human existence seem to be constantly radically called into question by 
non-identity, pointlessness and worthlessness. "23 Kung goes on to describe the problem 
of evil as, "the rock of atheism. "24 
'' Hans Kung, On Being a Christian, (1974; trans. Edward Quinn, London: Collins, 1978), p. 428. 
24 Ibid., p. 431. 
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Chapter seven will present various forms of the problem of evil, and the use of the Free 
Will Defence as a possible explanation, or `theodicy'. The concept of free ý'v-ill was an 
important one for Chesterton, and I will analyse the way in which he used this idea to 
respond to the problem of evil in his writings. Although the Free Will Defence can be 
used to deal with some forms of the problem of evil, it leaves other questions 
unanswered. Human suffering provides a focal point for many of these question, as can 
be seen in the story of Job. Chapter eight will consider Chesterton's response to human 
suffering, and explore the way in which Chesterton reconciled his belief in the mystery' 
of suffering with his attempts at providing a theodicy. 
By examining Chesterton's response to questions regarding the nature of evil and why 
it occurs, we shall be in a position to understand his concept of evil. I want to suggest 
that this theological context is a necessary foundation for anyone who wishes to make 
sense of his optimistic outlook. His particular philosophy of life must not be seen as an 
attempt to hide from the reality of evil. Instead, having understood the reality of evil, 
Chesterton sought to respond to it by viewing it within the wider theological context of 
existence. This is the subject of my concluding chapter, in which I take a fresh look at 
Chesterton's optimism. My contention is that we can only really appreciate 
Chesterton's optimism when we begin to understand his concept of evil. Chesterton 
suggests as much when he explains: "Perhaps, when I eventually emerged as a sort of 
theorist, and was described as an Optimist, it was because I was one of the few people 
in that world of diabolism who really believed in devils. "25 
I, Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 91. 
Chapter 2: Religion and Literature 
Historically, the relationship between religion and literature has been an uncertain one. 
This can be traced back to the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle concerning the 
function and value of literature. Plato wanted to ban poets from his Republic because of 
their destabilising influence, ' while Aristotle praised poetry for its instructive value. 2 
The ensuing debate has invoked a range of responses from theologians, some of which 
have been hostile: "Much theology, for example, tends towards unity and coherence, a 
systematic exploration of the content of faith which attempts to impose limits on the 
meaning of words, while literature, as Ezra Pound insisted, is often dangerous, 
subversive and chaotic, an anarchic celebration of the creative possibilities of 
language. "3 
Despite the suspicion of many theologians, literature has played a central role in the 
theological tradition: "There is a way to do theology, a way that runs from the gospels 
and Paul through Augustine and Luther to Teilhard and the Berrigans, that one could 
call intermediary or parabolic theology, theology which relies on various literary forms 
- parables, stories, poems, confessions - as a way from religious experience to 
systematic theology. "4 Literary influences on theology can be found as early as 
Augustine, whose autobiographical Confessions owe a great deal to his classical 
upbringing. Since that time, literature has helped to shape a great deal of western 
theology. 5 For example, the popular perception of heaven and hell owes much to 
"So if we are visited in our state by someone who has the skill to transform himself into all sorts of 
characters and represent all sorts of things, and he wants to show off himself and his poems to us, we 
shall treat him with all the reverence due to a priest and giver of rare pleasure, but shall tell him that he 
and his kind have no place in our city... " Plato, The Republic (Trans. Desmond Lee, London: Penguin 
Books, 1987), p. 157. 
2 In part four of the Poetics, Aristotle argues that poetry imitates life, and thus helps people to learn. 
T. R. Wright, Theology and Literature (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 1. 
`' Sallie McFague TeSelle, Speaking in Parables: A Study in Metaphor and Theology (London: SCM 
Press Ltd, 1975), p. 2. 
There are many other examples - aside from the ones that follow - of writers that have contributed to 
theological thought. Some of these are discussed by Colin Manlove in his book, Christian Fantasv: From 
1200 to the Present (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). Of particular interest in relation to 
this thesis, are writers that have discussed the concept of evil in their fiction. Brian Horne looks at a 
number of these in his book, Imagining Evil (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1996). 
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Dante's, The Divine Comedy, while Milton's Paradise Lost has had a similar impact on 
the way in which we understand the Fall. 
The interplay between literature and theology continued during the Romantic period. 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), often described as the father of modern 
theology, can be linked with the English Romantics: "Schleiermacher formulated his 
hermeneutical perspective at the same time that the Romantic movement was 
establishing itself in English literature, and the parallels between the German 
theologian and the English poets are striking. ,6 Among the English Romantics, Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) is particularly important because of the way in which he 
encouraged theologians to acknowledge the role of the imagination as an aid to 
religious truth: "Coleridge was, perhaps, unique in being both a major artist and a 
major religious thinker, and this was for him the shaping tension of his whole career. "7 
Much of the literature of the nineteenth century dealt with religious matters in some 
form or other. 8 Authors such as Alfred Lord Tennyson (1809-1892) and George Eliot 
(1819-1880), expressed the religious doubt and scepticism that emerged in the 
aftermath of German Higher Criticism and Darwinism. Other writers, such as Leo 
Tolstoy (1828-1910) and Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-81), included a great deal of 
theological reflection within their novels. Although many Victorian authors did not 
consider themselves to be religious writers, they were nearly all concerned with 
religion to some degree. Robert Wolff reminds us of the centrality of religion to the 
literature of the period: "Moreover, almost all Victorian novels - even those dealing 
6 Roger Lundin, "Hermeneutics" in Clarence Walhout & Leland Ryken, ed., Contemporary Literary 
Theory: A Christian Appraisal (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1991), p. 154. For a more detailed analysis of the 
connection between Schleiermacher and the English Romantics, see David Jasper, ed., The Interpretation 
of Belief Coleridge, Schleiermacher and Romanticism (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1986). 
7 Stephen Prickelt, Romanticism and Religion: The Tradition of Coleridge and it'ordsworth in the 
l "ictorian Church (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 27. In addition, see J. Robert 
Barth, S. J., "Theological Implications of Coleridge's Theory of Imagination" in Christine Gallant. ed., 
Coleridge's Theory of Imagination Today (New York: AMS Press, 1989). 
x The wide-ranging literary response to religion that characterised the nineteenth century is discussed by 
Elizabeth Jay in her book, Faith and Doubt in Victorian Britain (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
1986). She divides her work into five chapters: 1. The Evangelicals, 2. The Oxford Movement and the 
Catholic Tradition, 3. The Broad Church, 4. Dissent, and 5. Doubt. 
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primarily with far different subjects - touch upon religious matters. "9 In the twentieth 
century, the group of Christian authors known as the Inklings, helped to shape our 
understanding of the way in which myth and allegory relate to the Christian faith. 1° 
In recent years, literary approaches to theology have become increasingly popular with 
the emergence of narrative theology. The origin of narrative theology is usually linked 
to the publication of Hans Frei's, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (1974), although as Brian Horne has 
noted, it is more accurate to say that narrative theology arose out of a common interest 
in the link between theology and literature: "It began to emerge with the publication, 
mainly in the United States of America, of a number of books and articles in the 1970's 
asking similar questions and finding similar answers. "1 I 
In The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hermeneutics, Frei argued that as a result of the Enlightenment, "neither religious 
apologists nor historical critics were finally able to take proper and serious account of 
the narrative feature of the biblical stories. " 12 This was because eighteenth-century 
theology had separated the narrative dimension of Scripture from the question of 
historicity. The Bible was either narrative, or it is was historically accurate, but it could 
not be both: "Frei's thesis is that the realistic and figural interpretations of the biblical 
stories, which at one time had been natural allies, began to break down under the 
`' Robert Lee Wolff, Gains and Losses: Novels of Faith and Doubt in Victorian England (London: John 
Murray Ltd, 1977), p. 3. A good illustration of this can be found in the novels of Charles Dickens. 
Dickens did not write religious novels, but the reader constantly encounters religious themes and 
characters in these novels. See Dennis Walder, Dickens and Religion (London, Allen 
& Unwin, 1981). 
10 The Inklings are the subject of the journal, VII: An Anglo-American Literary Review, which also 
looks 
at some of the other figures typically associated with this group. (The seven people 
looked at by this 
journal are: George MacDonald, G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, 
Charles Williams, 
Dorothy Sayers and Owen Barfield. ) Books dealing with the literary-theological contribution of the 
Inklings include: John Warwick Montgomery, ed., Myth Allegory and Gospel (Minnesota: Bethany 
Fellowship, 1974), and Gunnar Urang, Shadows of Heaven: Religion and Fantasy in the Fiction of 
C. S. 
Lewis, Charles Williams and J. R. R. Tolkien (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1971). 
" Brian Home, "Theology in the Narrative Mode" in Peter Byrne & Leslie Houlden, ed., Companion 
Encyclopedia of Theology (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 965. A number of 
journals have emerged since 
the 1970's which reflect this interest in the relationship between religion and 
literature. These include: 
Christianity and Literature, Literature and Theology, and Religion and 
Literature. 
Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: . -t 
Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centun' 
Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 136. 
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pressures of an increasing preoccupation with questions of historicity. - 13 In the late 
twentieth century, hermeneutics has become increasingly central to both theology and 
literary theory, as both disciplines have struggled to understand the meaning of the text. 
Indeed, as David Jasper points out, "much twentieth-century literary theory seems to 
take its origins from a theological anxiety [dating back to the nineteenth century] ."4 
The current popularity of interdisciplinary approaches to theology and literature does 
not justify the methodology of my thesis in itself. Chesterton wrote a large number of 
non-fictional works, ranging from journalistic articles, to propagandist war tracts. His 
output also included a number of theological works, 15 and this might seem a more 
obvious place to begin my thesis. Yet in spite of the obvious value of such writings for 
understanding Chesterton's concept of evil, I want to suggest that his fiction offers us a 
unique insight into his theology. Stephen Prickett has suggested that George 
MacDonald influenced Chesterton in this respect: "MacDonald, I believe, showed 
Chesterton that imaginative literature need not merely illustrate theological insights, but 
could create new ones. He demonstrated that theology was of its nature a 
fundamentally poetic and mythopoeic activity, and that the growing divorce between 
theology and literature... was, in the long run, as damaging to literature as it was to 
theology. " 16 
In discussing Chesterton's novels, Ian Boyd tells us that, "they are also the products of 
Chesterton's powerful allegorical imagination through which he sought to teach and to 
persuade by means of parable and allegory rather than by discursive reason. "" This 
I' James Fodor, Christian Hermeneutics: Paul Ricoeur and the Refiguring of TheoloD. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 262. 
" David Jasper, The Study of Literature and Religion: An Introduction, 2"d ed. (London: 
The Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1992), p. 2. As I have already pointed out, the theological anxiety of the nineteenth century 
resulted from the intellectual challenge to Christianity that came 
from German Higher Criticism and 
Darwinism. 
1' Chesterton's explicitly theological works include Orthodoxy (1908); The Everlasting 
Man (1925): The 
Catholic Church and Conversion (1927); The Thing (1929): St Thomas Aquinas 
(1933); and The Well 
and the Shallows (1935). 
"' Prickett, Romanticism and Religion, p. 230. The influence of George MacDonald on 
Chesterton is 
examined further by Leo Heltzer in his article, "G. 
K. Chesterton and the Myth-Making Power", l'il: An 
, Anglo-American 
Literary Review Vol. 3 (1982). 
17 Ian Boyd, The Novels of C. K. Chesterton: A Study in Art and Propaganda (London: 
Elek Books 
Limited, 1975), p. xi. 
15 
chapter will explore the way in which Chesterton understood and used fiction, in an 
attempt to elucidate the methodological approach that I am adopting. 
Chesterton's View On The Function Of Literature 
In his first major study on Charles Dickens, Chesterton noted two schools of literary 
thought that had emerged in the aftermath of Dickens. ' 8 The realists insisted that 
literature should be `like life'. In reaction to the realists, there were those who adopted 
symbolism: "Men saw that it was necessary to give a much deeper and more delicate 
meaning to the expression `like life'. Streets are not life, cities and civilizations are not 
life, faces even voices are not life itself. Life is within, and no man hath seen it at any 
time. "' 9 The argument between these two schools was wrapped up in the struggle 
between reason and the imagination that had dominated much of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 20 The rise of the Romantics at the end of the eighteenth century is 
commonly understood as a response to the rationalism of the Enlightenment. This 
subsequently led to the rise of Realism, as Robert Boyer has pointed out: "Realism was 
a radical response, an undisguised reaction, to Romanticism... "21 Dennis Walder tells 
us that realist prose fiction, "may be said to have become the dominant literary form in 
Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century. , 22 In chapter six, I will show how a 
growing discontent with realism was behind the rise of impressionism (and symbolism) 
in the later half of the nineteenth century: "If Romanticism can be seen as a reassertion 
of religious values in reaction to eighteenth-century rationalism, Symbolism could be 
18 G. K. Chesterton, Charles Dickens (1906; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1943), pp. 12 
ý`' Ibid., p. 12. 
20 1 am not suggesting that the ongoing tension between reason and the imagination was identical to the 
one existing between the realists and the symbolists, but there were certain similarities between these 
debates which are interesting to note. 
21 Robert D. Boyer, ed., Realism in European Theatre and Drama 1870-1920: A Bibliography 
(Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. xvii. 
22 Dennis Walder, ed., The Realist Novel (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 4. For an interesting collection of 
essays on nineteenth-century realism, see D. A. Williams, ed., The Monster in the 
Mirror: Studies in 
Nineteenth-Century Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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called a rebellion against the limitations of nineteenth-century positivism and its denial 
of the realm of mystery. 523 
Chesterton was well aware of the oscillating views of literature that preceded his o« n 
period. The debate between realism and romance went back a long way: "I have known 
24 all my life what is called the conflict between romance and realism... ' This is a 
conflict that can be found throughout Chesterton's writing. Ultimately. it is never 
resolved; nor does he try to resolve it. As we move on to consider Chesterton's position 
on this matter, it is helpful to reflect upon his brother's observation that Chesterton 
evades easy categorisation: "But he is a peculiar and rare combination, a Romantic 
Idealist... From this eccentric wedding - of Idealism and Romance, is born the 
"25 Chestertonian novel. 
Chesterton may be difficult to categorise, but it is possible to locate him within the 
wider literary tradition in which Samuel Johnson occupies an exemplary place. 
Chesterton was fascinated by Johnson to whom he often referred. Chesterton even 
wrote a play with him as the central figure - The Judgement of Dr. Johnson (1927). 
Denis Conlon writes: "Chesterton was a great admirer of Dr. Johnson's common sense, 
enjoyed impersonating him in pageants, and had an ambition to wed the republicanism 
of John Wilkes to the religious position of Johnson. It is hardly surprising that, when he 
looked around for a plot for another play, he should choose to undertake such a difficult 
"26 balancing act... 
Johnson argued that literature should not try to imitate life per se, but that it should 
imitate human nature. 27 This perspective challenged the fixed notions of the neo- 
23 Wright, Theology and Literature, p. 149. 
24 G. K. Chesterton, "On the Truth of Legends", All is Grist (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 193 1), p. 150. 
25 Cecil Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton. A Criticism (London: Alston Rivers Ltd, 1908), pp. 198-9. 
2" Denis Conlon, "Chesterton: A Dramatist in Spite of Himself', The Chesterton Review Vol. 3 No. I 
(Fall-Winter, 1976-77), p. 114. In light of Chesterton's interest in Dr. Johnson, it is interesting to read 
L. J. Filewood's article, "An Imaginary Conversation Between Samuel Johnson and Gilbert Chesterton", 
The Chesterton Review Vol. 5 No. I (Fall-Winter, 1978-79). 
27 For a more detailed analysis of Johnson's view on literature and the arts, see Morris R. Bro\\ nell, 
Samuel Johnson's Attitude to the Arts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) & Leopold Damrosch, Jr.. The 
Uses of Johnson's Criticism (Virginia: The University of Virginia Press, 1976). 
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classical critics as to what literature should be, while continuing to accept the realism of 
that tradition. As a result, Johnson is often seen as a transitional link between the 
Augustan age, and the Romantic era that was to follow. He outlined his position in a 
famous essay entitled, "A Preface to Shakespeare": "Shakespeare is above all writers. 
at least above all modern writers, the poet of nature; the poet that holds up to his 
readers a faithful mirror of manners and of life. "28 The same idea is found in The 
History of Rasselas, when Imlac describes the role of the poet: He must write as the 
interpreter of nature, and the legislator of mankind... "29 Underpinning Johnson's view- 
was a belief in human nature, common to all men: "but there is such an uniformity in 
the state of man, considered apart from adventitious and separable decorations and 
disguises, that there is scarce any possibility of good or ill, but is common to human 
kind... We are all prompted by the same motives, all deceived by the same fallacies, all 
animated by hope, obstructed by danger, entangled by desire, and seduced by 
pleasure. , 30 
Chesterton's views on the purpose of literature were similar to Johnson's, despite the 
fact that the latter preceded the Romantics, while the former lived in their aftermath. In 
The Victorian Age in Literature, Chesterton defined the purpose of the novel 
accordingly: "I mean a fictitious narrative (almost invariably, but not necessarily, in 
prose) of which the essential is that the story is not told for the sake of its naked 
pointedness as an anecdote, or for the sake of the irrelevant landscapes and visions that 
can be caught up in it, but for the sake of some study of the difference between human 
beings 
. 
"31 He wanted fiction to represent the essence of man, rather than merely convey 
the details of his surroundings. In The Napoleon of Notting Hill he comments: "... for 
there is one respect in which a town must be more poetical than the country, since it is 
closer to the spirit of man; for London, if it be not one of the masterpieces of man, is at 
28 Samuel Johnson, "Preface to Shakespeare", reprinted in Robert Con Davis & Laurie Finke. ed., 
Literary Criticism and Theory: The Greeks to the Present (New York: Longman, 1989), pp. 407-8. 
29 Samuel Johnson, History of Rasselas (1759; repr. London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 62. 
'0 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler No. 60 (Saturday 13`x' October, 1750; repr. Samuel Johnson, Selected 
t'ritings London: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 169. 
' G. K. Chesterton, The [Victorian Age in Literature (1913; repr. London: Williams & Norgate, 1923 ), p. 
90. 
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least one of his sins. , 32 Chesterton thought that literature had a unique abilit\ to 
represent aspects of human nature, and that this distinguished it from journalism: 
"Journalism only tells us what men are doing; it is fiction that tells us what they are 
thinking, and still more what they are feeling. , 33 
Samuel Johnson had shown that Shakespeare could imitate life without keeping to the 
rules of classical realism. In the same way, Chesterton argued that literature could 
represent the essence of life without following the rules of nineteenth-century realism. 
He explained that art was not an exact copy of the world in which we live: "Art is a 
mirror not because it is the same as the object, but because it is different. A mirror 
selects as much as art selects; it gives the light of flames, but not their heat; the colour 
of flowers, but not their fragrance; the faces of women, but not their voices; the 
proportions of stockbrokers, but not their solidity. A mirror is a vision of things, not a 
working model of them. , 34 Chesterton recognised that any attempt at literal realism was 
ultimately flawed because of the inability of fiction to capture the level of detail found 
in life. Lynette Hunter states that: "Chesterton bewails the fact that the novelist 
believed that realism was showing things `as they are', or reproducing. The critic's 
[Chesterton's] own view was that a communication of essence was as fully real as the 
artists could be... "35 Elsewhere, Chesterton explained: "Shakespeare's famous phrase 
that art should hold the mirror up to nature is always taken as wholly realistic: but it is 
"36 really idealistic and symbolic.. 
Although Chesterton embraced Johnson's view of imitation, he combined it with a 
romantic streak that is not found in Johnson. Johnson was nervous of the romantics of 
his own and earlier ages, as can be seen in the following complaint: "Why this wild 
3- G. K. Chesterton, The Napoleon of Notting Hill (1904; repr. London: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 66. 
G. K. Chesterton, "The Independence of Women", The Illustrated London News (1923; repr. Collected 
Works Volume 33: The Illustrated London News 1923-1925, San Francisco: The Ignatius Press, 1990). p. 
88. 
'` G. K. Chesterton, "History and the Theatre". The Illustrated London News (1910; repr. Collected 
Works Volume 28: The Illustrated London News 1908-1910, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), p. 603. 
Lynette Hunter, G. K. Chesterton: Explorations in Allegory (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979), 
p. 50. 
36 Chesterton, "History and the Theatre". The Illustrated London News (1910; repr. G. K. Chesterton: The 
Collected Words Vol. 28). pp. 602-3. 
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strain of imagination found reception so long, in polite and learned ages, it is not easy 
to conceive... "37 Chesterton did not share Johnson's inhibitions regarding a 'romantic' 
free use of the imagination. Instead, he cultivated his imagination and sought to live life 
as a romantic adventure. This is illustrated by Chesterton's decision to stop on the way 
from his wedding to his honeymoon to buy a revolver and some cartridges. He 
explained: "They seemed to me the most natural things in the world. I did not buy the 
pistol to murder myself or my wife ... 
I bought it because it was the great adventure of 
my youth, with a general notion of protecting her from the pirates doubtless infesting 
the Norfolk Broads, to which we were bound... "38 A further illustration is offered by 
the sword-stick that he carried with him at all times: "An essential part of Gilbert's 
dress was the ubiquitous sword-stick. The sword, the walking stick and the cane were 
to arise time and again in his writing, a symbol of romantic chivalry and pure 
indications of noble gestures ... 
The stick which he carried in his early twenties was a 
rapier inside an elegant and sturdy outer cane. "39 Commenting on Chesterton's 
romantic traits, his brother Cecil wrote: "Romanticism is in Mr Chesterton's bones. It 
leads him not only to worship the good romantic writers - Scott and Dumas and 
Stevenson - but to devour even bad romantic writers, if no others are available . 
"4o 
It is interesting to consider the allegorical dimension of Chesterton's fiction in 
conjunction with his mimetic views; the power of art to mirror nature. 41 Although 
Chesterton is not a realist in the nineteenth-century tradition, some of his critics are 
equally mistaken in their suggestion that his allegory hints at a Platonic ideal. Ian Boyd 
is guilty of this when he writes: "What Chesterton meant by allegory is never clearly 
37 Samuel Johnson, The Rambler No. 4 (Saturday, 31st March, 1750; repr. Victor Sage, ed., The Gothick 
Novel: A Casebook London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990), p. 31. However, Victor Sage has pointed 
out that despite the distrust of romanticism in Johnson's criticism, there is evidence to suggest that 
Johnson had a weakness for romances. See Sage's "Introduction" in The Gothick Novel: A Casebook, p. 
10. 
38 G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 33. 
39 Michael Coren, Gilbert: The Man who was G. K. Chesterton (London: Jonathan Cape, 1989), p. 72. 
40 Cecil Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton: A Criticism, p. 207. Further evidence of Chesterton's romanticism 
can be found in G. M. Brown, G. K. Chesterton: an argument for his status as a serious creative urfiter in 
the mainstream of English Romanticism with a discussion of his possible influence on the novelist and 
poet Charles Williams (Unpublished MPhil Thesis, Council for National Academic Awards, 1983) & 
William L. Isley, The Adventure of Life: Romance in the Writing of G. K. Chesterton (Unpublished PhD 
Thesis: Drew University, 1986). 
"I use the word allegorical here in its broadest sense. 
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expressed in his writing, but there is some evidence that he associated it with an almost 
platonic view of life. "42 Chesterton's allegory is not to be confused with a platonic view 
of life, which would assert the ultimate reality of a non-material world. It is associated 
with this world, which he thought provided art with all the inspiration it needed. 
According to Chesterton, nineteenth-century realism failed because life was too rich to 
be fully captured by art; not because it was not rich enough. Admittedly, Chesterton 
often challenged his readers to look beyond the material aspects of this world, but he 
was not referring to a different world when he did so: "Art indeed copies life in not 
copying life, for life copies nothing. "43 The allegory that permeates Chesterton's fiction 
is firmly rooted in the reality of this life. Hence Chesterton's observation of Adam 
Wayne in The Napoleon of Notting Hill: "This one poor rhymester, having burnt his 
own rhymes, began to live that life of open air and acted poetry of which all the poets 
of the earth have dreamed in vain; the life for which the Iliad is only a cheap 
substitute. "44 The same belief underlies Chesterton's praise of the fairy tales written by 
Hans Christian Anderson: "Instead of teaching a child to look for magic only in 
imagined worlds with the assistance of charmed swords and fairy godmothers, he put it 
into the doll's house and toy box... "4s 
The way in which Chesterton rediscovered the wonder of existence is a theme that 
recurs throughout my thesis, and one that I will focus upon in the concluding chapter. It 
explains many of the details that we find in Chesterton's fiction. Chesterton is often at 
his most imaginative when he is describing (and exaggerating) something factual. The 
spaceship in The Ball and the Cross is a prime example. It appears to show Chesterton 
at his most fanciful, leading Ian Boyd to offer it as proof against his real iSM. 46 
However, it is not as fanciful as it first appears. It is almost certainly based on various 
craft that the army balloon squadron experimented with at the time. They regularly flew 
them over St Paul's Cathedral, which was visible from Chesterton's office at Fisher 
42 Ian Boyd, "Philosophy in Fiction", in John Sullivan, ed., G. K. Chesterton: A Centenary Appraisal 
(London: Paul Elek Books, 1974), pp. 46-7. 
4' Chesterton, Charles Dickens, p. 12. 
44 Chesterton, The Napoleon of Notting Hill, p. 70. 
's From an early fragment by Chesterton quoted in Maisie Ward's introduction to G. K. Chesterton. The 
Coloured Lands (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938), p. 10. 
" See Boyd, The Novels of G. K. Chesterton, p. 21. 
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Unwin and later at the Daily News and the Illustrated London News. Other examples of 
realism can be found throughout the topography of Chesterton's fiction, which mirrors 
places with which Chesterton was familiar. 47 
Chesterton & The Moral Dimension Of Literature 
Chesterton's similarity to Samuel Johnson raises the question of the relation between 
literature and morality. Johnson insisted that literature had a moral purpose. His 
fictional character, Imlac, explained: "To a poet nothing can be useless. Whatever is 
beautiful, and whatever is dreadful, must be familiar to his imagination... for every idea 
is useful for the enforcement or decoration of moral or religious truth... "48 Johnson did 
not see morality as a by-product of literature; he thought that it was its primary 
consideration. He believed that writers had a responsibility to write moral fiction, even 
if realism was sacrificed in the process: 
It is justly considered as the greatest excellency of art, to imitate nature; but it is 
necessary to distinguish those parts of nature, which are most proper for 
imitation... 
... It 
is therefore not a sufficient vindication of a character, that it is drawn as it 
appears; for many characters ought never to be drawn ... 
49 
Although Chesterton wanted to emphasise the moral dimension of literature, he did not 
entirely agree with the conclusion that Johnson reached. Chesterton wrote: "Little 
children ought to learn nothing but legends; they are the beginnings of all sound morals 
and manners. I would not be severe on the point: I would not exclude a story solely 
because it was true. But the essential on which I should insist would be, not that the tale 
must be true, but that the tale must be fine. , 50 Chesterton offers a refinement of 
Johnson's views on this subject. For example, Chesterton's attack on the pessimism of 
'" I am indebted to Denis Conlon for pointing out these examples to me. 
48 Johnson, History of Rasselas, p. 61. 
41' Samuel Johnson, The Rambler No. 4 (Saturday 31 S` March, 1750; repr. in Johnson, Selected Writings), 
p. 151. 
50 G. K. Chesterton, "History and Inspiration", The Illustrated London News (1910; repr. Collected {Works 
Vol. 28), p. 611. 
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contemporary writers is not an absolute statement on the moral necessity of optimistic 
fiction. Chesterton was simply addressing a mood that he perceived within literature as 
a whole: 
There is no reason, within reason, why literature should not describe the 
demonic as well as the divine aspect of mystery or myth. What is really 
remarkable is that in modern fiction, in an age accused of frivolity, in an age 
perhaps only too headlong in its pursuit of happiness, or at least of hedonism, 
the only popular sort of fantasy is the unhappy fantasy.. . on the whole, when the 
serious modem novel has dealt with the serious preternatural agency, it has not 
only been serious but sad. 51 
The optimism within Chesterton's own fiction is not necessarily provided at the 
expense of realism. He did not feel bound by Johnson's rigid concept of morality, and 
sought instead to write fiction that was fundamentally honest in its portrayal of life: 
"Telling the truth about the terrible struggle of the human soul is surely a very 
elementary part of the ethics of honesty. If the characters are not wicked, the book is. '"'2 
While Chesterton's morality was not as rigid as Johnson's, it was still central to his 
understanding of literature: "... I think there is in all literature a sort of purpose; quite 
different from the mere moralizing that is generally meant by a novel with a purpose. 3 
This statement was directed at the legacy of the aesthetes, who thought that art and 
literature were free from all moral considerations. 54 The aesthetes argued that art could, 
and should, be enjoyed for its own sake. Oscar Wilde articulated this in his preface to 
The Picture of Dorian Gray (l. 891): "There is no such thing as a moral or an immoral 
book. Books are well written, or badly written. That is all. " He went on to conclude 
that: "All art is quite useless. "5' Chesterton rejected Wilde's belief that art and morality 
S1 G. K. Chesterton, "Magic and Fantasy in Fiction", Sidelights on New London and Newer York 
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1932), pp. 230-1. In chapter six, I discuss Chesterton's understanding of 
`modern fiction', and Modernism in general. 
52 G. K. Chesterton, "Tom Jones and Morality", All Things Considered (1908; repr. London: Methuen & 
Co Ltd, 1937), p. 266. 
S' G. K. Chesterton, "On Philosophy versus Fiction", All is Grist, p. 82. 
5' For a more detailed look at the role of the Aesthetes in the rise of Modernism, along with Chesterton's 
response to Oscar Wilde, see chapter six. 
', Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891; repr. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Classics, 1992). pp. 
5-6. 
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could be separated in this way. In an essay on Oscar Wilde, he dismissed VN'ilde's 
claims: "He sometimes pretended that art was more important than morality, but that 
was mere play-acting. Morality or immorality was more important than art to him and 
everyone else. "56 In Heretics, Chesterton declared that the main tenet of aestheticism 
was flawed, and that this could be seen in its pragmatic failure: 
In the fin de siecle atmosphere every one was crying out that literature should be free from all causes and all ethical creeds. Art was to produce only exquisite 
workmanship, and it was especially the note of those days to demand brilliant 
plays and brilliant short stories. And when they got them, they got them from a 
couple of moralists. The best short stories were written by a man trying to 
preach Imperialism. The best plays were written by a man trying to preach 
Socialism. All the art of all the artists looked tiny and tedious beside the art 
which was a by-product of propaganda. 57 
Chesterton declared that all great literature denied the principle of art for art's sake: 
``Every great literature has always been allegorical - allegorical of some view of the 
whole universe. The Iliad is only great because all life is a battle, the Odyssey because 
all life is a journey, the Book of Job because all life is a riddle. "58 The view of life 
expressed in these books is what made them so successful. It was a view of life that 
their authors could not help expressing. Chesterton explained that every writer had a 
view of the world, a Weltanschauung, which came out in their fiction: "We have a 
general view of existence, whether we like it or not; it alters, or, to speak more 
accurately, it creates and involves everything we say or do, whether we like it or not. -9 
Chesterton used this argument to defend the religious propaganda that critics found in 
his own fiction: "Personally, I am all for propaganda; and a great deal of what I write is 
deliberately propagandist. But even when it is not in the least propagandist, it will 
probably be full of the implications of my own religion; because that is what is meant 
by having a religion. "60 It is interesting to consider George Orwell's attack on 
56 G. K. Chesterton, "Oscar Wilde", A Handful of Authors: Essays on Books and Writers (London: Sheed 
& Ward, 1953), p. 143. 
5' G. K. Chesterton, Heretics (1905; repr. London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1928), pp. 290-1. 
G. K. Chesterton, The Defendant (1901; repr. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1918), p. 68. 
Chesterton, Heretics, p. 303. 
60 G. K. Chesterton, The Thing (1929; repr. London: Unicorn Books, 1939), p. 1133. 
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Chesterton in light of this. Orwell complained that: "Chesterton was a writer of 
considerable talent who chose to suppress his sensibilities and his intellectual honesty 
in the cause of Roman Catholic propaganda... Every book that he wrote, every 
paragraph, every sentence, had to demonstrate beyond possibility of mistake the 
superiority of the Catholic over the Protestant or the pagan. , 61 We have already seen 
how Chesterton tried to put intellectual honesty before moral or didactic considerations. 
We might also note that Orwell is equally guilty of writing books that are overtly 
propagandist (e. g. Animal Farm). Yet Chesterton's argument goes further. Even if 
Orwell had not consciously tried to be propagandist in his fiction, he would have been 
unable to avoid expressing certain aspects of his Weltanschauung. Every piece of 
fiction informs us to some extent about the views and beliefs of its author. 
The Effect Of Chesterton's Propaganda On His Fiction 
Those who are suspicious of propaganda in literature have often seen in Chesterton the 
most blatant example of the propagandist. Chesterton was the first to admit that much 
of what he wrote was `deliberately propagandist'. Cecil Chesterton voiced the concern 
of a number of critics when he suggested that this intentional use of propaganda tended 
to overshadow Chesterton's art: "His own art is certainly a by-product of 
propaganda. , 62 Elsewhere, Cecil noted that: "... Mr Chesterton's artistic talents are 
simply the weapons that he uses in his war against his controversial enemies. -63 This 
point is confirmed by Kingsley Amis: "The Polemicist, thickly or thinly disguised. 
"64 turns up virtually everywhere in Chesterton's fiction.. 
In his Autobiography, Chesterton acknowledged the problems raised by his didactic 
style: "In short, I could not be a novelist; because I really like to see ideas or notions 
6' George Orwell, "Great is Diana of the Ephesians" (Repr. In D. J. Conlon, ed., G. K. Chesterton:. 4 Half 
Century of Views, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 102. 
62 Cecil Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton: A Criticism, p. 223. 
6, Ibid., p. xii. 
64 Kingsley Amis, "Four Fluent Fellows" in Sullivan, ed., G. K. Chesterton: A Centenary Appraisal. p. 
29. Along similar lines is Rev William T. Scott's observation concerning Chesterton: He is first and 
foremost a propagandist. " in Chesterton and other Essays (Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham, 1912). p. 17. 
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wrestling naked, as it were, and not dressed up in a masquerade as men and women. --6, 
Chesterton's statement needs a word of qualification at this point. Chesterton is 
obviously exaggerating, otherwise he would not have wasted his time writing fiction. 
Moreover, in the context of this part of his Autobiography, Chesterton assumes a 
distinction between the novel and the short story. Much of his fiction is in the form of 
the short story - even his novels might be thus described when compared to the 
Victorian novels that preceded him. Although Chesterton believed that propaganda was 
a valid component of fiction, he was also aware of the distinction between literature 
and philosophy: "A good novelist always has a philosophy; but a good novel is never a 
book of philosophy. , 66 
Chesterton used two particular techniques to express his propaganda. The first of these 
was narrative or dialogue, in which the author openly uses the movement of the story or 
the words of a character to voice his own opinion. This technique occurs throughout his 
fiction in various forms, from the poems that rail against prohibition in The Flying Inn, 
to the sermons that are such an integral part of the Father Brown stories. The explicit 
nature of this technique means we need not explore it in any further detail. The second, 
and much more complex, technique that Chesterton used was symbolism. 67 
Discussing Chesterton's use of allegory and its related forms, Lynette Hunter suggests 
that Chesterton's use of symbolism was inhibited by his fear of its potential 
subjectivity. She writes: "This type of style is one that becomes important to Chesterton 
when he recognises the need for fusing essence with appearance. It even becomes 
synonymous in his vocabulary for `poetry'. However it is limited by its ever-present 
65 Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 298. 
66 Chesterton, "Vanity Fair", A Handful ofAuthors, p. 61. 
6 Chesterton's use of symbolism does not necessarily make him part of the symbolist school that arose 
in the late-nineteenth / early-twentieth century, although he was undoubtedly influenced by this school. I 
am simply concerned with the fact that symbols are prevalent throughout Chesterton's writings. and also 
with the fact that his worldview was quite symbolic. M. H. Abrams tells us that, "the term symbol is 
applied only to a word or phrase that signifies an object or event which in turn signifies something. or 
has a range of reference, beyond itself. " In M. H. Abrams, . -1 
Glossary of Literary Terms, 5`" ed. (Florida: 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Inc., 1988), p. 184. 
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potential for becoming purely associative, random and arbitrary . 68 Although 
Chesterton was aware of the subjective use of symbols by many of his contemporaries. 
he believed that symbols could be used in an objective manner. In an article entitled 
"Symbolism without Meaning", Chesterton attacked the increasingly subjective use of 
symbolism by his contemporaries: "This, however, is the standing peculiarity of the 
symbolism of our time. Allegory is now to be used actually to hide the truth which it is 
supposed to make clear. , 69 It is a mistake to suggest that Chesterton deliberately 
limited his use of symbols because of their potential danger. It is more accurate to say 
that he wanted to use them within a framework through which they could be properly 
understood. Ultimately, Christianity allowed him to do this. The ability of the Christian 
faith to provide a complete explanation for the universe was something that attracted 
Chesterton to it. Colin Manlove has commented on the reasoning behind this: The 
disappearance early in the seventeenth century of the Christian symbolist picture of the 
universe, wherein each item in creation could be seen as distinct with conferred 
meaning, led to a divorce between the perceptions of objects and of concepts by the 
human mind. "70 In contrast to the modem era, the medieval period was full of Christian 
symbolism, and this was one of the reasons behind Chesterton's fascination with it. 
7 
Various kinds of symbolic devices can be traced throughout Chesterton's work, 
especially in his fiction. A visual type can be seen to occur in The Napoleon of Notting 
Hill. Auberon Quin decrees that the regions of London are to become small 
independent nations, represented by their own national colours. Auberon's inspiration 
for this comes from the ex-President of Nicaragua: "Can you not understand the ancient 
sanctity of colours? The Church has her symbolic colours. And think of what colours 
68 Hunter, C. K. Chesterton: Explorations in Allegory, p. 14. In her book, Hunter distinguishes between a 
number of related literary devices in Chesterton's work, including allegory, metaphor, analogy, emblem, 
symbol and parable. While Hunter's analysis is interesting and 
incisive, I am not convinced that 
Chesterton would have made such detailed distinctions. He consistently failed to show that 
level of detail 
in any of his other ideas. 
G. K. Chesterton, "Symbolism without Meaning", The Illustrated London News (1907; repr. Collected 
Works ['olume 27. The Illustrated London News 1905-1907, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), p. 475. 
70 Colin Manlove, Literature and Reality: 1600-1800 (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1978), p. 
210. 
Chesterton's love of the medieval period permeates much of his writings, and is particularly explicit 
in 
The Return of Don Quixote (1927). This is a subject that I will return to briefly 
in chapter five. 
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mean to us - think of the position of one like myself, who can see nothing but those 
two colours, nothing but the red and the yellow. , 72 
Many of Chesterton's fictional characters also operate as symbols. His use of 
personality types can be seen in The Napoleon of. Notting Hill, where we encounter the 
fanatic (Adam Wayne) and the humorist (Auberon Quin). Chesterton explained this 
technique in his Autobiography: 
When a writer invents a character for the purposes of fiction, especially of light 
or fanciful fiction, he fits him out with all sorts of features meant to be effective 
in that setting and against that background. He may have taken, and probably 
has taken, a hint from a human being. But he will not hesitate to alter the human 
being, especially in externals, because he is not thinking of a portrait but of a 
picture. 73 
As we noted earlier in this chapter, Chesterton tried to imitate the essence of reality 
rather than its details, and this explains the symbolism that we find in his fiction. Ian 
Boyd describes the effect this has on Chesterton's characters: "Chesterton's 
characterization is in terms of the typical rather than the individual, so that what one 
encounters in his fiction is not a series of fully rounded characters, but a series of 
political and social types. The importance of each character is in what he represents and 
in what he tells one about a particular Chestertonian point of view rather than in what 
he is. "74 Boyd illustrates his point with an example from The Napoleon of Notting Hill. 
He suggests that the character `Buck' represents Chesterton's view of the quintessential 
businessman. 
The symbolic use of characters is something that Chesterton saw and admired in 
Dickens. Garry Wills tells us that: "Chesterton knew from the first that Dickens' 
greatness lay in his subtle use of symbol. "75 Chesterton was aware that Dickens" 
72 Chesterton, Napoleon of Notting Hill, p. 23. (The heraldry in this novel is a further link to the medieval 
period. ) Chesterton's fascination with colours, and the colour red in particular, is discussed by Kevin 
Morris in his article, "Chesterton Sees Red: The Metaphysics of a Colour", The Chesterton Review Vol. 
21 No. 4 (November 1995). This is a theme that I will return to in the concluding chapter. 
,' Chesterton, Autobiographv, pp. 333-4. 
" Boyd, The Novels of G. K. Chesterton, p. 11. 
75 Garry Wills, Chesterton: Afan and Mask (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), p. 68. 
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symbolism was not always intentional, but he thought that it flowed from an acute 
perception of life and humanity. Introducing Great Expectations, Chesterton wrote: "A 
great man of letters or any great artist is symbolic without knowing it. The things he 
describes are types because they are truths. Shakespeare may, or may not, have ever put 
it to himself that Richard the Second was a philosophical symbol; but all good criticism 
must necessarily see him so. "76 Chesterton liked the symbolism he found in Dickens' 
characters because he thought that it represented the essence of certain personality 
types: "Chesterton attributes the brilliance of the characterisations to an ability to find 
the vast yet unchanging essence of a person; and then create the physical limits of a 
human being around it. "77 
Chesterton probably took some of the inspiration for his fiction from Dickens' use of 
character. This is alluded to by Lynette Hunter when she discusses the `fundamental 
stylistic elements' that they had in common: "They both produced caricatures of 
people; they both had the journalistic habit of writing to a set length that creates pulses 
of movement through a book; and most of all they both used exaggeration in an original 
and creative manner. "78 In spite of these similarities, Dickens is normally regarded as 
the better writer. Dickens' caricatures are usually seen as a virtue, whereas Chesterton's 
are seen as a fault. Discussing this fault, Chesterton's own brother explained: "Indeed, 
his judgement is often warped by his tendency to see only ideas when others see only 
persons. , 79 This raises an interesting point. Dickens' characters are highly symbolic, 
but they are more than just symbols. Chesterton's characters are also symbolic, but they 
generally lack depth; both of psychological observation and social interaction. This is 
because Chesterton's emphasis on ideas and propaganda were usually at the expense of 
76 Chesterton, "On Great Expectations" in Appreciations and Criticisms of the Works of Charles Dickens 
(1911; repr. as Chesterton on Dickens, London: Everyman, 1992), p. 204. 
" Hunter, G. K. Chesterton: Explorations in Allegory, p. 49. 
78 Ibid., p. 49. A considerable amount of work exists on the connection between Chesterton and Dickens. 
For a more detailed discussion see Peter Rae Hunt, Chesterton and Dickens (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis: 
Dalhousie University, 1980); and the special edition of The Chesterton Review which looks at Charles 
Dickens (Vol. 11 No. 4- November 1985). 
79 Cecil Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton:: Criticism, pp. 197-8. 
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his art: "... Chesterton was always far less interested in the artistic execution of his 
creative writings than he was in the ideas he wished those writings to convey.... 180 
In View Of His Limitations As A Writer, Why Did Chesterton Write Fiction? 
In his book, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis (1984), John Coates 
explores the way in which Chesterton responded to contemporary thought. We find 
Chesterton arguing with his contemporaries at every turn. In view of this, it might not 
be surprising that Chesterton used fiction as a medium for expressing his ideas. But 
why did Chesterton not stick to other genres when he was so aware of his own 
limitations as a fictional writer? Part of the answer to this was his belief that fiction had 
become the most important medium in his age: "Fiction is the primary and central 
product, the primary and central power of his age. It is our peculiar discovery and our 
peculiar atmosphere. We think and move in it. It is not merely that more silly people 
read fiction than anything else; it is also that more clever people write fiction than write 
anything else. "8' 
One of the attractions of fiction is its ability to translate ideas for a wide audience by 
using metaphor. Metaphors can be used in any type of writing, but they are most 
closely related to fiction (or poetry), where they are a primary means of 
communication. In his discussion of the function of metaphor and analogy, Richard 
Swinburne comments that: "Even if the writer is trying to convey a belief, the way he 
does it, the style of his writing, may be at least of equal importance to him... the use of 
metaphor may enable the speaker to get his message home to the hearer, who might pay 
80 Patrick Keats, C. K. Chesterton and the Victorians: Dialogue, Dialectic and Synthesis (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis: The Catholic University of America, 1994), p. 283. The relative superficiality of 
Chesterton's use of character limited his ability to portray suffering in his fiction. This is something that I 
will return to in the final chapter. 
81 G. K. Chesterton, "Chesterton on Meredith", The Book Lover (1st May, 1905), p. 52. A similar 
sentiment is expressed in Chesterton's dictum: "Literature is a luxury; fiction is a necessity. " Chesterton. 
The Defendant, p. 21. 
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no attention to some dry sentence containing words used in literal senses. "'' There are 
two ways in which metaphor can translate truth for a wide audience: it can dramatise 
truth and it can simplify truth. 83 The ability to dramatise truth is pointed out by Sally 
McFague TeSelle: "A metaphor is a word used in an unfamiliar context to give its a 
new insight; a good metaphor moves us to see our ordinary world in an extraordinary 
way. "84 Metaphor can also be used to simplify truth. This does not mean that metaphor 
is necessarily reductive, but it can often convey ideas in terms that are more easily 
understood. Chesterton understood this distinction: "Briefly, I have always meant by 
romance something that may be stated thus. The belief that the simplified and symbolic 
version of life, which depicts it, under the image of love and war, as a quest with a 
prize (especially a princess), is nevertheless a true version of life; that is an 
enlightening symbol and a legitimate simplification. , 85 
Throughout history, people have argued that in the act of translating truth, metaphor 
inevitably distorts truth. This is the accusation that John Bunyan encountered w" hen 
writing Pilgrim's Progress - that "metaphors make us blind". 
86 It is also an accusation 
that Plato makes in The Republic, when he tells us that: "The art of representation is 
therefore a long way removed from truth... 87 Colin Manlove makes it clear that these 
accusations are part of a long tradition of suspicion towards metaphor. He writes: 
"There has in history been a strong vein of belief, Platonic and later Puritan, that 
literature is lies; and, since lying is the distinctive ability of the devil, the making of any 
Christian stories but the biblically authorised ones could constitute a wandering from 
the true spiritual path. "88 According to Manlove, the Christian writers that have used 
metaphor were painfully aware of the danger of distorting truth: "They know the 
82 Richard Swinburne, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 49. (I 
have amended one word in the quotation to correct an apparent typographical error. The original 
quotation reads "... message home to the speaker... " rather than, "... message home to the hearer... ") 
83 Metaphors can also distort truth, which is something that I look at later in this chapter. 
84 TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 4. (The same is true of the grotesque, which I will look at in chapter 
four. ) 
85 G. K. Chesterton, "Our Notebook", The Illustrated London News (18`x' April, 1931), p. 628. 
x`' John Bunyan, Pilgrim 's Progress (1678; repr. London: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 46. 
87 Plato, The Republic. p. 426. 
88 Colin Manlove, Christian Fantasy: From 1200 to the Present (Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1992), p. 8. 
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dangers of invention: they know that new images may divert the mind from the truth 
contained in them. But they believe also that through such new images the faith can be 
revitalised... "89 Chesterton was certainly aware of this predicament. Although he often 
used metaphor, he recognised that it had the ability to distort truth. In one article on the 
subject, he wrote: "Reading those words, I never thought of a metaphor being 
dangerous because it might turn out (in a verbal sense) a bad metaphor. I thought of 
metaphor being dangerous because it was good metaphor. I thought of metaphor 
sophisticating morals and confounding philosophy from the beginning of the world. "` 0 
As Chesterton recognised, metaphor has the potential to distort truth. Yet this does not 
mean that it necessarily distorts truth. This distinction is a vital one if we are to defend 
the ability of metaphor to truthfully convey an idea. Many analytical philosophers have 
suggested that metaphors cannot convey truth as effectively as propositional sentences. 
In response to this, Richard Swinburne provides us with a helpful observation: 
"However, all sentences have border areas for their truth... Metaphorical sentences 
simply have wider border areas than most other sentences... "91 Propositional 
statements are not entirely accurate in the truth they communicate because no language 
is completely precise. Thus metaphor should be seen as a legitimate means of 
communication. 92 Long before the twentieth century's preoccupation with the 
philosophy of language, 93 St Thomas Aquinas saw that the problems involved in using 
language to talk about God required a solution that involved both propositional and 
metaphoric language: "The recognition of the role of the imagination in theology was 
not, however, confined to the Romantics. Aquinas, as we shall see, stressed the 
89 Ibid., p. 9. 
90 G. K. Chesterton, "The Danger of Metaphor", The Illustrated London News (1906; repr. Collected 
Works Vol. 27), p. 128. 
91 Swinburne, Revelation, p. 46. 
92 Some philosophers have argued that the lack of clarity within language means that ýýe cannot talk 
meaningfully about anything at all. However, any argument for this involves an inherent contradiction, 
because the author is using language in a meaningful sense to tell us that language is meaningless. In 
view of this, it seems reasonable to assume that language is meaningful, at least in some sense. 
9' Much of the recent work in the philosophy of religion concerns the use of language to talk about God. 
Philosophers such as Kai Nielsen and Anthony Flew have argued that the term God is linguistically 
meaningless. 
3? 
importance of analogy in the theological enterprise... "94 Aquinas argued that metaphor 
was an important tool in language: "But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as 
both necessary and useful. " 95 
Literature And Metaphor - More Than Translated Truth 
So far I have argued that Chesterton used metaphor to translate ideas into simpler, more 
dramatic terms, and that this did not necessarily distort the ideas he was 
communicating. Yet this is only a partial answer to my original question regarding 
Chesterton's use of fiction. To understand Chesterton's use of metaphor properly, we 
need to begin by looking more closely at the word `metaphor'. 
In her book, Metaphor and Religious Language, Janet Martin Soskice tells us that, "a 
metaphor is established as soon as it is clear that one thing is being spoken of in terms 
that are suggestive of another and can be extended until this is no longer the case. "996 
Although Soskice believes that a metaphor suggests something else, she is quick to 
point out that it is not a substitution for that other thing. Soskice rejects all substitution 
theories of metaphor as inadequate. If a metaphor is purely a substitution for another 
word, then why not just use that other word? A metaphor might offer an interesting 
alternative, but it quickly becomes superfluous in philosophical terms: "Even then, the 
use of the metaphorical substitute for plain talk might be just as likely, as Locke says, 
to confuse as to enlighten. The assumed ready availability of a literal substitute makes 
the value of metaphor, especially for the purpose of philosophical and scientific 
reasoning, negligible. , 97 Metaphors are not substitute words, because they allude to a 
number of different things. When the Psalms talk about God as a `rock', they 
do not 
9' Wright, Theology and Literature, p. 8. For a clear and concise explanation of 
Aquinas' doctrine of 
analogy, see Brian Davies, "Chapter 4: Talking About God", The Thought of 
Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1992). 
9' Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 1, Article 9, Reply Objection 1, (Vol. 1, Trans. 
English Dominican Fathers, London: Burns & Oates, 1947), p. 6. The way in which Chesterton relates to 
the Thomistic tradition is something that I will look at in the next chapter. 
9G Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 23. 
Ibid., p. 25. 
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simply mean that God is big, or that God is solid, or that God is strong. The metaphor 
of a `rock' conjures up all of these images, and more: that is why it is so powerful. 
Hence Chesterton's declaration that: "Men tell more truth by their metaphors than by 
their statements. 998 
I 
As an extended metaphor, 99 a story has the ability to convey a number of different ideas 
and images, that could not otherwise be conveyed: "The condensation of the meaning 
of the metaphor into concept catches a part, but not all, of the metaphor. The metaphor 
speaks to us on a deeper level. "100 Chesterton explained that the metaphor was central 
to literature because of its ability to hold a number of different images together: The 
metaphor, the symbol, the picture, has appeared to most critics to be a mere ornament, a 
piece of moulding above the gateway; but it is actually the keystone of the arch. "' 01 Ian 
Boyd suggests that this is why Chesterton was attracted to fiction: "... the allegory is 
never a mere translation of a discursive argument into symbolic terms. There is a sense 
in which the meaning does not exist apart from the allegory which reveals it. This may 
be why Chesterton speaks of the artistic mind that `sees things as they are in a 
picture' .. ), 
102 The ability of metaphor to capture the fullness of life is conveyed by 
Chesterton in one of his Father Brown stories, when Father Brown explains why he 
likes the puppet show so much: "For one reason... Because it contains the secret of this 
tragedy. "' 03 
The symbolism that we have already observed in Chesterton's fiction works in a similar 
way to metaphor. 104 Its power is derived from its ability to communicate an array of 
different images simultaneously. Most of these are consciously intended by the author, 
98 Chesterton, "Objections to the Party System", The Illustrated London News (1910; repr. Collected 
Works Vol. 28) p. 648. 
99 Technically speaking, an extended metaphor is usually described as an allegory. However, my use of 
the phrase stands if we accept Chesterton's view that all literature is allegorical in some sense. 
ioo Ken Bailey, Finding the Lost: Cultural Keys to Luke 1-5 (Missouri: Concordia Publishing House, 
1992), p. 19. 
101 G. K. Chesterton, "The Bones of a Poem", A Handful ofAuthors, p. 103. 
102 Boyd, The Novels of C. K. Chesterton, p. 8. 
10' G. K. Chesterton, "The Pursuit of Mr Blue", The Scandal of Father Brown (1935; repr. London: 
Penguin Books, 1982), p. 96. 
10' See my explanation of the way that I am using the terms 'symbol' and 'symbolism' in footnote 67. 
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although the symbol in question will probably convey other connected images of which 
the author has not consciously thought. This is what Chesterton meant when he wrote: 
If truth is a plan or pattern of things that really are, or in other words, if truth truly 
exists outside ourselves, or in other words, if truth exists at all, it must be often possible 
for a writer to uncover a corner of it which he happens not to understand, but which his 
reader does happen to understand. The author sees only two lines; the reader sees where 
they meet and what is the angle. "105 
Although a symbol can suggest images that the author does not consciously intend, it is 
still largely controlled by the author. Symbols suggest a finite set of images, and this set 
is determined by the choice of symbol that the author makes. Chesterton was keen to 
affirm authorial intention. He saw the spiritual significance of the author's attempt to 
communicate a vision of life: "The poet, like the priest, should bear the ancient title of 
the builder of the bridge. His claim is exactly that he can really cross the chasm 
between the world of unspoken and seemingly unspeakable truths to the world of 
spoken words. His triumph is when the bridge is completed and the word is spoken; 
above all, when it is heard. "106 
Chesterton's use of symbolism and metaphor has led a number of his critics to liken his 
fiction to parables. For example, Cecil Chesterton tells us that: In The Napoleon of 
Notting Hill and the tales which have followed it he tried to use for the same purpose 
[i. e. propaganda] the very old method of parable or fable. " 107 Parable (or fable) allowed 
Chesterton to communicate his concepts and ideas using pictures, a style that is more 
familiar to the Middle Eastern mind: "The Middle Eastern mind creates meaning by the 
use of simile, metaphor, proverb, parable, and dramatic action... The primary language 
is that of the metaphor/parable and the secondary language is the conceptual 
105 Chesterton, "On The Old Curiosity Shop", Chesterton on Dickens, p. 60. 
106 Chesterton, "The Middleman in Poetry", Sidelights on New London and Newer York, p. 209. For 
Chesterton's own analysis of the spiritual significance of this image, see Chesterton, "The God \k ith the 
Golden Key", Autobiography. 
10' Cecil Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton: A Criticism, p. 196. Ian Boyd makes the same point when he tells 
us that Chesterton's fiction, "may be described as political fables, parables, and allegories... " in Bo}d. 
The Novels of G. K. Chesterton, p. 5. 
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interpretation of the metaphor that in Biblical literature is often given with it. "108 His 
use of parable does not make Chesterton any less theological. It is simply' a different 
style of theology to the one that most of us are used to: In most forms of discourse. we 
from the West begin with an idea and then occasionally illustrate that idea with a 
simile, metaphor, or parable. The conceptual language is primary and the metaphor or 
parable is secondary... For indeed, the story is presented only to clarify the meaning of 
the concept. "' 09 
Parables enabled Chesterton to resolve the tension between reason and the imagination 
by offering a form where both elements were integral: "The essential Chesterton, 
however, is found in the imaginative argument which comes in the shape of what 
Chesterton calls variously an allegory, a fable, or a parable. And even here it is 
important to note that the imaginative argument is inseparable from the concrete image 
or story which expresses it. There is no abstract argument that exists apart from the 
story. The story is itself the argument. "110 Gabriel Gale makes this point in The Poet 
and the Lunatics: "I doubt whether any truth can be told except in a parable. "' m1 
Conclusion 
Following in the tradition of Samuel Johnson, Chesterton believed that literature was 
both imitative and moral. It was firmly rooted in this world and not a pale reflection of 
another one, and in this sense, Chesterton can be seen as a realist. At the same time. 
Chesterton thought that literature should represent the essence of humanity rather than 
the details surrounding the context of that humanity. This view allowed his fiction to 
108 Bailey, Finding the Lost, p. 16. Although Bailey argues that the story is primary for the Middle 
Eastern mindset, he does not think that this negates conceptual interpretation: First, 
conceptualization/interpretation of the metaphor is not a strange aberration imposed on the Biblical 
metaphor by a non-Middle Eastern mind. Existentialists have denied any form of conceptualization of 
metaphor... But Biblical authors themselves often encase their metaphors in conceptualizations Xýhich 
focus the reader's interpretative reflection. " (p. 17. ) 
109 Ibid., p. 15. 
110 Ian Boyd, "in Search of the Essential Chesterton", VU: An Anglo-American Literary Review Vol. 1 
(1980), p. 32. 
1 G. K. Chesterton, The Poet and the Lunatics (1929; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson Ltd. 1962). p. 92. 
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exaggerate and distort the details of `reality' in order, paradoxically, to convey its 'true 
nature'. Chesterton also identified with Johnson's recognition of the moral dimension 
of literature, though he understood it differently at significant points. These two 
postulates help to explain the world that we encounter in Chesterton's fiction. 
I have defended the ability of literature - as an extended form of metaphor - to 
communicate theological concepts without distorting them. Yet Chesterton wrote 
fiction because he saw within it, a unique ability to communicate an array of different 
images within a single framework. This is why many of Chesterton's stories are 
parabolic. 
Furthermore, Chesterton's parables are often written in the form of detective stories. 
Along with the Father Brown stories, examples of this include The Club of Queer 
Trades and Four Faultless Felons. Some of his other stories have elements of this 
genre within them although they are not overtly detective stories (e. g. The Man ii'ho 
Was Thursday: A Nightmare). Lynette Hunter has pointed out that this particular genre 
was well suited to Chesterton's parabolic style: "The detective story as Chesterton 
creates it gives one a picture with all the necessary evidence. It is an allegory of life in 
which man has to realise and act upon the significance of the clues he has been 
given. " 112 She continues: "The Father Brown stories constitute both an interpretation 
and an expression of Chesterton's philosophy. " 113 
It is important to note the consciously autobiographical strain in his fiction. Many of his 
stories contain autobiographical elements; the most obvious example being, The Man 
who was Thursday: A Nightmare. Chesterton thought that his own story provided a 
framework for the symbols within his parables: "Now why do I offer here this handful 
of scrappy topics, types, metaphors all totally disconnected? Because I am not now 
112 Hunter, G. K. Chesterton; Explorations in Allegory, p. 157. Elmar Schenkel explains that: Time and 
again critics have pointed out the structural resemblances between detective stories and earlier religious 
literature such as the sermon or the Puritan quest. " Elmar Schenkel, "Visions from the Verge: Terror and 
Play in G. K. Chesterton's Imagination" in Kath Filmer, ed., Twentieth-Century Fantasists: Essays on 
Culture, Society and Belief in Twentieth-Century Mythopoeic Literature (London: The Macmillan Press 
Ltd, 1992), p. 34. 
' Ibid., p. 157. The theological elements of detective fiction are explored further by Robert S. Paul in 
his book, Whatever Happened to Sherlock Holmes: Detective Fiction, Popular Theology and Society 
(Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991). 
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expounding a religious system. I am finishing a story; rounding off what has been to 
me at least a romance, and very much of a mystery story. "' 
14 
Long before the current popularity of narrative theology, Chesterton understood 
something of the relationship between story and theology. He did not think that the 
Christian faith was untrue and thus best described in terms of a story. (He was a self- 
confessed dogmatist. ) Nor did he believe that stories were the only way to understand 
theology. (He wrote a number of non-fictional works on theology. ) He simply thought 
that literature offered a unique insight into what life was really like: "Life may 
sometimes legitimately appear as a book of science. Life may sometimes appear. and 
with a much greater legitimacy, as a book of metaphysics. But life is always a 
novel. " ' 1' It is for this reason, that I intend to use Chesterton's fiction to look at his 
conception of evil. 
114 Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 352. 
1 15 Chesterton, Heretics, p. 192. 
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Chapter 3: The Nature of Evil 
The whole question of evil has a number of important implications for theology, both 
practically and theoretically. Even for those not normally interested in metaphysics. 
suffering raises unavoidable questions. As Karl Rahner, one of the most influential 
contemporary theologians, declares: "It can scarcely be denied that this is one of the 
most fundamental questions of human experience. "' Chesterton was no exception to 
Rahner's observation. His concern for both metaphysical and practical questions, led 
him to reflect upon the theological issues surrounding evil: "While acknowledging 
religious mystery, he wished to keep close to solid reality and plain common sense. He 
knew that positive evil and original sin were the starting-point of his argument... ýý ' 
While the problem of evil is a popular theme in the contemporary philosophy of 
religion, few writers seem interested in trying to define evil. 3 This point is illustrated in 
Barry Whitney's important reference work, Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography On 
The Problem of Evil, 1960-1990. Whitney consigns what he terms `historical theodicy' 
to an appendix, and provides the following justification: "I suspect that those who write 
from an historical (or certainly from a Thomistic) perspective probably consider 
themselves writing in the `mainstream', but the sheer weight of publications in the 
scholarly journals would not bear this out. "4 
It is interesting to consider why this is the case. One reason is that evil is often defined 
in terms of goodness, and goodness in terms of God. Thus the confusion over the 
Karl Rahner, "Why Does God Allow Us To Suffer? ", Theological Investigations Vol. /X. Faith and 
Ministry (Trans. Edward Quinn, London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984), p. 194. 
2 Emile Cammaerts, The Laughing Prophet (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1937), p. 23. 
For example, none of the following works contain anything significant by way of an attempt to 
identify 
what evil is: J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism; Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and 
Evil; Bruce R. 
Reichenbach, Evil and A Good God, Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God. The one notable 
exception to this is John Hick's classic, Evil and the God of Love, which considers the matter 
extensively. 
4 Barry L. Whitney, Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the Problem of Evil, 1960-1990 (News 
York: Garland Publishing, 1993), p. 377. 
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concept of God that has marked much twentieth-century theology, ' makes it even 
harder to define evil. Alternatively, a more pragmatic explanation can be given - evil is 
not defined because it is too difficult. When Richard Worsley defends the limitations of 
his book by admitting that, "evil is notoriously difficult to define", 6 he echoes the King 
in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, who declared: "If there's no meaning in it. that 
saves a whole world of trouble. "7 
Some contemporary writers on evil not only make no attempt to identify its nature; they 
actually advocate the avoidance of such discussions. In his book on good and evil, 
Raimond Gaita tries to avoid being forced into admitting whether or not he believes in 
the reality of good and evil. When pressed on the subject, he declares: It would be 
better, at least in ethics, to banish the word `ontology' . 
"8 Yet without any recourse to 
ontology, ethics becomes relativistic, and it is no longer possible to condemn an act as 
being evil in any absolute sense. 
Other writers suggest that the lack of any definition for evil should be seen as an asset. 
In his introduction to The Anthropology of Evil, David Parkin writes: As regards the 
term `evil' itself in English, its loose analytical value has enabled the contributors in 
this volume to go beyond such conventional categories as ghost or witch in their 
studies, and to pick out what they see as distinctive in the cultures they look at... this 
might suggest that such odd job words as `evil' are in fact good for anthropologists to 
think. "9 
Whatever the reasons for not defining evil, the same problem remains. Without 
definition, words become meaningless. It is ironic that while contemporary writers have 
One example of the point that I am trying to make here is the `death of God theology' of theologians 
such as Thomas Altizer. For an interesting, if rather aggressive, critique of the confusion caused by death 
of God theology, see John Warwick Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology (Minnesota: 
Bethany Fellowship, 1975). 
6 Richard Worsley, Human Freedom and the Logic of Evil (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), p. 
8. 
Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865; repr. London: Everyman, 1993), p. 100. 
8 Raimond Gaita, Good and Evil: An . Absolute 
Conception (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1991). p. 
192. 
9 David Parkin, ed., The . Anthropology 
Of Evil (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 23. 
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not seemed concerned about this in regard to evil, they have shown great concern for 
defining the term `God'. The work of thinkers such as Wittgenstein has prompted 
philosophers such as Anthony Flew and Kai Nielsen to suggest that the ver} concept of 
God is linguistically meaningless. In response, theists have sought to explain more 
precisely what they mean when they talk about God. 1° In the same way that God has to 
be a meaningful term if we are to talk about God; evil has to be a meaningful term if we 
are to talk about the problem of evil. ' 1 Otherwise discussion becomes like a present day 
Tower of Babel in which everyone speaks and yet no-one understands. This was one 
reason that Chesterton wrote so prolifically. Not only was he interested in writing about 
a wide variety of subjects, but he also saw that a wide variety of subjects needed to be 
written about. Chesterton warned against meaningless talk: 
It is perfectly true that there is something in all good things that is beyond all 
speech or figures of speech. But it is also true that there is in all good things a 
perpetual' desire for expression and concrete embodiment; and though the 
attempt to embody is always inadequate, the attempt is always made... 
... 
The charlatan who has no idea will always confine himself to explaining that 
it is much too subtle to be explained. 12 
As the quotation above conveys, Chesterton sought for greater clarity, but he was not 
naive enough to think that everything could be fully defined and explained. This is a 
healthy perspective for those trying to understand the nature of evil. Although I have 
argued for the importance of trying to define what evil is, the difficulties of doing so 
quickly remind us that "Now we see but a poor reflection as in a mirror... ", 3 Our 
understanding is limited, and it is with that in mind that we should heed the advice of 
10 Examples of linguistic attacks against the concept of God can be found in works such as Kai Nielsen, 
The Intelligibility of God Talk", Religious Studies 6 (1970); and Anthony Flew & Alasdair McIntyre, 
New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955; repr. London: SCM Press Ltd, 1972), especially chapter 6 
- Theology and Falsification. Respondents to such attacks 
include: Frederick Ferre, Language, Logic and 
God (1962; repr. London: Fontana Library, 1970); and Ian Ramsey, Religious Language (1957: repr. 
London: SCM Press Ltd, 1973). 
Analytic theistic philosophers have pointed out that the logical problem of evil is sometimes the result 
of confusion over the meaning of words such as good and evil: -It is always too easy to assume that one 
knows what things are good and what events are equal as God evaluates them... " in Frederick Ferre, 
Language, Logic and God, p. 77. Further discussion of this point can be found in chapter seven. 
'2G. K. Chesterton, The Mystagogue" .4 Miscellany of Men 
(1912; repr. London: Methuen & Co, 1926), 
pp. 145-7. 
13,1 Corinthians 13: 12 (New International Version). 
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Plotinus: "Whoever inquires from whence evils originate... will begin his inquiry in a 
proper manner, if he first establishes what evil is, and defines its nature... "'. 
Father Brown & Chesterton's Theology Of Evil 
In the previous chapter, I argued that fiction offers a unique insight into Chesterton's 
theology. As Sister Marie Virginia observes: "Repeatedly Chesterton reminded his 
readers that religion cannot be excluded from any form of literature, because it includes 
everything. " 15 In this section, I want to suggest that the Father Brown stories 16 are 
particularly valuable for anyone who is interested in examining Chesterton's theology 
of evil. Ronald Knox hints at this when he says: "Nearly always, there is a 
philosophical or at least a political idea at the very heart of each story. " 17 Although 
much of Chesterton's fiction has a propagandist edge to it, the Father Brown stories 
stand out as tales with morals attached to them. One of the more obvious reasons for 
this is that they are all short stories -a genre that is well suited to making a particular 
point. (Longer stories that make one point continuously sound more like homilies, 
because a reader expects a long story to contain a number of different points/morals. ) 
A number of critics have noted that the philosophical overtones of the Father Brown 
stories include the subject of evil. In his book on Chesterton, Matthias Wörther refers to 
the religious understanding of evil that can be seen in the method of Father Brown., 
8 
Another critic, Frederick Crosson, notes that this is one of the major differences 
between Father Brown and Sherlock Holmes. He explains the unique nature of the 
'' Plotinus, On the Nature and Origin of Evil, (Trans. Thomas Taylor, Five Books of Plotinus, London: 
Edward Jeffrey, 1794), p. 57. 
1' Sister Marie Virginia, G. K. Chesterton's Evangel (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1937), pp. 29-30. 
"' The Father Brown stories number fifty-three in all. The Innocence of Father Brown (1911) contains 
twelve stories; The Wisdom of Father Brown (1914) contains twelve stories: The Incredulity of 
Father 
Brown (1926) contains eight stories, The Secret of Father Brown (1927) contains ten stories: and 
The 
Scandal of Father Brown (1935) contains eight stories. In addition to these 
five collections, there are 
three other Father Brown stories: "Father Brown and the Donnington Affair". The 
Vampire of the 
Village", and "The Mask of Midas". 
1' Ronald Knox, Literarm Distractions (London: Sheed & Ward, 1958), p. 167. 
18 Matthias Wörther's book, G. K. Chesterton - Das Unterhaltsame Dogma, 
is reviewed b\ Josef Hoffart 
in The Chesterton Review, Vol. 12 No. 1 (February 1986), pp. 89-92. 
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Father Brown stories: "It is rather that the stories are not just stories of crimes in a 
legal. or even a moral sense. The crimes they tell of are evil deeds. deeds prompted by 
the Evil one, crimes not only against man but against God - and crimes which violate 
the soul of the actor himself. "19 Perhaps the most detailed examination of the 
association between evil and the Father Brown stories is to be found in chapter five of 
Gillian Cross' PhD thesis, G. K Chesterton and the Decadents (Sussex University, 
1973). She introduces the second half of her chapter with the following observation: "A 
fairly comprehensive, if fragmented, presentation of Chesterton's views on sin and the 
workings of evil in the mind can be found in the Father Brown stories, which were 
written throughout the latter part of his life, from 1911 onwards. "20 
In his Autobiography, Chesterton tells the reader how he was initially inspired to write 
the Father Brown stories. 21 He met a priest (Father John O'Connor) who had a 
considerable knowledge of evil through his role in the confessional. When Chesterton 
later heard two Cambridge undergraduates remark that although the priest was very 
friendly, it was a shame that he did not know anything about the real evil in the world, 
Chesterton was struck by the irony of it all. As Chesterton went on to explain: And 
there sprang up in my mind the vague idea of making some artistic use of this comic 
yet tragic cross-purposes; and constructing a comedy in which a priest should appear to 
know nothing and in fact know more about crime than the criminals. -22 The Father 
Brown that emerged from this incident was based loosely on Father John O'Connor, 
not so much in appearance, but in his understanding and awareness of evil. In The 
Absence of Mr Glass", Chesterton returned to the incident that first prompted him to 
write the stories. The famous criminologist, Dr Hood, patronises Father Brown because 
he thinks that the priest does not understand the criminal mind: "You, with your small 
parochial responsibilities, see only this particular Mrs MacNab, terrified with this 
particular tale of two voices... "23 As in the story of the two Cambridge graduates and 
'`' Frederick J. Crosson, "Father Brown, Sherlock Holmes, and the Mystery of Man", Rufus William 
Rauch, ed., A Chesterton Celebration (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 28. 
-10 Gillian Cross, C. K. Chesterton and the Decadents (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Sussex Uni\ersity, 
1973), p. 1 12. See the introductory chapter of my thesis for further comment on Cross' work. 
21 G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press. 1992), pp. 336-339. 
2-1 Ibid., p. 3339- 
-) ' G. K. Chesterton, The Wisdom of Father Brown (1914: repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970). p. 14. 
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Father O'Connor, the irony is that Father Brown has a considerable understanding of 
evil and the criminal mind (as is demonstrated later on when he explains the solution to 
Dr Hood). As Father Brown comments elsewhere: "Has it never struck you that a man 
who does next to nothing but hear men's real sins is not likely to be wholly unaware of 
human evil? "24 
Father Brown understands evil, and this enables him to solve each crime with which he 
is faced. His entire methodology stems from this ability to understand the moral evil', 
that flows from the human heart: "Since crime for the meek priest is, in most cases. of a 
moral and psychological order, very often derived from one of the vices of Christian 
theology, such as pride, greed or lust, his methods of detection belong also to a moral 
order. , 26 Because Father Brown believes in the idea of `human nature', he is able to 
identify with evil rather than merely understand it in an abstract sense. In "The Secret 
of Father Brown" (the opening chapter in The Secret of Father Brown), Father Brown 
explains his methodology to Mr Chace. When Mr Chace presses Father Brown on this 
subject, he is shocked by the response of Father Brown: "You see, I had murdered them 
all myself. So, of course, I knew how it was done. "27 Father Brown then proceeds to 
explain that he does not commit the crimes in a physical/material sense. Instead, he 
empathises with the criminal in order to understand the criminal. This is possible 
because he shares the same human nature as the criminal. Hence he declares in `The 
Hammer of God": "i am a man and therefore have all devils in my heart. "28 The 
limitation of Father Brown's methodology is that he struggles to solve crimes that are 
not orientated around simple human sins. Fortunately for him, Chesterton rarely wrote 
any other type of story. Yet there are occasions when Father Brown has to admit his 
limitations: "Oh, I know well enough when I'm out of my depth; and I knew I should 
be, when I found we were hunting a fraudulent financier instead of an ordinary human 
24 G. K. Chesterton, "The Blue Cross", The Innocence of Father Brown, (1911 ; repr. The Annotated 
Innocence of Father Brown, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 39. 
25 The distinction between moral evil and natural evil is discussed in chapter seven. 
16 Elmar Schenkel, "Visions from the Verge: Terror and Play in G. K. Chesterton's Imagination" in Kath 
Filmer, ed., Twentieth-Century Fantasists: Essays on Culture, Society and Belief in Twentieth-Century 
A9i'thopoeic Literature (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), p. 35. 
G. K. Chesterton, The Secret of Father Brown", The Secret of Father Brown (1927; repr. Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1974), p. 11. 
i's G. K. Chesterton, "The Hammer of God", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 195. 
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murderer... Now murder's almost always human and personal; but modern theft has 
been allowed to become quite impersonal. "29 
Historic Christian Theology & The Nature Of Evil 
Philosophical discussion about evil has always oscillated between the two extremes of 
dualism and monism. 30 The problem of dualism is essentially that it leaves too many 
questions unanswered (e. g. dualism has no first cause from which to explain the 
beginning of creation). The problem of monism, is that it suggests that all is one. and 
thus that there is no difference between good and evil. Thus evil becomes little more 
than an illusion; a view which falls painfully short of our everyday experience. 
Combining either view with Christianity raises additional difficulties. Both radical 
dualism and radical monism would seem to contradict central tenets within 
Christianity. Radical dualism challenges the core of the Christian doctrine of God, with 
its belief that God is the Omnipotent Creator: Christianity has no place for an equal 
independent rival divinity. By contrast, radical monism's contention that good and evil 
are merely aspects of a single universal structure calls into question the doctrine of the 
atonement. "3 , 31 In light of these problems, Christian thinkers have had to find some 
explanation by which Christianity can combine its belief in God as the creator of 
everything that exists, with a belief in the reality of evil. John Hick articulates the 
predicament when he writes: "This dilemma has haunted all attempts to arrive at a 
Christian understanding of evil... in the end we have to acknowledge that both polar 
''32 truths are valid and inescapable. 
G. K. Chesterton. "The Mask of Midas" (1936; repr. Collected Works [plume 14: Short Stories, Fairy 
Tales, Mystery Stories, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), p. 409. 
'° These two poles of thought are discussed in chapter two of John Hick's book, Evil and the God of 
Love', 3'd ed. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985). 
If there is no evil and no sin, there was no need for Jesus to die on the cross for the sake of mankind. 
'' John Hick. Evil and the God of Love, p. 16. 
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St Augustine's explanation of the nature of evil was influenced by his desire to respond 
to the arguments of the Manichees, who believed that the universe was dualistic. " In an 
attempt to reassert the sovereignty of God, Augustine formulated his definition of evil 
as "privatio boni" (the privation of good). 34 This idea had its roots in the teaching of 
both Aristotle and Plotinus. 35 Augustine's theory of evil was taken up by St Thomas 
Aquinas who also argued that privation provided the best explanation of eN il. Aquinas 
understood evil as the "absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. " 16 His 
basic conception of the nature of evil was very similar to that of Augustine. although 
there was a slight change of emphasis. 37 
Both Augustine and Aquinas defended their doctrine of `evil as a privation' from the 
charge of treating evil as an illusion. This was necessary as the idea of privation 
appeared similar to the idea of negation (i. e. nothingness). The famous example that 
Aquinas used was the example of blindness. 38 Blindness is something rather than 
nothing, but that something is essentially an absence - the absence of a particular good 
that is naturally due (i. e. sight). For Aquinas, "Evil denote[d] the lack of good, not a 
mere absence". 39 In trying to explain this, Herbert McCabe uses another example: If I 
The Manichees were a third-century sect founded by the Persian, Mani. They believed the world was 
split into good (spirit) and evil, (matter) which was grounded in two co-eternal and independent cosmic 
powers of light and darkness. 
For a more comprehensive treatment of Augustine's theory of evil, see G. R. Evans, Augustine On Evil 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
However, Augustine's theory of evil as a privation was noticeably different from earlier Greek 
thought: "Although Aristotle treats of the various forms of privation... he does not develop a specific 
doctrine of evil as a privation. " Leo J. Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St Thomas Aquinas: in a 
Historical Perspective (Trans. Dr John Dudley, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), p. 124. Plotinus is not any 
nearer to Augustine in this respect: "The work done by Greek thinkers was able to prepare for the 
elaboration of this definition of evil, but it is... not found in Plotinus... ", Charles Journet, The Meaning of 
Evil (1961; trans. Michael Barry, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1963), p. 28. 
36 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 49, Article 1 (Vol. 1, trans. English 
Dominican Fathers, London: Burns & Oates, 1947-8), p. 253. 
37 "[Aquinas] renders the traditional definition more precise by giving priority.. . to `deprivation' and 
defect'. " John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 94. A more detailed discussion of Aquinas' theor\ of 
evil as privation can be found in Edward Cook, The Deficient Cause of Moral Evil . according to 
Thomas 
Aquinas (Washington: The Council for Research in Values, 1996), especially "Chapter 2: The Nature of 
Evil". In addition, the intellectualism of Aquinas is significantly different to the voluntarism of 
Augustine. 
'A Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 5, Article 3. Reply Objection 2, p. 25. & Part 1, 
Questions 48, Article 2, Reply Objection 2, p. 250. 
119 Norman Geister, Philosophy of Religion (Michigan: Zondervan, 1974), p. 341. 
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have a hole in my sock, the hole is not anything at all, it is just an absence of wool or 
cotton or whatever, but it is a perfectly real hole in my sock.. It would be absurd to say 
that holes in socks are unreal and illusory just because the hole isn't made of anything 
and is purely an absence. Nothing in the wrong place can be just as real and just as 
important as something in the wrong place. "40 Following on from this, the question 
arises of what the ontological status of evil is? Norman Geisler provides us with a 
helpful phrase when he describes evil as, "an ontological parasite" 4 .1 
Although the theory of evil as a privation has appeared to offer the best solution to the 
Christian's dilemma concerning evil, it remains a difficult concept. One area of 
difficulty concerns its expression, a point noted by Brian Home: "... for the concept of 
evil as privation, absence or lack conveys a frustrating sense of abstraction: the 
atmosphere of the philosopher's study, remote from the experience of the violence, 
cruelty and hatred of the real world. , 42 Home goes on to articulate the problem of 
imagining evil as a privation: "If evil is only an absence, it cannot be imagined and 
certainly cannot be personified. "43 This problem can be seen illustrated in Milton's 
Paradise Lost. According to the theory of privation, no being can be totally evil. 44 
When Milton tries to imagine this in his great epic, the ensuing complexity is portrayed 
in Satan. Consequently, this has led readers to see him more as a tragic hero than an 
evil villain, resulting in a greater sympathy for Satan than Milton originally intended. 
Yet, as Chesterton acknowledged: "Milton's devil is only grand because he is half an 
archangel. "45 The way in which the theory of evil as a privation might be portrayed. is a 
subject to which I will return in chapters four, five, and six. 
40 Herbert McCabe, God Matters (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1987), p. 29. 
a' Geister, Philosophy Of Religion, p. 336. 
42 Brian Horne, Imagining Evil (London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd, 1996), p. 43. 
4" Ibid., p. 41. 
44 "Nothing, however, can be wholly evil, since privation always exists in a subject and that subject, as 
an existing thing, is good". David Gallagher, "Aquinas on Goodness and Moral Goodness", David 
Gallagher, ed., Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1994), p. 45. 
'' G. K. Chesterton, Notebook 73321 B, 1892, p. 32., "The Department of Manuscripts", British Library, 
London. 
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Is Chesterton Part Of The Thomistic School? 
To help us understand Chesterton's comments on evil, it is helpful to locate his 
theology within a historical context. Therefore, we will look at his relationship to the 
historic Christian position on evil, before going on to investigate Chesterton's view s at 
first hand. In the previous section we focused on the theory of evil as a privation, an 
idea advocated by both Augustine and Aquinas. Although Chesterton has not 
particularly been linked to Augustine, many critics have discussed his connection to the 
Thomistic school. It is that connection that I wish to explore here. 46 
There is almost an endless list of writers who have commented on the connection 
between Chesterton and Aquinas. Some of these have denied Chesterton's status as a 
Thomist, arguing that, "no one could claim that in any strict sense Chesterton was a 
systematic philosopher or a Thomist, although much critical work on Chesterton tries to 
prove just that. 547 Others, as Dale points out, have argued that Chesterton should be 
seen as a Thomist. Hugh Kenner writes: "When late in life he came to grips with 
systematic philosophy, he was able to produce without apparent effort a profound study 
of St Thomas Aquinas, because St Thomas expounded in an orderly fashion what 
Gilbert Chesterton had been seeing and saying all his life. "48 In a similar vein, Emile 
Cammaerts observes that Chesterton "expounded the foundations of Thomist 
theology", 49 while M. Molyneaux has suggested that Chesterton be viewed as an 
"Optimistic Thomist. In between these positions, critics such as Quentin Lauer have "'0 
46 In this section I am using the term "Thomist" rather loosely, to refer to Thomas Aquinas and those that 
follow in that tradition. I am aware that there is a great deal of diversity within Thomism that I have 
chosen to ignore as it is not directly relevant to my thesis. However, it is useful to note that Chesterton's 
reading of Aquinas was probably influenced by the Neo-Thomists of his period. Chesterton seems to 
have had some correspondence with Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, and probably read some of 
their writings. Perhaps more significant was his close friendship with Father Vincent McNabb. who was 
heavily influenced by Aquinas. 
47 Alzina Stone Dale, The Outline of Sanity: A Life of G. K. Chesterton (Michigan: Eerdmans, 1982). p. 
290. 
48 Hugh Kenner, Paradox in Chesterton (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948), pp. 5-6. 
49 Emile Carnmaerts, The Laughing Prophet, p. 5. 
'0 M. Molyneaux, G. K. Chesterton As Literary Critic (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Ulster Pol\technic. 
1984), chapter 1. 
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taken a more ambivalent approach, which affirms a link between Chesterton and 
Aquinas, but falls short of declaring him a Thomist. 5' 
Ostensibly, there are two important pieces of evidence that link Chesterton to Aquinas. 
The first is that they were both great apologists for the Catholic Church. Having 
officially been received into the Roman Catholic Church in 1922, it is hardly surprising 
that Chesterton found great affinity with the greatest philosopher of the Catholic 
tradition. The second piece of evidence is the amount that Chesterton referred to and 
wrote about Aquinas. This culminated in his critical study, St Thomas Aquinas. 
published in 1933. Many writers on Chesterton have commented on the significance of 
this work. 52 It is ironic how little research Chesterton put into a book that was to 
become one of his most poignant and famous works. In her biography, Maisie Ward 
explains that Chesterton had written half the book before he thought about consulting 
any other studies on Aquinas, and even then, he hardly read any of the books about 
Aquinas that his secretary obtained for him. 53 At the same time, Chesterton had read 
Aquinas' Summa Theologica many years before he began to write his own book on 
Aquinas. 54 It is difficult to determine how much of the Summa Theologica Chesterton 
actually read. It is possible that Chesterton read it from cover to cover, a view hinted at 
by the comment Father Brown makes in "The Secret Garden": "I used to be fairly good 
at thinking. I could paraphrase any page in Aquinas once. "'" 
Yet how significant is it that Chesterton wrote a book on Aquinas? As Ralph Mclnerny 
reminds us: "On whom did he not write a book or at least an essay? "56 Indeed, 
Chesterton wrote a great deal about many writers with whom he had little affinity. 
However, in St Thomas Aquinas Chesterton repeatedly affirms his admiration for 
51 See Quentin Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 1988). 
5-) These include John Coates, Chesterton and The Edwardian Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull University 
Press, 1984), p. 18.; Michael Coren, Gilbert: The Man who was G. K. Chesterton (London: 
Jonathan 
Cape, 1989), pp. 251-253; and Michael Ffinch, G. K. Chesterton (London: Weidenfeld 
& Nicolson). pp. 
335-9. 
'' Recounted in Maisie Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (London: Sheed & Ward, 1944), p. 525. 
'4 Mentioned in Dale, The Outline Of 'Sanity, p. 290. 
5, Chesterton, "The Secret Garden", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 57. 
S6 Ralph Mclnerny, "Chesterton as Peeping Thomist", Rauch, ed., .4 
Chesterton Celebration, p. 7. 
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Aquinas. Examples of this range from the autobiographical traces in Chesterton .s 
book57 to overt expressions of admiration. 58 The significance of Chesterton's book on 
Aquinas, over and above the other critical biographies he wrote, is that it was so well 
received by Thomistic scholars. Perhaps the most famous of these was Etienne Gilson, 
probably the greatest Aquinas scholar of Chesterton's age. Gilson expressed his respect 
for Chesterton's study: "I consider it as being without possible comparison the best 
book ever written on St Thomas. Nothing short of genius can account for such an 
achievement. , 59 More recently, Ralph Mclnerny, another influential Aquinas scholar, 
has written an essay suggesting a degree of commonality between Chesterton and 
Aquinas. 60 Clearly Chesterton's book on Aquinas is more than just another book. He 
regarded it as an expression of much of his own philosophy, and others have praised its 
perceptiveness. Despite this obvious affinity between the two men, Chesterton should 
not automatically be described as a Thomist, as Quentin Lauer explains: 
There is no way of classifying his thought as any kind of 'ism'... Even with 
regard to Thomas Aquinas... he was not of the `Thomistic' school in any 
significant sense... What Chesterton found. . . was that, when 
he had thought his 
way through to a highly metaphysical view of the totality of reality, that view 
turned out to resemble in highly significant ways that of Aquinas. Whether we 
can call this the `influence' of Aquinas is difficult to say. 1 6 
As Lauer indicates, there are some significant similarities in the metaphysical thought 
of Chesterton and Aquinas. Two important areas include their analogical thought, and 
their metaphysical realism. 
M. Versfeld defines analogical thinking and notes Chesterton's use of it: "Descriptions 
of God in terms of created things are called analogical, and what we notice in 
57 Chesterton introduces St Thomas Aquinas as "a heavy bull of a man", who "was so stolid that the 
scholars, in the schools which he attended regularly, thought he was a dunce. " Chesterton goes on to say 
that Aquinas, "would much rather be thought a dunce than have his own dreams invaded by more active 
or animated dunces. " G. K. Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas (1933; repr. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1938), p. 15. Of course, this is all autobiographical. 
58 For example, Chesterton declares that, "the modern mind needs Thomas Aquinas. " Ibid., p. 20-5. 
Quoted in Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton, p. 526. 
60 The essay I am referring to is "Chesterton as Peeping Thomist". 
61 Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio, p. 37. 
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Chesterton is the facility with which he moves from created things to God. "6ý ersfeld 
also notes that the same idea is found in Aquinas' work, where he explained that God 
could only be discussed in terms of analogy. 63 Versfeld is not the only one to have 
noted this similarity. Hugh Kenner devotes an entire chapter of his study on Chesterton 
to the same issue. 64 
The other important similarity between Chesterton and Aquinas is their concern for 
metaphysical realism. Chesterton observed that Aquinas' belief in life stemmed from 
this: It breathes somehow in his very first phrases about the reality of Being. If the 
morbid Renaissance intellectual is supposed to say, To be or not to be - that is the 
question, ' then the massive medieval doctor does most certainly reply in a voice of 
thunder, `To be - that is the answer. "165 For both Chesterton and Aquinas, their 
metaphysical realism resulted in a sense of wonder that they existed at all. The 
significance of this in terms of their response to evil, is a subject that I will address in 
the concluding chapter. The fact that both men believed that `a thing was a thing'. 
provided them with a firm foundation for the rest of their thought: "The first doctrine 
which underlies both the principle of man's dignity and the value of everything in 
general may be termed metaphysical realism, denoting a profound and even obvious 
kinship between Chesterton's thought and Thomism. As realism, it affirms that the 
essential value of any object or being is that it exists. "66 
Having examined the relationship between Chesterton and Thomism, we can conclude 
that there certainly is a link of sorts. Chesterton had a great affinity with Aquinas, but 
this does not extend to their having an identical systematic theology; primarily because 
Chesterton could never be tied down to any particular `ism'. And yet the closest that 
Chesterton came to any kind of `ism' was Thomism. At the same time, we must not 
forget that Chesterton did not grow up in the Thomistic school, rather he grew up and 
62 M. Versfeld, "Chesterton and St Thomas", English Studies In Africa Vol. 4. No. 2 (September, 1961), 
p. 133. 
63 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 13, pp. 59-72. 
64 See "Chapter 3: The Idea of Analogy", in Kenner, Paradox in Chesterton. 
`'; G. K. Chesterton. St Thomas Aquinas. pp. 131-2. 
66 L'Abbe Yves Denis, "The Theological Background of Chesterton's Social Thought", The Chesicuton 
Review Vol. 7 No. 1 (1981), p. 62. 
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found himself in it. This was a process that was virtually identical to his discovery of 
the truth of the Christian faith, a story he recounted in Orthodoxy: "I am the man who 
with the utmost daring discovered what had been discovered before. 567 Therefore. as 
we move on to investigate Chesterton's thoughts on evil, we should expect to find a 
large degree of agreement between him and Aquinas (and thus the historic Catholic 
position). It is a resemblance seen by Christopher Hollis: "Therefore there are in the 
world forces of good and evil. One might argue whether things in themselves are evil 
or whether they are merely misused by men. Saint Thomas and Chesterton would both 
have maintained the latter... "68 
Chesterton & Dualism 
Thee is a sense in which all Christian writers advocate, or at least flirt with, dualism in 
some form: "While Christianity has always refuted the claims of thorough-going 
dualism, it has, in its history, consistently painted pictures of and enunciated 
propositions about the relationship between good and evil that bear a strong similarity 
to the explanations that dualism offers for the existence of evil. "69 This is also true of 
Chesterton's work, where we quickly encounter this vivid struggle between good and 
evil. It is the opening theme of The Ball And The Cross, as Father Michael opposes 
Professor Lucifer. In The Poet And The Lunatics, Gabriel Gale defends superstitious 
people on the grounds that they grasp something of this epic battle: "They at least read 
things in black and white, and saw life as the battlefield it is. "70 Gale's comment is an 
attempt to recognise the difference between good and evil that is required if we are to 
take evil seriously. As Quentin Lauer points out, "one could go so far as to say that it is 
6' G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908; repr. London: The Bodley Head, 1927), p. 16. 
68 Christopher Hollis, The Mind Of Chesterton (London: Hollis & Carter, 1970), p. 256 
69 Brian Horne, Imaging Evil, p. 26. The picture that is painted, of good fighting against evil. can be 
found in the work of writers such as Milton, Bunyan, Spenser, and J. R. Tolkien. A number of interesting 
discussions about the work of these and other writers, can be found in Colin Manlove's book, Christian 
Fantasy: From 1200 To The Present (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). 
70 G. K. Chesterton, The Poet. 4nd The Lunatics (1929: repr. London: Darwen Finlayson, 1962), pp. 139- 
140. 
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meaningless to speak of evil if there is no good to which it is contrasted. -7 1 However, 
while Chesterton's position bordered on dualism, he ultimately rejected it quite 
categorically. 72 Such a position involves a perilous balance, which C. S. Lewis sought to 
explain: 
... real 
Christianity (as distinct from Christianity-and-water) goes much nearer 
to Dualism than people think. One of the things that surprised me when I first 
read the New Testament seriously was that it was always talking about a Dark 
Power in the universe -a mighty spirit who was held to be behind death, and 
disease, and sin. The difference is that Christianity thinks this Dark Power was 
created by God, and was good when he was created, and went wrong. 
Christianity agrees with dualism that this universe is at war. But it does not 
think this is a war between independent powers. It thinks it is a civil war, a 
rebellion, and that we are living in a part of the universe occupied by the rebel. 73 
A study of Chesterton clearly reveals his rejection of dualism. His book on Aquinas 
devotes a whole chapter to the `Angelic Doctor's' attack on Manichean thought (which, 
as I noted earlier, was dualistic). Chesterton even went as far as to say that this was the 
primary aim of Aquinas: "But if we wanted to put in a picturesque and simplified form 
what he wanted for the world... we might well say that it really was to strike a blow and 
settle the Manichees. "74 Explaining the way in which the Manichees believed that evil 
was rooted in nature, Chesterton says that, "it was a dualism, which made evil an equal 
partner with good... "75 Chesterton believed that the pessimism of his age, against 
which he reacted so strongly, was a result of Manichean dualism that considered life to 
be essentially bad. Chesterton wanted to remind people that when Genesis declared, 
"God looked on all things and saw that they were good, "76 it was advocating, the 
thesis that there are no bad things; but only bad uses of things". 77 Chesterton recognised 
that if evil was part and parcel of nature, pessimism would seem to be the logical 
conclusion. Quentin Lauer explains the connection: "Nor does it solve anything to say 
Quentin Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio, p. 79. 
This point will be illustrated during my discussion of the traditional grotesque in chapter five. 
C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952; repr. London: Fontana Books, 1964), p. 47. 
74 Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas, p. 118. 
'' Ibid., pp. 123-4. 
76 Ibid., p. 125. (Chesterton's paraphrase of Genesis 1: 3 1. ) 
77 Ibid., p. 125. 
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that evil is simply an inevitable concomitant of existence: that eliminates the possibility 
of doing anything about it, and is eventually a surrender to pessimism. "78 
Chesterton's rejection of dualism is even more apparent in his discussion of Robert 
Louis Stevenson's story, The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Commenting on 
this story, Chesterton makes the following statement: "The real stab of the story is not 
in the discovery that the one man is two men; but in the discovery that the two men are 
one man. After all the diverse wandering and warring of those two incompatible beings, 
there was still only one man born and only one man buried. , 79 This observation 
unequivocally rejects a dualistic interpretation of the story. Chesterton argued that the 
story was not about the battle between two independent forces of good and evil: The 
reason is that there can never be equality between the evil and the good. Jekyll and 
Hyde are not twin brothers. "80 In "The Duel Of Dr Hirsch", Chesterton borrows from 
Stevenson's tale and takes the opportunity to make a similar point against dualism. In 
the story, two men appear to challenge one another to a duel, but Father Brown 
ultimately discovers that the two men are in fact one man. He explains what led him to 
his discovery: "These opposites won't do. They don't work... Things made so opposite 
are things that cannot quarrel. "8' Chesterton's argument here needs some amplification. 
Father Brown spots that the two men are one man because they are too opposite. He 
explains that it is too unlikely that two things can be so completely opposite. This is 
Chesterton's position on dualism. Any attempt to break the universe down into good 
and bad is a dichotomy that does not agree with our everyday experience. Many things 
are not that clear-cut. In the words of Father Brown, it simply "does not work", because 
reality cannot be broken down so neatly. 
A further example of Chesterton's rejection of dualism can be seen in the methodology 
of Father Brown, which I referred to earlier. Father Brown's ability to catch evil 
criminals is not due to his inherent goodness. Rather, he is able to catch the criminals, 
78 Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio, p. 101. 
'`' G. K. Chesterton, Robert Louis Stevenson (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 1927), p. 72. See chapter 
five for further discussion on the doppelgänger motif present in this novella. 
80 Ibid., p. 73. 
81 Chesterton, The Duel Of Dr Hirsch", The Wisdom of Father Brown, p. 56. 
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because he recognises something of their evil within himself. He realises, to quote the 
apostle Paul. that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God. -82 This is the 
whole basis of the Father Brown stories, and underlies Chesterton's rejection of 
dualism. Flambeau reinforces this in his confession to Grandison Chace: 
Have I not heard the sermons of the righteous and seen the cold stare of the 
respectable; have I not been lectured in the lofty and distant style, asked how it 
was possible for anyone to fall so low, told that no decent person could ever 
have dreamed of such depravity? Do you think all that ever did anything but 
make me laugh? Only my friend told me that he knew exactly why I stole; and I 
have never stolen since. 83 
A dualist would portray Father Brown as the complete opposite of Flambeau. Instead 
Father Brown shares Flambeau's fallen nature, and can identify with him. This enables 
him to rescue Flambeau from his life of crime. At the root of Chesterton's argument 
against dualism is the simple empirical fact that there is good and bad in every human 
being. This is one of the morals of "The Man In The Passage", where Father Brown 
describes a figure who looks like the devil, and then admits that he is talking about 
himself. 84 
Chesterton & The Illusion Of Evil 
Chesterton also rejected all forms of Monism with its belief that all is one, and 
therefore, that evil is only an illusion. He believed that much of the new wave of 
superficial optimism that surrounded him was the result of Monism. One monistic 
group of the time was Christian Science. Chesterton's complaint with Christian Science 
was that it, "denies the actual reality of evil in experience. "8 As this quotation 
indicates, Chesterton knew that evil was an integral part of our experience, and could 
not therefore be denied. Writing on Robert Browning he declared: If you had gone to 
82 Romans 3: 23 (New International Version). 
8, Chesterton, "The Secret Of Flambeau", The Secret of Father Brown, p. 175. 
84 Chesterton, The Man In The Passage", The Wisdom of Father Brown, pp. 72-3. 
85 G. K. Chesterton, "On Optimism and Scepticism", All is Grist (193 I; repr. London: Methuen & Co 
Ltd, 1942), p. 177. 
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Robert Browning with the definite and deliberate doctrine, `There is no pain or evil'. he 
would certainly have classed you among the maniacs. "86 
Father Brown encounters a similar version of monism in, "The Eye of Apollo". In the 
original introduction to the story (which was later edited out), Chesterton describes the 
new religion of Apollo as, "one of the many new religions of the twentieth century that 
taught a superior innocence of sin and pain... g Elsewhere in the story, Flambeau 
makes a similar remark, describing the religion of Apollo as, "one of those new 
religions that forgives your sins by saying that you never had any. "88 The way in which 
this idea falls short of our everyday experience is powerfully illustrated in the story. 
Introducing a central character, Chesterton writes: "For Pauline Stacey had nothing to 
say to tragedy; she was understood to deny its existence"89 Only a few pages later 
Pauline Stacey is found dead, having been cruelly murdered: "For the last four minutes 
Flambeau had looked down on it; had seen the brained and bleeding figure of that 
beautiful woman who denied the existence of tragedy. "90 Chesterton knew that the 
reality of evil was an undeniable fact for any sane human being. 
The reality of evil was a central tenet in Chesterton's stories: before Father Brown 
could solve the crimes he encountered, the crimes had first to be committed. Thus for 
Chesterton and Father Brown, the reality of evil was inescapable, a fact which is 
symbolised by his story, "The Invisible Man". In this story, a crime appears to have 
been committed; only there is no sign of either the victim or the murderer. A number of 
independent witnesses confirm that these are the facts of the case. Yet Father Brown 
does not accept invisible crimes and invisible murders; and so he searches for, and 
eventually finds, the solution. The murderer is real, only he is too obvious to have been 
noticed by anyone. Father Brown's belief in the reality of evil was so deeply rooted, 
that he clung to it even when others began to doubt it. 
86 Ibid., p. 176. 
87 Quoted by Martin Gardener in his annotated notes to Chesterton, The Innocence of Father Brown. p. 
215. 
88 Chesterton, "The Eye of Apollo", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 198. 
89 Ibid., p. 200. 
`9" Ibid., p. 205. 
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The horrific nature of many of the crimes in the Father Brown stories makes it clear 
that Chesterton did not wish to ignore the reality of evil in the world. In Father Brown 
we read of the general who tries to send eight hundred men to their death to cover his 
own crime ("The Sign Of The Broken Sword"); the lawyer who swindles, ruins and 
then murders one of his clients ("The Green Man"); and the prophet who commits, 
"one of the most brutal and brilliant murders in human history. "91 The catalogue of 
horrors is practically endless. This has almost proved too much for the sensibilit" of 
some Chesterton critics, such as Christopher Hollis. Hollis thinks that the plot of The 
Secret Garden" suggests a morbid streak in Chesterton that was only later held in check 
by his conversion to Roman Catholicism. 92 He seems to forget that Chesterton included 
horrific evils in his stories, because they were an inescapable part of life. This was 
Chesterton's defence of fairy stories: "... fairy tales do not give the child the idea of the 
evil or the ugly; that is in the child already, because it is in the world already... What 
fairy tales give the child is his first clear idea of the possible defeat of bogey. -93 
Chesterton & Privation 
"The Dagger With Wings" provides us with perhaps the most clear-cut example of 
Chesterton's views on evil as a privation. In this story Father Brown makes the 
following observation, in line with traditional Roman Catholic teaching on the nature of 
evil: "All things are from God; and above all, reason and imagination and the great 
gifts of the mind. They are good in themselves; and we must not altogether forget their 
origin even in their perversion. , 94 Although not a strict philosophical definition of 
privation, this quotation confirms that Chesterton accepted the idea of evil as a 
91 /bid., p. 214 
A point made by Martin Gardener in his notes to Chesterton The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 62. 
`'' G. K. Chesterton, "The Red Angel", Tremendous Trifles (1909; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd. 
1926), p. 102. 
94 G. K. Chesterton, "The Dagger With Wings", The Incredulity of Father Brown, (1926; repr. Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1958) p. 1-1?. In a recent introduction to a collection of Father Brown stories, \k A\ 
Robson points out that Chesterton revised this story a number of times, which was unusual. This leads 
Robson to conclude that the story is pivotal to the cannon of Father Brown stories. See W. W. Robson, 
"Introduction" to G. K. Chesterton, Father Brown: A Selection (Oxford: World's Classics, 1995), p. S43. 
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privation. It explains that evil is not a substance in itself, but that it is a corruption of 
that which is good. 
Lauer explains that in Chesterton, "there quite definitely is a recognition that evil is not 
part and parcel of nature, even though imperfection is; if evil is to exist at all it has to 
be introduced by beings who are more than merely natural, beings who alone can in the 
moral sense be either good or evil... "95 The idea of evil being introduced through sin is 
something that I will examine in chapters seven and eight when I deal with the question 
of why evil exists. However, for now it is sufficient to note that Chesterton saw evil as 
a perversion of goodness; something that links him into the privation tradition. Tsanoff 
acknowledges this when he explains Augustine's position on the privation of evil: On 
a dozen fronts Augustine maintains this position: that which is called evil is really 
"96 nothing but corruption, perversion of nature. 
The idea that evil is something that corrupts or perverts the good is an affirmation of 
evil's parasitic nature. Evil is, `an ontological parasite'. In his discussion of The 
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Chesterton explains this incisively. He writes: 
"After all, Jekyll created Hyde; Hyde would never have created Jekyll; he only 
destroyed Jekyll. "97 In himself, Mr Hyde has no ontological status. He can only exist as 
a part of Dr Jekyll, and his existence ultimately destroys Jekyll as it destroys the 
goodness that is necessary for his existence. As a parasite, evil will always corrupt and 
pervert the good. This is something that Lynette Hunter discusses in her study of 
Chesterton: "The most uncanny story of the book [ The Innocence of Father Brown ] 
"The Sins Of Prince Sardine" is based on the degeneration of one of Flambeau's 
original crimes into a `copy' that makes it an evil travesty of the original. "98 The ability 
of evil to distort a good thing and make it bad, is something that Father Brown detests. 
He declares: "I always like a dog, as long as he isn't spelt backwards. "99 
95 Lauer, C. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio, p. 53. 
96 Radoslav A. Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 41. 
`'l Chesterton, Robert Louis Stevenson, p. 73. 
98 Hunter, G. K. Chesterton. p. 14?. 
9') Chesterton, The Oracle of a Dog", The Incredulity of Father Brown, p. 50 
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Chesterton used the idea of corruption extensively in his portrayal of evil. ' 00 Evil is a 
corruptive parasite which threatens to do an increasing amount of damage as it perverts 
the goodness in a thing. Father Brown elucidates this idea in "The Sign Of The Broken 
Sword": "Anyhow, there is this about such evil, that it opens door after door in hell, 
and always into smaller and smaller chambers. This is the real case against crime, that a 
man does not become wilder and wilder, but only meaner and meaner. "101 This is the 
danger that Father Brown convinces Flambeau of, causing him to renounce his life of 
crime. Father Brown warns Flambeau: "I want you to give them back, Flambeau, and I 
want you to give up this life. There is still youth and honour in you; don't fancy they 
will last in that trade. Men may keep a sort of level of good, but no man has ever been 
able to keep on one level of evil. The road goes down and down. "102 There is an echo 
of Shakespeare's play, Macbeth, in this warning: with every evil act, one becomes 
increasingly entrapped in evil. 
When I discussed the idea of evil as a privation earlier on in this chapter, I observed 
that it was difficult for writers to imagine evil in this form because it was so abstract. 
One solution to this problem is the approach utilised by Chesterton when he talks about 
evil as an active corruption of a particular good. This has the effect of presenting us 
with a concrete image. Sister Mary Edwin DeCoursey alludes to this in her discussion 
of privation. She states: "In itself privation is nothing real... But because it contravenes 
a reality, i. e., a due perfection, existing or potential, and because it has an exigency for 
specific subjects which are real beings, privation is more than simple non-being. It has 
definite, malevolent ties with reality; it is the absence that is conspicuous. " 103 [Italics 
mine] 
Although evil as an active corruption helps to embody the concept of privation, it does 
not solve Milton's predicament of how to portray Satan and other evil beings. The 
problem revolves around the impossibility of a totally evil being. John Hick explains 
"' The main technique that Chesterton uses to do this is the grotesque. See chapters four, five and six. 
Chesterton, The Sign of the Broken Sword", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 231. 
02 Chesterton, The Flying Stars", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 99. 
Sister Mary Edwin DeCoursey, The Theori' of' Evil in the Metaphysics of St Thomas anti its 
Contemporary Significance (Washington D. C.: The Catholic University Of America Press, I948). p. 34. 
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the position of Aquinas on this matter: "Since there cannot be a defect except ý, w ithin 
something good, it follows that there cannot be a purely evil being. " 104 As we saw 
earlier on, this is a problem for Milton in his attempt to portray Satan. Chesterton 
manages to side-step this problem in the Father Brown stories by not creating a figure 
who is consistently on the side of evil. Early on in the first collection of stories (The 
Innocence of Father Brown), the arch-criminal, Flambeau, is redeemed. This is 
possibly because Chesterton realised that any attempt to copy Conan Doyle's Professor 
Moriarty 105 would either contradict his idea of evil as privation, or it would result in a 
character with whom it was too easy to sympathise and admire. Instead, the Father 
Brown stories contain criminals that are always redeemable. Not all of them are 
redeemed, but that possibility always exists. One example can be seen in the Anglican 
priest in "Hammer of God". Father Brown confronts him, accuses him and then hears 
his confession. The criminal is left to decide what he must do. When he then gives 
himself up, there is a sense in which he is redeemed. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have begun my study of Chesterton's theology of evil by going back to 
first principles. The question `what is evil' is as necessary as it is difficult. It is one of 
the many questions that Chesterton addressed himself to. In this respect, he bears a 
marked resemblance to Father Brown, who, "could not help, even unconsciously, 
asking himself all the questions that there were to be asked, and answering as many of 
"106 them as he could... 
Chesterton did not believe that the theory of privation offered a complete, watertight 
explanation of evil. However, he did believe that it was a better explanation than any of 
the alternatives; none of which matched up to our experience of the world: 
104 Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 94. 
Ws The arch-enemy of Sherlock Holmes. 
106 Chesterton, "The Salad Of Colonel Cray". The Wisdom of Father Brown, pp. 157-8. 
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It is easy enough to make a plan of life of which the background is black, as the 
pessimists do... And it is easy enough to make another plan on white paper. as 
the Christian Scientists do... Lastly, it is easiest of all, perhaps, to say as the 
dualists do, that life is like a chess-board in which the two are equal... But every 
man feels in his heart that none of these three paper plans is like life ... 
107 r 
Chesterton believed that privation offered the best description of the nature of evil. At 
the same time, he was acutely aware of the difficulties involved in depicting such an 
abstract concept. Understanding privation as an active corruption or perversion of the 
good went some way towards helping Chesterton overcome this problem, although it 
did not provide a comprehensive solution. In the three chapters that follow, I will 
examine the primary technique that Chesterton adopted to enable him to depict evil 
within his fiction, a technique known as the grotesque. 
107 G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man (1925; repr. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). p. 244. 
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Chapter 4: Understanding the Grotesque 
Having established the way in which Chesterton understood the nature of evil, it is 
appropriate to move on to consider the depiction of evil in Chesterton's fiction. As we 
do so, an important question arises: What particular images of evil are we looking for? 
Are we looking for wicked characters, perverse morality, or simply terrifying 
atmospheres? One writer on the subject of the grotesque states that, the grotesque is 
repeatedly associated with gross unnatural distortions and calls to mind the fearful. the 
unearthly, the nightmarish, and the demonic. "I Similarly, the very title of Howard 
Daniel's book, Devils, Monsters and Nightmares. An Introduction to the Grotesque and 
Fantastic in Art, 2 emphasises the association between evil and the grotesque. 
The association between evil and the grotesque is further suggested by the relationship 
that exists between gothic literature and the grotesque. In many respects, the gothic 
novel is seen as the epitome of the presentation of evil: its intention being to express, 
"an atmosphere dank with chilling horror or terror, a setting drawn from the darkest 
aspects of nature, shrouded in gloom and hung with the heavy tapestries of supernatural 
dangers. ,3A number of writers have discussed the relationship between the grotesque 
and the gothic, 4 including Michael Hollington in his study on Dickens: "Moreover, 
reciprocally as it were, the grotesque figures prominently in Gothic fiction, both as a 
general atmosphere (a 1786 reviewer of Varthek praised the novel for possessing the 
sombrous grotesque of Dante') and as a term of approbation for pleasing effects 
One image common to both genres is that of the skeleton, as Maximillian Novak notes: 
John R. Clark, The Modern Satiric Grotesque (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky. 1991), p. 
19. 
2 Howard Daniel, Devils, Monsters and Nightmares: An Introduction to the Grotesque and Fantastic in 
Art (London: Abelard-Schuman Ltd, 1964). 
Robert Donald Spector, The English Gothic: A Bibliographic Guide to Writers from Horace Walpole to 
Mary Shelley (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 5. The way in which gothic literature evolved in 
the nineteenth century is a subject that I discuss in the next chapter. 
' See Margot Northey, The Haunted Wilderness: The Gothic and the Grotesque in Canadian Fiction 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976) and Maximillian E. Novak, "Gothic Fiction and the 
Grotesque", Novel 13 (Fall, 1979). 
Michael Hollington, Dickens and the Grotesque (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 23. On the same 
page, Hollington notes that: The taste for the grotesque and the taste for the Gothic were very much 
intertwined in the late 18`x' and early 19`h centuries... " 
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"The skeleton with its combination of deathly terror and horrible grin is the essence of 
the grotesque and the essence of the Gothic. "6 Chesterton discussed the image in an 
essay entitled "A Defence of Skeletons", which can be found in The Defendant (1901). ' 
The grotesque is prevalent in Chesterton, as Karen Youngberg reminds us: 
"[Chesterton's] fictions often impose on the commonplace world of London grotesque 
improbabilities which give to his fantasies the flavour of a wild and terrible dream or 
mad joke. "8 In view of the association between evil and the grotesque, C'hesterton's 
interest in the grotesque provides an ideal means of examining the way in which he 
depicts evil in his fiction. Chesterton's use of the grotesque is not an area to which 
critics have paid much attention. 9 Two of the most significant exceptions to this are the 
three pages in Arthur Clayborough's book on the grotesque which are devoted to 
Chesterton; and the chapter in John Coates' study of Chesterton that also looks at this 
subject. 10 
This chapter, the first of three addressing Chesterton and the grotesque, will begin by 
exploring Chesterton's concept of the grotesque. The two chapters that follow will look 
at the source of the grotesqueries he uses, and relate them to his understanding of evil. 
By necessity, this chapter will take a more theoretical approach to the grotesque, 
whereas the two subsequent chapters will focus on Chesterton's fiction and its relation 
to the wider tradition of the grotesque in literature. 
Novak, "Gothic Fiction and the Grotesque", p. 51. 
Also see Chesterton's poem from the 1890's. "The Skeleton". 
8 Karen Youngberg, "Job and the Gargoyles: A Study of The Man who was Thursday", The Chesterton 
Review Vol. 2 No. 2 (Spring-Summer, 1976), p. 240. 
`' As I have already noted in my introduction, Rudolf Matthius Fabritius refers to the grotesque in his 
book, Das Komische im Erzahlwerk G. K. Chestertons (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1964). 
However, this does not constitute a discussion of the grotesque, because Fabritius is merely using the 
grotesque as another term for the comic: "The separation of the comic from the grotesque is superfluous 
since Chesterton's terminology and method of portrayal resist such a distinction. " (p. 211. ) 
'° See Arthur Clayborough, The Grotesque in English Literature (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). pp. 
58-60. & John Coates, -Chapter 8: A True Sense of the Grotesque", Chesterton and the Ed t'ardian 
Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull University Press, 1984). The chapter in John Coates' book is a modified form 
of an earlier article entitled: "The Return to Hugo, A Discussion of the Intellectual Context of 
Chesterton's View of the Grotesque" in English Literature in Transition 1880-1920 Vol. 25 No. 2 
(1982). 
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In this chapter I want to look at the way in which Chesterton understood the grotesque. 
Before doing so, I will explain more precisely what I mean by the term `grotesque' and 
provide a working definition of it. Having done this, I will explore the cultural context 
in which Chesterton formulated his own conception of the grotesque. This will la) the 
foundation for examining the way in which Chesterton understood the grotesque within 
the doctrine of creation and the way in which he sought to respond to the evil it 
depicted through humour. 
The Meaning Of The Grotesque 
The word `grotesque' derives from the Latin word for the Ancient Roman `grottas' that 
were discovered in the fifteenth century, in which remnants from Nero's `Golden 
house' were discovered and excavated. The murals that were found mixed floral 
decoration with bits of mythical animals and human appendages. This distinctive style 
provided the basis for the word grotesque, which gradually made the transition from art 
into literature. As Mikhail Bakhtin explained about these murals: "They impressed the 
connoisseurs by the extremely fanciful, free and playful treatment of plant, animal and 
human forms. These forms seemed to be interwoven as if giving birth to each other. 
The borderlines that divide the kingdoms of nature in the usual picture of the World 
were boldly infringed. "' 
Although this fusion of separate elements in nature can be semantically traced to 
Ancient Rome, its true origins are even older. Wolfgang Kayser writes: "It was soon 
discovered that this style was by no means native to the Romans but had reached Italy 
as a new fashion relatively late... " 12 Similar examples of grotesqueries to those found 
in the grottas also appear to have been present in both early Egypt, 13 and ancient 
Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (1965; trans. Helene Iswolsky, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1984), p. 32. 
12 Wolfgang Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature (1957; trans. Ulrich Weisstein, Indiana: 
Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 19-20. 
Thomas Wright, .4 
History of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art (1865: repr. London: 
Chatto & Windus, 1875), p. 3. 
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Greece. 14 Fritz Gysin concludes: "Whereas the term merely dates back to the sixteenth 
century and was not even applied to literature until the eighteenth century. the 
phenomenon itself is much older; Aristophanes uses grotesque elements in the Greek 
theatre, Vitruvius attests its existence in Augustan art, and, in English literature, 
grotesque figures have been found already in Piers Plowman and in the Canterbury 
Tales. "' 5 
In more recent years, explanations and interpretations of the grotesque have utilised 
different approaches. While critics such as Mikhail Bakhtin have taken a sociological 
slant, others, such as Wolfgang Kayser, have favoured a more psychological approach. 
Both Kayser and Bakhtin have come to be regarded as seminal thinkers in the area of 
the grotesque, despite the fact that they disagree on a number of points. Indeed, 
Bakhtin's book was written partly as a response to Kayser's work on the grotesque. 
Their central debate has focused on whether the grotesque is primarily an expression of 
comedy, or terror. 
Earlier writers on the grotesque noticed the presence of comedy and terror. Notable in 
this regard are Victor Hugo (1802-85) and John Ruskin (1819-1900), two important 
nineteenth-century commentators on the grotesque. Hugo wrote: "In modern creations, 
on the other hand, the grotesque plays an enormous part. It is to be found everywhere; 
on the one hand it creates the deformed and the horrible; on the other hand, the comic, 
the buffoon. " 16 John Ruskin made a similar observation in The Stones of Venice: "... it 
14 Ibid., p. 10. Victor Hugo also noticed the presence of the grotesque in ancient Greece in his "Preface to 
Cromwell", The Dramas of Victor Hugo Vol. 8 (Trans. I. C. Burnham, London: H. S. Nichols, 1896). p. 
14. 
1' Fritz Gysin, The Grotesque in American Negro Fiction (Switzerland: Francke Verlag Bern, 1975). pp. 
22-3. 
16 Hugo, "Preface to Cromwell", p. 14. John Coates emphasises the importance of Hugo's contribution to 
the grotesque in his article, "The Return to Hugo, A Discussion of the Intellectual Context of 
Chesterton's View of the Grotesque". The importance of Hugo's extended "Preface to Cromwell". is also 
noted by Dieter Meindl in his discussion of the history of the grotesque: "The outstanding French 
contribution is Victor Hugo's preface to his 1827 play Cromwell. ". American Fiction and the 
Metaphysics of the Grotesque (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1996), p. 13. In a similar sein 
are the comments made by Donald Fanger, Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism.. 4 Study cif Dostoevsky in 
Relation to Balzac, Dickens, and Gogol (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 229. 
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seems to me that the grotesque is, in almost all cases, composed of two elements. one 
ludicrous, the other fearful.. "17 
While Bakhtin has emphasised the ludicrous side of the grotesque, Kayser has 
emphasised the fearful element. Towards the end of his book, Kayser explains the 
nature of the grotesque by using three categories that reveal his bent towards the 
element of terror. These are: (1) The Grotesque is the estranged world (in which we are 
aliens, unable to orientate ourselves); (2) The Grotesque is a play with the absurd 
(although he says it is a dangerous game); and (3) The Grotesque is an attempt to 
invoke and subdue the demonic aspects of the world. ' 8 All three categories discuss the 
grotesque in terms of the fearful world that surrounds us. Thus Kayser tell us: 
"Laughter originates on the comic and caricatural fringe of the grotesque. "9 In sharp 
contrast to this approach, Bakhtin argues that the grotesque is primarily comic: 
"However, the most important transformation of Romantic grotesque [from the 
Medieval and Renaissance] was that of the principle of laughter. This element of course 
remained, since no grotesque, even the most timid, is conceivable in the atmosphere of 
absolute seriousness. But laughter was cut down to cold humour, irony, sarcasm. It 
ceased to be a joyful and triumphant hilarity. "20 The way in which this comic emphasis 
practically ignores the element of terror is freely admitted by Bakhtin in his discussion 
of the medieval depictions of the Devil. Bakhtin declares: "There is nothing terrifying 
or alien in him. , 21 
In many respects, the debate between Kayser and Bakhtin as to whether the grotesque 
is primarily ludicrous, or fearful, revolves around the historical periods that they focus 
on. Kayser's interest centres on the Romantic and Modern era, whereas Bakhtin 
focuses his study on the Medieval and Renaissance period. Bakhtin admits that the 
different periods they cover determine the way in which they conceive of the grotesque: 
" John Ruskin, The Stones of Venice, Vol. 3 (1853: repr. London: George Allen, 1900). pp. 124-5. 
18 Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, pp. 179-189. 
19 Ibid., p. 187. 
- Bakhtin, Rabelais and His ii orld, pp. 37-8. 




History of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art. He wrote: The devils are 
droll 
but not frightful, they provoke laughter, or at least excite a smile, but the\ create no 
horror. " (p. 73. ) 
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The images of the Romantic grotesque usually express fear of the world and seek to 
inspire their readers with this fear... " He continues: "On the other hand, the medieval 
and Renaissance folk culture... turned [terror] into something gay and comic. ' 22 The 
problem of interpreting the grotesque through a particular historical lens is one that 
Frances Barasch has recognised and commented upon: "Modern uses of -grotesque' 
differ remarkably from each other because the critics employing them have in mind 
separate historical traditions for the use of the word. "23 
Although the different approaches outlined cover important aspects of the grotesque, 
they still do not fully explain exactly what it is. Indeed, one critic has observed the \\ ay 
in which recent debate is indicative of the problem: "The Grotesque has been much 
written about in recent years, primarily because no one is exactly sure what it is. "24 
When it comes to the subject of the grotesque, the problem of definition is actually 
quite acute: "... it seems to be one of those quickly cheapened terms which are used to 
express a considerable degree of emotional involvement without providing a qualitative 
distinction between the rather vague terms `strange', `incredible', `unbelievable' - it is 
certainly not a well-defined category of scientific thinking. , 25 In an attempt to explain 
this predicament, Geoffrey Harpham provides us with a helpful insight: "One reason 
for this confusion is that the grotesque is so omnipresent that nearly any theory at all 
can be supported by a judicious choice of examples. , 26 Yet despite the omnipresence of 
the grotesque, and the resulting difficulties in defining it, there seems to be little 
problem in recognising the grotesque when it occurs. John Sykes, attempting to define 
the grotesque, reminds us that grotesqueries are not, "so unprecedented that we do not 
recognize them at all. , 27 
22 Ibid., p. 39. Once again, a similar comment on the comic use of the grotesque in the medieval period 
can be found in Wright, A History of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art, p. 73. 
'' Frances K. Barasch, The Grotesque: A Study in Meanings (The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1971), p. 10. 
'4 Kelly Anspaugh, "Jean Qui Rit and Jean Qui Pleure: James Joyce, Wyndham Lewis and the High 
Modern Grotesque", in Michael Meyer, ed., Literature and the Grotesque (Amsterdam: Rodopi 
Perspectives on Modern Literature, 1995), p. 129. 
` Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, p. 17. 
26 Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in . -brt and 
Literature (Neww 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1982). p. xviii. 
27 Ibid., p. 3. 
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In his article on Chesterton, Patrick Keats declares: "Chesterton never gives a precise 
definition for the term `grotesque', apparently believing that such an unruly subject 
resists definition... "28 While it is true that Chesterton does not give us a precise 
definition, he makes some attempt at defining aspects of the grotesque. For this reason, 
it seems appropriate to begin this examination of Chesterton and the grotesque by 
trying to establish a working definition of what we are talking about. As Bernard 
McElroy has noted, such an attempt must recognise from the outset, "that the limits of 
definition of the word must be fairly flexible. , 29 
In their attempts to define the grotesque, a number of critics have captured something 
of the essence of the grotesque. Geoffrey Harpham describes the grotesque as, the 
sense that things that should be kept apart are fused together. , 30 Though true, this 
remains too loose to become an effective definition. Margot Northey's attempt at 
further clarification leads her to state that, "the grotesque emphasizes incongruity, 
disorder, and deformity, and arises from the juxtaposition or clash of the ideal with the 
real, the psychic with the physical, or the concrete with the symbolic .,, 
31 Once again, 
this definition though helpful, remains inadequate. It ignores the tension between 
comedy and terror that we have already seen to be so integral to the work of Kayser and 
Bakhtin. To establish a working definition that is both comprehensive and flexible. I 
wish to suggest three principles that govern the grotesque. 
Firstly, the grotesque includes a combination of comedy and terror. As I noted earlier, 
32 this is an idea that can be traced back to writers such as Ruskin and Hugo. The 
different emphasis' offered by Kayser and Bakhtin serve to illustrate that in fact, the 
grotesque involves both comedy and terror. It is this strange combination, in which the 
reader does not know whether to laugh or be horrified, that gives the grotesque so much 
of its particular style, and is responsible for its particular effect. Dieter Meindl writes: 
28 Patrick H. Keats, "Chesterton, Browning and the Decadents", The Chesterton Review Vol. 19 No. 2 
(May, 1993), p. 184. 
"' Bernard McElroy, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), p. 2. 
'0 Harpham, On the Grotesque, p. 11. 
Northey, The Haunted Wilderness, p. 7. 
This combination of comedy and terror goes back even earlier than Ruskin and Hugo if ýNe take Gothic 
literature into account. See my discussion of Gothic literature in chapter five. 
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"There exists at present a certain consensus among literary critics and scholars 
regarding the essential nature of the grotesque. It is widely conceived as a combination 
of, or, rather, tension between, humour and horror, as provoking laughter and fear. "" 
Secondly, the grotesque includes a combination of fantasy and reality. Whether applied 
to character, situation, or atmosphere, the grotesque juxtaposes the fantastic in the 
context of the real. This aspect is carefully explained by Paula Uruburu: The true 
Grotesque... distinguishes itself from the supernatural tale or horror story: its 
dependence upon reality; its characters move about in a world we accept or 
acknowledge as our own; its impact upon our emotions stems from its ability to 
successfully and realistically portray the eruption of the abnormal in our everyday 
lives. , 34 Thus the grotesque is clearly distinct from genres such as fairy tales in which a 
secondary world is created that is intentionally distinct from our own. 3' As Philip 
Thomson puts it, "the grotesque derives at least some of its effect from being presented 
within a realistic framework, in a realistic way. "36 
Thirdly, the grotesque includes physical distortion or exaggeration. As we observed 
earlier, this was the style discovered in the excavated Roman `grottas' that provided the 
semantic origin for the grotesque. In theorising about the grotesque, this element of the 
physical or visual can easily be lost, and yet it is an integral part of the grotesque. 
McElroy explains: "In literature, it exists in precisely those works that use language to 
evoke for the reader a vivid visual image which is perceived as grotesque". 
37 The 
importance of the physical side of the grotesque is heavily emphasised by Bakhtin. 
Chapter five of his book, Rabelais and His World, is entitled "The Grotesque Image of 
the Body and its Sources". 
11 Meindl, American Fiction and the Metaphysics of the Grotesque, p. 6. 
N Paula M Uruburu, The Gruesome Doorway: An Analysis of the American Grotesque (New York: Peter 
Lang, 1987), p. 1. 
For a discussion of how fairy tales create a secondary world - the land of Faierie - see J. R. R. 
Tolkien's essay, "On Fairy Stories" (1947 - deriving from a lecture given at the University of 
St 
Andrews in 1938). 
36 Philip Thomson, The Grotesque (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), p. 8. 
'' McElroy. Fictions of the Modern Grotesque, p. ix. Also see Thomson, The Grotesque, p. 57. 
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Understanding The Grotesque - Chesterton's Contemporaries 
Certain aspects of nineteenth century thought exerted a significant influence on 
Chesterton. This is why Leo Hetzler includes a section on the nineteenth century in his 
doctoral thesis on Chesterton: "In presenting an analysis of the thought contained in 
Chesterton's writings from 1900-1914, I should like to examine first his ideas and 
judgements on the nineteenth century, the age from which he and his generation were 
descended and against which they reacted. , 38 Much of Chesterton's literary criticism 
was written about this period, including critical biographies of Stevenson, Dickens and 
Browning, as well as his study, The Victorian Age in Literature (1913). In addition, 
Chesterton's early career involved working at a publisher where he was required to 
read manuscripts written during the late Victorian period. In 1895 he began work at a 
small publishers called Redways. 39 After nine months he moved to the larger 
publishing firm, Fisher Unwin, where he remained until 1901. Michael Coren has noted 
in his biography, that Chesterton claimed to have read ten thousand volumes during this 
period, and challenged people to test him on it. 40 In view of this, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Chesterton was immersed in the literary culture of late Victorian 
41 England 
The Victorian period, with which Chesterton was so well acquainted, was full of 
various aspects of the grotesque, and this undoubtedly influenced Chesterton's own 
38 Leo Hetzler, The Early Literary Career of G. K. Chesterton: His Literary Apprenticeship and an 
. Analysis of 
his Thought, 1874-1914 (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Cornell University, 1964), p. 132. 
'`' Interestingly enough, Joseph Pearce notes in his recent biography of Chesterton, that Redways 
specialised in occultic literature, Joseph Pearce, Wisdom and Innocence: A Life of C. K. Chesterton 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996), pp. 35-6. The branch of the occult that Redways specialised in 
was spiritualism, which Chesterton was particularly wary of after experimenting with the ouija board 
during his youth. See G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), pp. 79-83. 
40 Michael Coren, Gilbert, The Man who was G. K. Chesterton (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1989), p. 68. 
Coren goes on to say that when Chesterton was taken up on this challenge, he was invariably successful. 
A further reference to this is made by Maisie Ward, Gilbert Keith Chesterton (London: Sheed & Ward, 
1944), p. 146. 
4' Two Chesterton critics address this relationship directly in separate monographs. A. M. A. Bogaerts, 
Chesterton and the Victorian Age (Holland: Hilversum. 1940) & Patrick Henry Keats, G. K. Chesterton 
and the Victorians: Dialogue, Dialectic and Synthesis (Unpublished PhD Thesis: The Catholic 
University of America, 1994). Keats introduces his thesis by explaining: "I will present in this 
dissertation the thesis that Chesterton's most original and significant contributions, both as a literary 
artist and critic, developed through his close connection with.. . the 
late Victorian period. " (pp. 3-4. ) 
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work. On a non-literary level, John Clark has pointed out that a hint of the grotesque 
even infiltrated Victorian architecture: "The Victorians were placidly fond of garish 
furniture, elaborate and wildly ornate lamps and screens and wallpaper, or of sofas 
whose arms and legs were transmogrified into eagle's talons, elaborate vines, or lion's 
claws. "42 One of the other, more popular, ways in which the grotesque entered 
Victorian culture was through their interest and obsession with freaks and freak shows. 
This is the subject of Martin Howard's book, Victorian Grotesque. Chesterton 
experienced something of the Victorian interest in freaks at first hand. In his younger 
years, many of his fellow schoolboys regarded him as an oddity or freak. Michael 
Coren describes his period at Colet Court Preparatory School: "At gym class the rest of 
the boys would break from their frenzied activities to watch Gilbert fail to jump over 
the exercise horse, or make no headway on the climbing frame. "43 When Chesterton 
first moved to St Paul's, little had changed. He was extremely tall for his age, had little 
physical agility, and spoke with a high pitched voice. 
The grotesque can also be found in the work of various nineteenth-century writers; 
many of whom Chesterton was well acquainted with. One of these was H. G. Wells, 
who began writing during the late nineteenth century, and subsequentl} became a 
contemporary and friend of Chesterton. In thinking about the grotesque, his book The 
Invisible Man is particularly relevant. Many people forget that the full title of this book, 
published in 1897, was The Invisible Man: A Grotesque Romance. Discussing its 
treatment of the grotesque, Bruce Beiderwell reminds us of the importance of the 
subtitle: "A tension between play and terror, along with a resistance to the full 
recognition of them functions as the central technique in The Invisible Man. -44 
Robert Browning was another nineteenth-century writer with a fondness for the 
grotesque -a point highlighted by Chesterton in his book on Browning. Upon 
publication of Chesterton's study, one reviewer observed that Chesterton shared 
Browning's liking for grotesqueries. "What, then, is this idiosyncratic insolence of 
4-1 Clark, The Modern Satiric Grotesque, p. 25. 
ý3 Coren, Gilbert: The Man who was G. K. Chesterton, p. 22. 
`' Bruce Beiderwell, "The Grotesque in Well's The Invisible Man", Extrapolation Vol. 24 No. 4 (1983). 
p. 302.1 discuss Wells' novel further in chapter six of the thesis. 
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Browning which appeals to Mr Chesterton? It is, I think. his perception of that 
grotesque element in existence which is the true basis of optimism. Mr Chesterton's 
humour, like Browning's, is based on the cosmic incongruity which exists between the 
soul of man and the external universe... "45 Chesterton's book on Browning constitutes 
his most sustained discussion of the grotesque. It provides the material for the 
discussion I referred to earlier by Arthur Clayborough on Chesterton and the grotesque. 
Chesterton's book, though typically full of generalisations and factual inaccuracies, 
became a key work on Browning, a point grudgingly admitted by Philip Drew: "... it is 
still probably the best single book to put into the hands of somebody who wishes to 
begin learning about Browning. That it should be so is no very flattering commentary 
on the Browning literature since 1903. "46 Chesterton's recognition of the grotesque in 
Browning has prompted other studies of Robert Browning which explore this aspect. In 
her thesis on Browning, Lilly Bess Campbell refers to Browning as the, "poet of the 
great grotesque". 47 
Chesterton was also attracted to Charles Dickens, a writer who is often associated with 
elements of the grotesque. Chesterton's studies include Charles Dickens (1906) and 
Appreciations and Criticisms of the Works of Charles Dickens (1911). Dickens' interest 
in the grotesque has been examined in considerable depth by Michael Hollington, in his 
book, Dickens and the Grotesque. 48 Although Dickens is traditionally known as a 
realist, his novels also contain a hint of something bizarre and strange. Edgar Johnson 
was well aware of this when he exclaimed: "No writer so intimately fuses the familiar 
`'; James Douglas, "Personality in Literature", The Bookman (July 1903), quoted in Denis Conlon. ed., 
G. K. Chesterton: The Critical Judgements - Part 1 1900-1937 (Antwerp: Antwerp Studies in English 
Literature, 1976), p. 75. 
"' Philip Drew, An Annotated Critical Bibliography of Robert Browning (London: Harvester Wheatsheat; 
1990), p. 20. 
4' Lilly Bess Campbell, The Grotesque in the Poetry of Robert Browning (Masters thesis. published in 
the Bulletin of the University of Texas No. 92,1907), p. 17. Another, more comprehensive thesis on 
Browning and the grotesque is A. Bandyopadhyay, The Grotesque in Browning 's Poetry with Special 
Reference to the Period 1855-1869 (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Birbeck College, University of London, 
1974-5). Bandyopadhyay considers Chesterton in his thesis, noting that: "The grotesque happened to be 
one of his favourite themes. " (p. 116. ) 
48 For further work on this subject, see D. S. Racadio, The Comic, the Grotesque and the Uncanny in 
Charles Dickens (Unpublished PhD Thesis: University of East Anglia, 1990) and D. P. Kelly. Temporary 
Subversion: the Grotesque in the Novels of Charles Dickens (University of Sheffield: Unpublished MPhil 
thesis, 1989). The subject of the grotesque is also raised throughout Mark Spilka's study. Dickens and 
Kafka: A Mutual Interpretation (London: Denis Dobson, 1963). 
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and the strange as Dickens does. "49 Earlier I explained how the mix of the fantastic and 
the real was an essential component of the grotesque. In some respects, Dickens acts as 
a microcosm of the way in which the Victorian period mixed these two elements., 0 
When I proceed to examine Chesterton's use of the grotesque in subsequent chapters. 
we shall see how this Victorian blend infiltrated much of what he wrote. 
The subject of the grotesque in art and literature was a subject addressed by many of 
the Victorian Sages on different occasions. '' For example, John Ruskin discussed the 
grotesque in the third volume of his work, The Stones of Venice, and John Addington 
Symonds (1840-1893) did the same in volume one of his work, Essays Speculatily and 
Suggestive. Indeed, the prevalence of the grotesque among these thinkers provides the 
basis for John Coates' analysis of Chesterton and the grotesque that I alluded to at the 
start of this chapter. At the beginning of his discussion, Coates outlines his plan to 
discuss Chesterton and the grotesque "within their intellectual context". 52 
Many of the Victorian Sages inherited a particular conception of beauty that derived 
from Ancient Greece, and made beauty synonymous with goodness. According to 
Chesterton, the Greek understanding of beauty was extremely narrow because of the 
way in which it rejected anything that was perceived to be either ugly or grotesque. '3 In 
an essay entitled "On Gargoyles", Chesterton suggested that the Greeks had idealised 
beauty, and used it to try and emulate God: "The old Greeks summoned godlike things 
to worship their god. , 54 This worship of beauty in itself meant that the Greeks had no 
tolerance for anything that fell short of it, hence their dislike for the grotesque. The 
4') Edgar Johnson, Charles Dickens: His Tragedy and Triumph Vol. 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster 
Inc., 1952), p. 22. 
") The Victorian period combines fantastic works such as Bram Stoker's Dracula and Lewis Carroll's 
. Alice's Adventures 
in Wonderland, with realists such as George Eliot. One example of an indi% idual 
work that blends the fantastic and the real is Robert Louis Stevenson's novella, The Strange Case of Dr 
Jekyll and Mr Hyde. 
The `Victorian Sages' was the collective name given to key thinkers in nineteenth-century Britain. 
Examples of the Sages include Thomas Carlyle, Walter Pater, John Ruskin & Walter Bagehot. 
Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 171. 
lt is important to note that Chesterton almost invariably uses the words 'ugly' and 'grotesque' 
interchangeably. I will follow this pattern in my use of both words throughout this chapter. 
54 G. K. Chesterton, "On Gargoyles", 41arrns and Discursions (1910; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 
1924), p. 4. 
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continuing influence of this Greek aesthetic in Chesterton's era can be found in the 
writings of George Santayana (1863-1952) and John Addington Symonds. In defence 
of his aesthetic principle, Symonds conflates ethics and aesthetics when he "rites: ": fit 
a certain point art must make the common cause with morality... If it repudiates this 
obligation, it errs against its own ideal of harmony, rhythm, repose, synthetic beaut\. It 
introduces an element which we seek to subordinate in life... "" Chesterton"s desire to 
repudiate this viewpoint can be clearly seen in his essay "A Defence of Ugly Things", 
where he declares: "The tyrants and deceivers of mankind in this matter have been the 
Greeks. 56 
By rejecting the ability of the grotesque to depict art or literature that was beautiful, the 
Victorian Sages ensured that the grotesque suffered a loss of status during the Victorian 
period . 
57 John Coates explains that "Walter Bagehot... was unwilling ... to grant 
it [the 
grotesque], except in theory, any significant stature. "58 A similar attitude to the 
grotesque can also be found in John Addington Symonds: In Symonds' view it can 
have no originality and must be parasitic on the `real' world. "'9 According to Coates, 
even Ruskin effectively demotes the grotesque: "The grotesque impulse, for Ruskin, 
chiefly occupies a middle rank in the human temper between the perfect, and those 
either too morose, dull or exhausted to invent a jest. "60 It was in response to the 
Victorian Sages, albeit indirectly, that Chesterton defended the status of the grotesque. 
In an essay entitled "On Carols", Chesterton defended the status of the incongruous 
images within certain Christmas carols, by arguing that they required a considerable 
level of artistic skill. He stated: "It is the art of the grotesque; but many critics forget 
that the art of the grotesque is an art ... 
The Mock Turtle may be a mixture of different 
55 John Addington Symonds, Essays Speculative and Suggestive Vol. 1 (of 2) (London: Chapman & Hall, 
1890), p. 251. 
"' Chesterton, "A Defence of Ugly Things", The Defendant. p. 114. 
57 John Coates suggests that Walter Pater was the one possible exception to this. 
58 Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 176. 
' Ibid., p. 177. 
60 Ibid., p. 175. 
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animals; but not a mixture of any animals or all animals... There must be a shape. a 
design, and a relation in fantastic form. "61 
As well as attacking the way in which the classicists and neo-classicists worshiped 
beauty, Chesterton attacked the decadents' worship of the grotesque. As Bernard 
McElroy tells us: "Decadence and the grotesque have long been at home in each other's 
company. "62 The decadence movement enjoyed the bizarre expression afforded it by 
the grotesque, and the association between the two became increasingly common in the 
1890's: 
In an age that was both attracted to and repelled by the possible mutation and 
deformation of meaning, the grotesque naturally became a prevalent stylistic 
metaphor for fundamental metaphysical dislocation. . . 
Capitalism's erosion of 
the traditional structures of nineteenth-century society as well as an increased 
interest in prehistory, alchemy and the occult combined to make the Victorian 
fin de siecle fertile ground for fantastic and monstrous elements. 63 
One of the figures at the forefront of the decadent movement was Aubrey Beardsley 
(1872-98), a writer and illustrator who once commented to an interviewer: '`I have one 
aim - the grotesque. If I am not grotesque, I am nothing. , 
64 Chesterton devoted a 
portion of his book on William Blake to a discussion of Beardsley's grotesque art . 
ý'ý 
Chesterton believed that the decadents also had too narrow an aesthetic. Whereas the 
neo-classicists had made the mistake of making beauty synonymous with goodness. the 
decadents simply replaced beauty with ugliness. Chesterton thought that the decadents 
had begun to love the ugly for the sake of its ugliness. Their enjoyment of the ugly was 
not initially wrong, but it became wrong when they forgot that art was ultimately for 
the glory of God: "The modern realists [i. e. the decadents] summon all these million 
`'' G. K. Chesterton, "On Carols", Generally Speaking (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1928), p. 168. 
62 McElroy, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque, p. 129. 
6, Chris Snodgrass, Aubrey Beardsley: Dandy of the Grotesque (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1995), p. 27. 
64 Recorded by Linda Gestner Zatlin in her book, Beardsley Japonisme and the Perversion of the 
! Victorian Ideal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 217. 
65 G. K. Chesterton, William Blake (1910; repr. London: Duckworth & Co Ltd, 1920), pp. 189-96. For a 
more detailed discussion of Chesterton's interaction with the decadents, see chapter six. 
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creatures to worship their god; and then have no god for them to worship. -66 Without a 
God to worship, Chesterton thought that the decadents had begun to worship the ugly 
(or grotesque). In other words, the decadents had begun to derive ultimate meaning and 
value from the grotesque, rather than using it as a means to an end. One recent Writer 
on decadence explains the aesthetic reversal that occurred: "Decadence. in short. 
amounts to a reformation of the aesthetic code whereby art brings forth its meaning. 
Christian and classical values are very much in the process of being rejected and 
»67 replaced... 
Although Chesterton rejected the philosophy of decadence, John Coates correctly 
observes that Chesterton shared a similar perspective to the decadents concerning the 
grotesque. "Chesterton's attitude to the grotesque involves, among much else. an 
attempt to recapture from the aesthetes and decadents their most defensible insight into 
the nature of art, the real value of unexpected combinations and their connection ýt ith 
energy. "68 Both Chesterton and the decadents saw the potential value of the grotesque. 
The difference was that Chesterton thought it valuable because he believed that the 
whole of existence was exciting, whereas the decadents liked the grotesque because 
they had grown tired of existence: "The decadents' fascination with the grotesque. then. 
proceeded from a fundamental pessimism which caused them to turn away from 
ordinary subjects, seeing these as dull and unworthy of artistic treatment. Hence they 
felt the need to seek out, or else to invent, bizarre and often perverse artistic subjects. -69 
This is the crux of the difference between Chesterton and the decadents concerning the 
grotesque, and it explains how Chesterton could be so close to the decadent's position, 
and yet remain so far. When discussing the decadence of the Marquis De Sade. 
Chesterton made his revulsion of worshipping the grotesque clear: "... but the point is 
66 Chesterton, "On Gargoyles", Alarms and Discursions, p. 4. 
"- David Weir, Decadence and the Making of Modernism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 
1995), p. 14. 
68 Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 183. Chesterton's relationship \ý ith the 
decadents is more ambivalent than is often assumed. See chapter six for more detail on this point. 
01' Keats, "Chesterton, Browning and the Decadents", p. 184. 
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that they did pursue evil; not pleasure, or excess of pleasure, or sex or sensualit\. but 
evil. "70 
In his discussion of Chesterton and the grotesque, Coates concludes by suggesting that 
Chesterton's response to his intellectual context involved a return to the thought of 
Victor Hugo. Regardless of whether or not this is strictly true, it is clear that Chesterton 
defended the grotesque from many of the views held by his contemporaries. Although 
Chesterton recognised the association between evil and the grotesque, he also valued 
the grotesque, and did not see it as inherently evil. Nor did he see it as a form of second 
class art. At the same time, he did not follow the decadents in worshipping the 
grotesque because of its ugliness. 
The Grotesque & Creation 
The grotesque is the natural expression of joy... When real human beings have real 
delights they tend to express them entirely in grotesques... "7 I Chesterton thus argues 
that the grotesque is a creative expression of joy. It is a process that he sees affirmed in 
one of the Gospel accounts: "When the street children shouted too loud, certain 
priggish disciples did begin to rebuke them in the name of good taste. He said: If these 
were silent the very stones would cry out. ' With these words... He founded Gothic 
architecture. "72 Chesterton believed that as God had expressed his joy in creation 
through the grotesque, so too could man express his joy in grotesque art and literature. 
He argued that Nature's creative energy could not be contained in a narrow aesthetic 
sphere. Instead, it insisted on bursting out into grotesque creations. As a result. one 
purpose of the grotesque was to remind us that `mere existence' is an exciting and 
wonderful thing. 
"' Chesterton, The Dangers of Necromancy", The Common Man (London: Sheed & Ward, 1950) p. 95. 
7` G. K. Chesterton, Appreciations and Criticisms of the Works of Charles Dickens (1911. repr. as 
Chesterton on Dickens, London: Everyman, 1992), p. 1 10. 
?'G. K. Chesterton, "The Tower", Tremendous Trifles (1909; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1926). p. 
Ill. 
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Chesterton's understanding of the grotesque as an expression of the joy of existence 
immediately raises a difficulty. How are we to account for deformity? For example. did 
Chesterton really believe that a child born with three legs could be described as an 
expression of God's joy in creation? The answer to this question is clearly no, for, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, Chesterton was keen to affirm the reality of evil. This 
apparent contradiction can be reconciled when we look further at two different 
meanings that Chesterton ascribed to the term grotesque. 
A distinction needs to be made between Chesterton's use of the grotesque as a 
description of that which is simply strange, and his use of the term as a way of 
describing something that is deformed or corrupt in some sense. Although he did not 
articulate this distinction, it is clearly implied in his writings. On a number of 
occasions, Chesterton talked about the grotesque as something that was aesthetically 
strange. In the "Ballade of the Grotesque", he repeatedly describes aspects of creation 
with the phrase: "The shape is decidedly queer. , 73 On other occasions, his use of the 
grotesque refers to a corruption or deformity within something. 74 It is only in this 
second usage that the grotesque becomes a means of representing evil in some form, 
recognising John Ruskin's observation that, "it is not possible to express intense 
wickedness without some condition of degradation. , 75 When Chesterton talks about the 
grotesque expressing the joy and wonder of existence, he means the grotesque in terms 
of the strange rather than the deformed. 
In response to his interpretation of Greek aesthetics, Chesterton affirmed the strange as 
an element of existence that was just as valid as the beautiful. On occasion, he even 
argued that nature's greatest quality was its strange ugliness: "The highest and most 
valuable quality in nature is not her beauty, but her generous and defiant 
ugliness... This is the deepest, the oldest, the most wholesome and religious sense of the 
value of nature - the value which comes from her immense babyishness. '76 Implicit 
within all of this is the belief that nature itself is stranger than we might otherwise 
'' G. K. Chesterton, The Coloured Lands (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938), pp. 114-5. 
'` Examples of this can be found in chapters five and six. 
'' Ruskin, The Stones of ! Venice, Vol. 3, p. 145. 
76 Chesterton, The Defendant, p. 48. 
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think. This idea is the main one that emerges from Chesterton's analysis of Browning 
and the grotesque. In using the grotesque, Browning mirrors nature which is itself 
strange; not rounded and beautiful. If, as Chesterton argues, nature is strange. then the 
grotesque actually involves, "a spontaneous intuition of the world". 77 
In his book on Robert Browning, Chesterton expounds his belief that the grotesque 
forcefully reminds us of the wonder of nature. 78 This particular perspecti\ e has been 
noted by other critics on the grotesque. Arthur Clayborough's discussion of Chesterton 
and the grotesque hinges on this concept: "The chief point of interest in Chesterton's 
remarks on the grotesque is the idea that the grotesque may be employed as a means of 
presenting the world in a new light without falsifying it. "79 In addition, Philip Thomson 
comments on how Chesterton saw, "that it may be a function of the grotesque to make 
us see the (real) world anew, from a fresh perspective which, though it be a strange and 
disturbing one, is nevertheless valid and realistic. " Thomson goes on to note: "This is a 
notion which gains importance in the twentieth century... "80 One of the reasons that it 
has gained importance in the twentieth century is that more and more critics have seen 
that the grotesque can be used to remind people forcefully of that which has been 
forgotten through familiarity. Whereas Chesterton wanted to remind people of the 
wonder of creation, Thomson notes how the grotesque can also remind us of our 
alienation in the world: "Something which is familiar and trusted is suddenly made 
strange and disturbing. "8' Carl Skrade has noted a similar technique of forceful 
remembrance in the work of Flannery O'Connor: "O'Connor uses the grotesque 
because of what she perceives to be the deafness of modern man to his own 
predicament: `To the hard of hearing you shout; to the almost blind you draw large and 
startling figures. ,, 82 
McElroy, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque, p. 184. 
78 G. K. Chesterton, Robert Browning (1903; repr. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1967). p. 151. 
79 Clayborough, The Grotesque in English Literature, p. 60. 
80 Thomson, The Grotesque, p. 17. 
81 Ibid., p. 59. 
82 Carl Skrade, God and the Grotesque (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974). p. 87. 
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In the period he wrote, Chesterton did not just believe that the strange could remind us 
of the wonder of the familiar; he believed that the strange was required to remind its of 
the wonder of the familiar. As we have already discussed, the decadents symbolised the 
way in which many moderns had simply grown tired of existence. In response to this. 
Chesterton used the grotesque to dislocate our weariness and familiarity with existence: 
"Religion has for centuries been trying to make men exult in the `wonders' of creation. 
but it has forgotten that a thing cannot be completely wonderful so long as it remains 
sensible. "83 This is a similar idea to Hugo's belief in the ability of the grotesque to 
retain and restore a sense of wonder: "It does away with all thought of monoton\ . 
--`4 
Following on from this, McElroy offers the following insight into the grotesque: "It 
distorts or exaggerates the surface of reality in order to tell us a qualitative truth about 
lt. "85 
Chesterton saw both the strange and the deformed within creation. He believed that the 
strange was part of God's original design, whereas the deformed was a result of human 
sin. 86 This can be seen in the distinction that he made between exaggeration and 
distortion, both techniques of the grotesque. 87 Chesterton argued that exaggeration 
merely develops a theme that is already found within existence: In short, if one is 
really to exaggerate the truth, one must have some truth to exaggerate. "88 Elsewhere, 
Chesterton tells us: "In one sense truth alone can be exaggerated; nothing else can stand 
the strain. , 89 In contrast, distortion involves a deficiency of some sort, which 
Chesterton found in the art of Aubrey Beardsley: "In Aubrey Beardsley the artistic 
thrill (and there is an artistic thrill) consists in the fact that the women are not quite 
811 Chesterton, The Defendant, p. 69. 
84 Hugo, "Preface to Cromwell", p. 21. 
85 McElroy, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque, p. 5. 
8( For a further discussion of Chesterton's belief in original sin, see chapter seven. 
8 See Chesterton, William Blake, pp. 191-6. 
88 Ibid., p. 195. 
"' Chesterton, Charles Dickens (1906; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1943), p. 134. 
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women nor the men quite men. Blake has absolutely no trace of this morbidit\ of 
deficiency. "90 
While Chesterton is more comfortable with exaggeration and the strange than he is with 
the deformed and the deficient, he argued that poets had a moral responsibility to 
include both within their work: "Telling the truth about the terrible struggle of the 
human soul is surely a very elementary part of the ethics of honesty. If the characters 
are not wicked, the book is. "91 Both the strange and the deformed grotesque should be 
an integral part of the artist's creation because they are an integral part of the created 
order. This idea underlies Victor Hugo's defence of the grotesque: 
Christianity leads poetry into the paths of truth.. . It will feel that everything in 
creation is not beautiful from the standpoint of mankind, that the ugly exists 
beside the beautiful, the misshapen beside the graceful, the grotesque beside the 
sublime, evil with good, darkness with light. It will ask itself if the restricted, 
relative reasoning of the artist ought to prevail over the infinite, absolute 
reasoning of the Creator; if it is for man to set God right... 92 
The grotesque is an integral part of reality, and thus an important technique for the 
artist who wishes to portray something of that reality. Indeed, Chesterton declared that: 
"There is no reason, within reason, why literature should not describe the demonic as 
well as the divine aspect of mystery or myth. "93 Chesterton was able to reconcile the 
grotesque with his optimism concerning existence because he believed that existence 
was essentially good -a theme that I will return to in my concluding chapter. This is 
not to suggest that our existence was without fault, or that deformity was good. Rather, 
the description of evil as a privation meant that any such deformity was contingent on 
creation. The grotesque can be seen as good news, because it reminds humanity in its 
`)" Chesterton, William Blake, pp. 195-6. 
91 G. K. Chesterton, "Tom Jones and Morality", All Things Considered (1908, repr. London: Methuen & 
Co Ltd, 1937), p. 266. See my discussion of Chesterton's perception of the relationship between 
representation and morality in chapter two. 
92 Hugo, "Preface to Cromwell". p. 13. 
9' G. K. Chesterton, "Magic and Fantasy in Fiction", Sidelights (London: Sheed & Ward, 1932), p. 230. 
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fallen state that we are not what we were created to be: "To be able to recognise a 
freak, you have to have some conception of the whole man... , 94 
Even in its deformity, the grotesque could not help alluding to the original value of 
creation. Chesterton made this observation in his introduction to Barnabe Ridge: 
And it is an interesting coincidence that here, in this book of Burnaby Rua'ge, 
there is a character meant to be wholly grotesque, who, nevertheless, expresses 
much of that element in Dickens which prevented him from being a true 
interpreter of the tired and sceptical aristocrat... 
... Dickens was vulgar, was absurd, overdid everything, but he was al ive. 
9' 
Within our fallen state, Chesterton saw that one benefit of the artist's use of the 
grotesque was its ability to stop mankind from becoming proud: "In the Middle Ages 
and in the Renaissance... it was the idea of the degradation of men in the grinning 
ugliness of his structure that withered the juvenile insolence of beauty and pride. And 
"96 in this it almost assuredly did more good than harm. 
In his essay, "An Introduction to the Grotesque: Theoretical and Theological 
Considerations", Wilson Yates introduces three theological categories that are helpful 
for understanding the grotesque: creation, the Fall, and redemption. 97 Central to 
Chesterton's understanding of the grotesque was an emphasis on the doctrine of 
creation. The wonder of creation expressed itself through both the strange and the 
beautiful. It is within this context that Chesterton understands the doctrine of the Fall, 
which he subsequently represents through the deformed grotesque. Even in our fallen 
state, we continue to see something of the goodness of creation. While it might be 
misleading to describe the grotesque in Chesterton as redemptive, there is clearly an 
element of response. Chesterton's use of the grotesque enabled him to represent evil 
while simultaneously diminishing its power. 
9' Flannery O'Connor, Mystery and Manners: Occasional Prose, (London: Faber & Faber, 1984). p. 44. 
74-5 Chesterton, Chesterton on Dickens, pp. 
96 Chesterton, The Defendant, p. 47. 
Wilson Yates, "An Introduction to the Grotesque; Theoretical and Theological Considerations" in 
James Luther Adams & Wilson Yates, ed., The Grotesque in. 4rt and Literature: Theological Reflections 
(Michigan: Eerdmans, 1997), pp. 50-68. 
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Using Humour To Overcome Terror In The Grotesque 
Many critics have noticed the nightmarish quality in Chesterton's work. Jill Brown 
writes: "Out of the corners of his eyes, as it were, he continually caught glimpses of 
something terrifyingly alien, a world of uncanny evil. "98 Later on in the same article 
she states that, "any reader of Chesterton realises that his imagination was perpetually 
haunted. "99 Chesterton himself acknowledged the presence of the nightmare within 
parts of his own work: 
... 
but I could at this time imagine the worst and wildest disproportions and 
distortions of more normal passion; the point is that the whole mood was 
overpowered and oppressed with a sort of congestion of imagination. As 
Bunyan, in his morbid period, described himself as prompted to utter 
blasphemies, I had an overpowering impulse to record or draw horrible ideas 
and images... 100 
The relationship between the nightmarish and the grotesque in Chesterton is one that 
John Coates denies. He argues: "What, perhaps, suggests that Chesterton's view of 
what Borges calls the `nightmarish', related more to public literary debate than to 
private phobias, is the marked change of tone between his earlier and late Views of the 
subject. " Coates suggests that Chesterton's use of the grotesque has little to do with the 
morbid tendencies that Chesterton admitted to, and that we should simply interpret his 
use of the grotesque in terms of the contemporary literary debate. Although Coates' 
analysis of the contemporary literary context is extremely helpful, it is a mistake to 
ignore the link between the nightmare and the grotesque in Chesterton. Coates' 
argument depends on an apparent change that he identifies in the way that Chesterton 
used the grotesque. He explains that Chesterton's early depiction of existence as 
something wild and fantastic, was an attempt to defend the status of the grotesque, 
whereas, in later years, Chesterton began to use the grotesque to depict the mysteries of 
98 Jill Brown, "'Unearthly Daylight': The Light and The Dark in Chesterton's Imagination". The 
Chesterton Review Vol. 13 No. 1 (February 1987), p. 22. 
99 Ibid., p. 23. 
10" Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 90. Similar sentiments regretting the morbidity that influenced periods 
of his life were expressed in a letter written to Ronald Knox in 1922. Of course, this was the year of 
Chesterton's conversion into the Catholic Church. See Evelyn Waugh. The Life of Ronald Knox 
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1959), pp. 207-8. 
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God. Thus he concludes that Chesterton's early work may resemble the nightmarish, 
but that this is the result of his attempt to defend the status of the grotesque against his 
contemporaries. To illustrate this alleged change in Chesterton's emphasis, Coates 
shows us how Chesterton's essay on the Book of Job (apparently written in 1929). 
differs from his earlier work. However, this argument is mistaken. Chesterton's essay 
on the Book of Job was actually written in 1907,101 during the same period as his novel, 
The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, which is generally recognised as his most 
nightmarish text. Therefore, we cannot argue that there is any significant change in 
Chesterton's use of the grotesque. Instead, we have to conclude that Chesterton had a 
wide-ranging rather than a changing perception of the grotesque, which included an 
intimate relationship with the nightmarish as well as an attempt to defend the status of 
the grotesque from his contemporaries. 
Many critics have taken the opposite view to Coates; believing that Chesterton's 
continual inclusion of the grotesque and nightmarish represented a ghost that he never 
fully exorcised. For example, Jill Brown refers to: "The nightmare, which he controlled 
so carefully and only allowed to spurt out spasmodically in fearful shapes ... 
"' 02 The 
exact nature of this nightmarish strain in Chesterton is an area that I will look at in 
further detail in my chapter, `Chesterton and the Modern Grotesque'. However, it is 
interesting to point out that there is clearly a sense in which Chesterton used the 
Thomistic belief in the primacy of goodness to help him exorcise this particular 
ghost. 103 
Whether or not Chesterton ever successfully exorcised the nightmarish from his 
thinking is secondary, at least for the purpose of this discussion. Of primary importance 
is the fact that he used the grotesque to help him try and exorcise it. This is an 
important function of the grotesque for Chesterton, and it is one that some of his critics 
have appeared unable to recognise. In particular, F. W. Brownlow seems to think that 
101 This date of 1907 is taken from John Sullivan's comprehensive three volume bibliography on 
Chesterton. The same date is also given by Chesterton's principal biographer, Maisie Ward 
in the 
bibliography that she provides at the end of her biography of Chesterton. 
102 Brown, "'Unearthly Daylight': The Light and the Dark in Chesterton's Imagination", p. 26. 
"'' This subject is one that I will return to in the concluding chapter. 
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Chesterton dealt with his nightmare by getting rid of the grotesque: "He became the 
prophet of the normal and the ordinary ... "104 This opinion is diametrically opposed to 
Chesterton's views on the grotesque that we have already looked at, and it is not 
supported by an analysis of his fiction (as we shall see in the next two chapters). 
In an important essay entitled "The Nightmare", Chesterton explained how the 
grotesque used comedy to overcome the terror of evil: 
That is the stern condition laid upon all artists touching this luxury of fear. The 
terror must be fundamentally frivolous... Let such poets as the one I was reading 
in the garden, by all means, be free to imagine what outrageous deities and 
violent landscapes they like... But these huge gods, these high cities, are toys; 
they must never for an instant be allowed to be anything else. ' 05 
Chesterton pointed out that this approach had been utilised before: "It was the 
Christians who gave the Devil a grotesque and energetic outline, with sharp horns and 
spiked tail. It was the saints who drew Satan as comic and even lively. -'06 For 
Chesterton, evil was a part of life, and could not be ignored. Earlier on we noted how 
Chesterton argued that artists and writers had a moral responsibility to depict both good 
and evil. At the same time, Chesterton wanted to subordinate evil and terror: For there 
is nothing so delightful as a nightmare - when you know it is a nightmare. " 
107 Humour 
was the means by which he sought to do this. 
Karen Youngberg has discussed the way in which Chesterton used the `harlequin' 
image to describe himself: "This image which Chesterton seems to have held of himself 
as a kind of harlequin, a metaphysical jester capering through a nightmare of denial, 
labouring like Lear's Fool to outjest the howling storm, is a useful concept to apply to 
his fantasy fiction, for it suggests that levity and nonsense may be enlisted in the 
10' F. W. Brownlow, "The Modernity of Chesterton's Browning Criticism", The Chesterton Review Vol. 
17 No. 2 (May 1991), p. 165. 
105 Chesterton, "The Nightmare", . Alarms and 
Discursions, p. 11. 
10b G. K. Chesterton, "The Mystagogue", A Miscellany of Men (1912; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd. 
1926), p. 146. 
107 Chesterton, "The Nightmare", Alarms and Discursions, p. 11. 
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service of the serious and profound. " 108 Obviously the comic is something that is 
central to Chesterton's work, as well as to his own personality. Examples range from 
the comic songs of The Flying Inn, to the practical joke that Auberon Quin inaugurates 
in The Napoleon of Notting Hill. David Derus explains: "Only a passing acquaintance 
with Chesterton is needed to see how large this question of humour is in any 
appreciation of him as a figure of literature. " 109 The style of Chesterton's humour is. of 
course, intimately related to his use of the grotesque. Derus goes on to allude to this: "It 
is at this point that he really gives his own apologia for treating serious subjects 
frivolously. By dislocating common-sense reality, we may realise fully the spiritual 
side of life... "110 Chesterton himself made a similar point in an essay on laughter: 
"Anybody can make a child laugh by some single inversion or incongruity; such as 
putting spectacles on the teddy bear. ""11 
Chesterton's use of the grotesque as a means of subverting evil and terror via the comic 
is an idea that is taken up by various other critics on the grotesque. Even Wolfgang 
Kayser, who as we saw earlier, emphasised the horror of the grotesque, acknowledged 
this function. Commenting on a lecture given by Kayser in 1964, Mark Spilka explains 
Kayser's position: "These strange effects rouse laughter, horror and perplexity in the 
observer, with laughter serving to diminish horror and perplexity, and so make the 
nightmare scene more bearable. "' 12 The ability of the comic to triumph over terror is 
more familiar in the work of Bakhtin. Typical of this is his following statement: We 
108 Youngberg, "Job and the Gargoyles: A Study of The Man who was Thursday", p. 241. Youngberg's 
use of the phrase `metaphysical jester' is probably borrowed from William B. Furlong's study of Shaw 
and Chesterton, Shaw and Chesterton: The Metaphysical Jesters (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1970). 
109 David L. Derus, The Literary Theory and Practice of G. K. Chesterton (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Yale 
University, 1961), p. 180. For a more detailed study of this aspect of Chesterton, see Michael Mason. The 
Centre of Hilarity (London: Sheed & Ward, 1959). We might also note Stephen Medcalf's observation: 
"Perhaps the most convincing proof of Chesterton's own wisdom and even sanctity is his capacity for 
sheer humour. " Stephen Medcalf "The Achievement of G. K. Chesterton" in John Sullivan, ed., G. K. 
Chesterton: 
.4 
Centenary Appraisal (London: Paul Elek Books, 1974), p. 121. 
10 Ibid., p. 190. 
111 Chesterton, "Laughter", The Common Man, p. 156. 
112 Mark Spilka, Dickens and Kafka: A Mutual Interpretation (London: Denis Dobson. 1963), p. 64. 
However, as we discussed earlier on, Kayser tends to diminish the comic in the grotesque. Hence other 
critics have qualified the way that Kayser uses the comic to dispel fear: "... though he 
feels that the 
demonic may be exorcised through laughter, he is rather vague as to how this is to take place. " In 
Lee 
B\ ron Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Post-Romani 
ic Prose 
(California: University of California Publications in Modern Philology Vol. 71,1963), p. 6. 
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have already shown that the Medieval and Renaissance grotesque, filled with the spirit 
of carnival, liberates the world from all that is dark and terrifying... "13 Following on 
from this, Spilka observes the same tendency in the work of Dickens and Kafka. for 
whom, "the grotesque became a way of mastering reality through comic means. "' 14 The 
idea that comedy can be used to dispel evil and terror also has a history outside of the 
confines of literature. Lee Byron Jennings notes that it finds confirmation in the 
cultural sphere: "It is interesting that this theory of the disarming of the demonic 
through humour finds confirmation in the sphere of cultural history. Stumptl notes that 
the Germanic gods and demons were made into evil or ludicrous figures by the Church 
and that this gave rise to the parallel of fool and devil in popular plays. " 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to provide a working definition of the grotesque. as 
well as demonstrating how Chesterton's interest in the grotesque was intrinsically 
related to his culture. In opposition to much of the contemporary thought of his day, 
Chesterton viewed the grotesque in a positive light. However, he was careful to 
distinguish the strange grotesque from the deformed grotesque, and to argue that it was 
only the first that was intrinsically good. The strange was understood within the 
doctrine of creation, whereas the deformed had to be understood within the doctrine of 
the Fall, without forgetting that creation preceded the Fall: "Man is a monster. And he 
is all the more a monster because one part of him is perfect. " 116 Following on from this, 
I examined the way in which Chesterton used the grotesque to help him overcome the 
evil that he encountered in the world through the use of comedy. As we observed, this 
Bakhtin, Rabelais and his World, p. 47. 
1 14 Spilka, Dickens and Kafka: A Mutual Interpretation, pp. 64-5. The prevalence of this idea is noted by 
Ralph Ciancio who describes Spilka's theory as a, "commonly held perception" among critics of the 
grotesque. Ralph Ciancio, "Laughing in Pain", in Michael Meyer, ed., Literature and the Grotesque. p. 9. 
Ili Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Post-Romantic Prose, p. 15. 
116 G. K. Chesterton, "Questions of Divorce", The Uses of Diversity (1920; repr. London, Methuen & Co 
Ltd, 1937), p. 119. 
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function of the grotesque is one that other critics on the grotesque have recognised and 
expounded. 
At the same time, the use of the grotesque to subvert terror is a potentially dangerous 
strategy. One reason for this is that the grotesque requires a fine balance between terror 
and comedy. Without this balance, the grotesque descends into farce, and terror is 
marginalised to the extent that the treatment of evil appears superficial. Jennings 
reminds us of the fine balance involved: "The grotesque presents the terrible in 
harmless guise, and its playfulness is constantly on the verge of collapsing and giving 
way to the concealed horror. Both aspects must be present in equal degree in a given 
object. "117 However, Wolfgang Kayser suggests that there are further dangers involved 
in the way that the grotesque seeks to play with terror: "It may begin in a gay and 
carefree manner... But it may also carry the player away, deprive him of his freedom, 
and make him afraid of the ghosts which he so frivolously invoked. " 118 Chesterton was 
clearly aware of this danger, which is why he made his intention clear: "I will ride on 
the Nightmare; but she shall not ride on me. "' 19 Whether or not his attempt to control 
the grotesque in this manner was successful, is something that I will go on to consider 
in the two chapters that follow. 
1" Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Post-Romantic Prose, p. 16. 
118 Kayser, The Grotesque in Art and Literature, p. 187. 
1'9 Chesterton, "The Nightmare", Alarms and Discursions, p. 13. 
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Chapter 5: The Traditional Grotesque 
Chesterton once wrote: "The timidity of the child or the savage is entirely reasonable: 
they are alarmed at this world, because this world is a very alarming place. "' In the 
previous chapter, I looked at the way in which Chesterton understood the grotesque as a 
means of expressing and controlling what could become an overwhelming sense of evil 
in the world. Chesterton declared: "I will ride on the Nightmare; but she shall not ride 
on me. "2 The question that I will look at in this chapter (and the next one), concerns the 
source of the nightmare that the grotesque seeks to express and control. As Lee Byron 
Jennings reminds us: "... the grotesque, through its terrible aspect, often serves as a 
focal point for everything that the author fears and abhors... "3 
Paula Uruburu has suggested that, "the true Grotesque tends to become prominent in 
both art and literature when the safe and familiar world we know seems on the verge of 
disintegration... "4 By looking at the main periods in which the grotesque genre has 
flourished, we can identify the source of the fear which the grotesque expresses, and 
discover exactly what it is that threatens to disintegrate our safe and familiar world. 
Using a distinction suggested by Bernard McElroy, I intend to identify two types of 
grotesque that have been used to represent the dominant fears of society. The `modern 
grotesque' is the subject of the next chapter. This chapter will look at what McElroy 
calls the `traditional grotesque'. I will begin by outlining the distinction that McElroy 
makes between these two types of grotesque before going on to analyse the 
transformation that occurs from one to the other. Having laid this foundation, I will 
proceed to look at Chesterton's use of the traditional grotesque. Chesterton does not use 
' G. K. Chesterton, The Red Angel", Tremendous Trifles (1909; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 
1926), p. 102. 
2 G. K. Chesterton, "The Nightmare", Alarms and Discursions (1910; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 
1924), p. 13. 
Lee Byron Jennings, The Ludicrous Demon: Aspects of the Grotesque in German Post-Romantic Prost? 
(California: The University of California Press, 1963), p. 24. 
' Paula M. Uruburu, The Gruesome Doorway: An Analysis of the . 
American Grotesque (Ne\\ York: Peter 
Lang, 1987). p. 15. 
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this form as much as one might expect, a point that will be explained and illustrated in 
the two sections that follow. 
McElroy's Distinction5 
In his book, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque, Bernard McElroy establishes the 
context for his subsequent discussion of twentieth-century writers that use the 
grotesque. He distinguishes between the `traditional grotesque' and the `modern 
grotesque'. He explains: 
In earlier art, the source of the grotesque was usually the external realm, natural 
or supernatural. In societies where men felt themselves to be at the day to day 
mercy of potent, malevolent spiritual powers, the grotesque often embodied that 
which, though invisible, was presumed to exist. But in the modern Western 
world, deeply aware of the rift between the external, objective world and the 
internal, subjective interpretation of it, the source of the grotesque has moved 
inward and is found in the fears, guilts, fantasies, and aberrations of individual 
psychic life. The modern grotesque is internal, not infernal, and its originator is 
recognised as neither god nor devil but man himself. 6 
The traditional grotesque is based upon an external figure of evil, whereas the modern 
grotesque internalises evil. In the modern grotesque, evil is everywhere, because the 
universe is interpreted through this lens of terror. Not every instance of the grotesque 
can be categorised in this way, but McElroy is simply observing that Western man no 
longer believes in an external supernatural or preternatural realm where evil can be 
found in The Other'. When Western man did believe in such a realm, the grotesque 
reflected it accordingly: "In the Middle Ages, the demonic provided the material for 
one of the richest strains in the history of grotesque art, culminating in the fantastic 
Bernard McElroy is one of the most important writers on the grotesque since Kayser and Bakhtin, 
especially in terms of the period in which Chesterton wrote. (See the previous chapter for more 
information on Kayser and Bakhtin). His book, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque (1989) is one of the 
only books that looks at the grotesque within the broad context of twentieth-century modern 
fiction. 
Most of the other writers that have dealt with aspects of the twentieth-century grotesque have 
focused on 
particular authors (such as Flannery O'Connor), or on areas that are outside my sphere of 
interest (such 
as Southern American fiction). For this reason, it seems wholly appropriate to use McElroy's 
distinction 
as a framework for my analysis of Chesterton's use of the grotesque. 
6 Bernard McElroy, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), p. 21 
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hellscapes of Hieronymus Bosch. "7 However, in the modern period, the philosophical 
belief in the supernatural realm has gradually been eroded. Modem man refuses to 
believe in the possibility of demons and monsters. 
It is interesting to consider the original gothic writers in relation to this. 8 -1-heir 
ambivalence towards the supernatural should not be confused with the attitude that 
McElroy finds so prevalent in modern man. Julia Briggs observes: "The Gothic novel 
had consisted of two distinct types, those stories that made free use of supernatural 
machinery, and those that aimed to appeal to both sensational and `enlightened' 
elements in popular taste by providing a (more or less) rational explanation. "9 Even this 
second approach, which was favoured by writers such as Ann Radcliffe, still relied 
upon the possibility of the supernatural to achieve its effect. Without such a possibility, 
there would not have been the atmosphere of terror that we find in such stories. 
Frederick Frank has pointed out that despite their rational explanations, Ann 
Radcliffe's gothic novels still have, "real dangers". 10 This is clearly different from the 
internalised fear that McElroy finds in the modern grotesque: "Even in those novels 
which depict the external world as being grotesque itself, the emphasis is usually not so 
much upon man's predicament before a powerful and dehumanising world as upon the 
protagonist's inner reaction to that predicament. Irrational fears and primitive dreads 
are made actual; fantasies, delusions, and hallucinations often mingle freely with 
physical existence in the external world. "" According to McElroy, the result of this 
internalisation is that: "The lowest common denominators of the modem grotesque are 
guilt and fear. " 12 
Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
8 In using the term `original gothic writers', I am referring to the period 1762-1830 (approximate) and 
writers such as Ann Radcliffe, Matthew Lewis, Horace Walpole and William Beckford. 
9 Julia Briggs, Night Visitors: The Rise and Fall of the English Ghost Story (London: Faber and Faber, 
1977), p. 143. 
1" Frederick S. Frank, The Early Gothic, 1762-1824" in Neil Barron, ed., Horror Literature; 4 Reader's 
Guide (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), p. 6. 
11 McElroy, Fictions of'the Modern Grotesque, pp. 21-2. 
12 Ibid., p. 25. 
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McElroy's identification of a difference between the traditional and modern grotesque 
is supported by other thinkers. Geoffrey Harpham acknowledges a similar distinction in 
his study of the grotesque when he discusses Dante, "writing in the golden age of'the 
grotesque before it became self-conscious... " 13 Similarly, when Mikhail Bakhtin's 
discusses the difference between the comedy of the medieval grotesque, and the terror 
of the romantic and modern grotesque, he tells us that there is a different type of fear 
involved. The romantic and modern grotesque expresses a, "fear of the world", whereas 
the medieval and renaissance writers describe, "comic monsters". ' 4 These comments 
are also supported by the general recognition among critics on the supernatural in 
fiction, that the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen an internalisation of 
supernatural fear. ' 5 
Analysing The Transformation 
In his attempt to explain how the traditional grotesque changed into the modern 
grotesque, McElroy locates Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground as the turning 
point: 
To summarise then: in a variety of ways, Notes from Underground anticipates 
much twentieth-century fiction of the grotesque. A repugnant protagonist, 
aberrant by all `normal' standards, is a humiliated man totally engrossed in a 
losing battle with his external environment, yet forced to concede that the world 
is right in judging him diseased and contemptible ... 
There is an irrational feeling 
of guilt at the centre of human experience, guilt based not upon having done 
something but upon the generally loathsome nature of the individual... 16 
Geoffrey Galt Harpham, On the Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 9. 
14 Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World (1965; trans. Helene Iswolsky, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1984), p. 39. 
1' For an example of this, see Glen Cavaliero, "Chapter 7: The Enemy Within", The Supernatural and 
English Fiction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). A more detailed analysis of the shift from 
external evil to an internalised terror can be found in Donald Baker, Themes of Terror in Nineteenth- 
Century English Fiction: The Shift to the internal (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Brown University, 195). 
1" McElroy, Fictions of the %lodern Grotesque, p. 28. 
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The way in which Dostoevsky prefigures the modern grotesque is also highlighted by 
Donald Fanger. Fanger explains that the only difference is the thread of a Christian 
framework that is present in Dostoevsky's work: "... Dostoevsky's grotesque world is 
linked to a traditional, Christian source of meaning by the slender thread of aspiration, 
whereas his spiritual descendants, breaking that thread, are left not with the aberrant 
(since there is nothing to aberr from), but with `the absurd'. -)117 
While Dostoevsky is clearly valuable in identifying the emergence of the modern 
grotesque, it is difficult to conceive of such a transformation being so clear-cut. 
McElroy seems to have some awareness of the difficulty: "It is not possible to say at 
precisely what point the modem grotesque detaches itself from the supernaturalism and 
Gothic tradition that permeates the mainstream of the nineteenth-century 
grotesque... " 18 
It could legitimately be argued that although the Gothics symbolise the external 
embodiment of evil, they also mark the beginning of the process of internalisation. This 
is largely due to their association with the Romantics: "In literature the word [gothic] 
refers to the kind of work, usually fiction, that developed during the later eighteenth 
and earlier nineteenth centuries out of the sentimental romance into the Dark Romantic 
tale of terror. "1 9 The Romantic movement reacted to the teaching of the Enlightenment 
" Donald Fanger, Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism: A Study of Dostoevsky in Relation to Bal_ac. 
Dickens, and Gogol (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 232-3. There are various references 
to Dostoevsky throughout this thesis, and it is interesting to reflect briefly upon Chesterton's relationship 
to this Russian writer. Despite a number of differences, the two writers share some important similarities, 
including: philosophical comment in their fiction; a commitment to the Christian faith; a fusion of 
romanticism and realism in their writing; and the use of the grotesque. These pieces of circumstantial 
evidence would encourage the idea that Chesterton was influenced in some manner by Dostoevsky. This 
seems even more likely in view of the fact that there was a surge of interest in Dostoevsky in England 
during the early twentieth century. However, the lack of direct references to Dostoevsky in Chesterton's 
writings make it difficult to prove this hypothesis. At the same time, the hypothesis finds some support 
from one of the few references to Dostoevsky that can be found in Chesterton's writings: if it is to some 
extent true that we hear more of certain writers like Zola or Tolstoy than of greater writers like Barres 
and Dostoevsky, the reason is amusingly simple. It is because the opinions of Zola and Tolstoy happens 
to be the more fashionable opinions in the particular province of which we are provincials. " G. K. 
Chesterton, "On the Unanimity of Opinion", Illustrated London News (1912; repr G. K. Chesterton: The 
Collected Fords Volume 29 - The Illustrated London News 1911-1913, San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 
1988), pp. 269-70. 
18 McElroy, Fictions of the Modern Grotesque, p. 22. 
19 G. R. Thompson, "Introduction", Thompson, ed., The Gothic Imagination: Essanys in Dark 
Romanticism (Washington: Washington State University Press, 1974), p. 1. 
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by focussing on individual experience and the internal self. This particular thread 
permeates the writing of the Gothics, and explains why Wolfgang Kayser links the 
romantics with the moderns when talking about the grotesque. 20 Howe ev er. Kayser 
exaggerates the connection. Although this process of internalisation began to occur in 
the Gothic genre, it did not fully develop there. Evil continued to exist primarily in the 
external realm. Thus we have to admit that critics such as G. R. Thompson seen to 
import some of their own modern presuppositions into their analysis of Gothic 
literature. For example: "But the apprehension that there was a dark substratum to the 
rock of Romantic faith obsessed those Romantic writers who turned to the Gothic mode 
of terror and horror in an effort to express a complex vision of the existential agony 
confronting man since the Age of Faith. "21 
If the Gothics began the process of transforming the traditional grotesque into the 
modern grotesque, the nineteenth century shaped and developed it: "Because of its 
preoccupations with extraordinary extrapolations of guilt and with medically defined 
madness, the history of the horror story from 1825 to 1896 is very largely an account of 
growing introversion. , 22 
Perhaps the most striking symbol of the internalisation of evil in nineteenth-century 
literature is that of the doppelgänger. 23 The term doppelgänger was first coined by the 
writer Jean Paul Richter (1763-1825) during the late eighteenth century in his novel 
Siebenkas. The doppelgänger was a key symbol for the Romantics; one that emerged 
during the nineteenth century: "The double is a central Romantic image. Its heyday 
corresponds approximately to the span of the nineteenth century, but its immediate 
literary roots are in late-eighteenth-century Romanticism... "24 The same observation is 
20 This point was established in the previous chapter when I examined the differences between Ka-, ser 
and Bakhtin. 
21 Thompson, The Gothic Imagination, p. 5. 
Brian Stableford, "The Later Gothic Tradition, 1825-96", in Barron, ed., Horror Literature: A 
Reader's Guide, p. 61. This internalisation continues to develop at the beginning of the t\ýentieth 
century. David Punter states that, "in Turn of the Screw and the stories of de la Mare, we can see Gothic 
fiction taking on a new psychological sophistication... " David Punter, The Literature of Terror - l'olume 
2: The ; Modern Gothic, 2nd edition (London: Longman Ltd, 1996), p. 67. 
-- 'Doppelgänger' is a German word which is usually translated as `double'. 
24 John Herdman, The Double in Nineteenth- Century Fiction (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1990), 
preface, p. x. 
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made by C. F. Keppler when he explains the focus of his study on the literary double: I 
have confined myself to European and American literature since the end of the 
eighteenth century; in other words to the period since the beginning of the Romantic 
Movement, a period which has been particularly rich in the production of Doubles. " 
The doppelgänger is clearly prevalent in nineteenth-century literature, in novels such 
as: James Hogg's The Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824): 
Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Double (1846); Robert Louis Stevenson's The Strange Case 
of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886); and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Grei' 
(1891 ). 26 However, for Otto Rank, an early commentator on the doppelgänger: 
"Hoffman is the classical creator of the double-projection... ), 27 (Hoffman is a figure 
that I will briefly return to later in this chapter when I consider the contribution of 
Sigmund Freud. ) 
Keppler's study of the doppelgänger associates it with evil. He devotes three chapters 
of his book to the `evil' dimension of the second self. 28 Chesterton hints at a similar 
association through the evidence that Mr Raymond Percy gives to the court in 
Manalive: "Not from the stairs below, but along the passage from the inner bedchamber 
(which seemed somehow to make it more alarming), footsteps were coming nearer. I 
am quite unable to say what mystery, or monster, or double, I expected to see when the 
door was pushed open from within. , 29 It is interesting to note what the doppelgänger 
tells us about the changing perception of evil. One of the most pivotal changes is that 
evil loses its ontological status, becoming more of an impression than anything 
substantial and existent. Gordon Hirsch acknowledges this in his article, "Frankenstein, 
I' C. F. Keppler, The Literature of the Second Self (Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1972), 
preface, p. x. 
26 For a more detailed discussion of the role of the double in nineteenth-century fiction, see Masao 
Miyoshi, The Divided Self A Perspective on the Literature of the Victorians (New York: Ne" York 
University Press, 1969). 
27 Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study (1914; trans. Harry Tucker, North Carolina: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 8-9. 
28 These are: "Chapter 3: The Second Self as Pursuer"; "Chapter 4: The Second Self as Tempter". and 
"Chapter 5: The Second Self as Vision of Horror". 
29 G. K. Chesterton, Manalive (1912; repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1947), p. 140. I do not «ish to 
suggest that Chesterton understood the doppelgänger as a purely evil figure. His comments on 
Stevenson's, The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, reveal the way in which he understood the 
doppelgänger to be a device through which the connection between good and evil could be represented. 
(See my comments on this in chapter three. ) 
95 
Detective Fiction, and Jekyll and Hyde": "The double in each book is repulsive. 
revolting; but in each book it is the impression that counts rather than ans' 
particularized physical description. "30 This change occurs as fear becomes a projection 
of the human psyche. 31 It does not diminish the terror involved. If anything. it 
intensifies it, because the source of evil is bound up with the protagonist and is thus 
more difficult to flee from. 
Internalised evil can also be considered to be more frightening because of the way in 
which it blurs the line of demarcation between good and evil. In the classic medieval 
tale, the battle between the brave knight and the wicked dragon clearly marked out the 
boundaries between good and evil. In contrast, the doppelgänger removes these 
boundaries because it is contingent on the protagonist: "The Doppelgänger is a second 
self or alter ego, which appears as a distant and separate being apprehensible by the 
physical sense (or at least, by some of them), but exists in a dependent relation to the 
original. "32 The way in which this contingent relationship blurs the demarcation 
between good and evil is illustrated in The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Dr 
Jekyll does not encounter a complete stranger in Mr Hyde. Instead, he encounters an 
integral part of himself. Good and evil become intertwined: "The doubling in the novel, 
then, does not establish or fix the boundaries of good and evil, self and other, but 
"33 discloses the ambivalence of identity... 
Rosemary Jackson identifies a similar idea in Frankenstein: "The monster has no name. 
It is anonymous, given identity only as Frankenstein's other, his grotesque reflection 
(hence the common confusion of the monster as Frankenstein) ... 
Frankenstein tries to 
Gordon Hirsch, "Frankenstein, Detective Fiction, and Jekyll and Hyde", in William Verder & Gordon 
Hirsch, ed., Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde After One Hundred Years (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1988), p. 225. 
Many of the studies on the doppelgänger come from this sort of psychological perspectiN e. In addition 
to Rank's study, that has already been mentioned, examples include Robert Rogers, .4 
Psvchoanah-tic 
Stuck' of the Double in Literature (Detroit: Waynes State University Press, 1970) and Freud's essay. "The 
Uncanny" (1919) to which I will be referring to later. 
Herduran, The Double in Nineteenth-Century Fiction, p. 14. 
11 Fred Botting, Gothic (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 141. 
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read the monster as a supernatural devil, `I was cursed by some devil, and carried about 
with me my eternal hell', but it is made by him, self-generated... -134 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the confusion between good and evil that 
was present in the doppelgänger had become increasingly significant. "When good and 
evil are intermingled they have a slippery tendency to change places and this 
undermines moral values and makes life seem uncertain and directionless. The 
grotesque is the literary means of portraying the human condition in such an unsure 
universe. "35 The doppelgänger helped to lay the foundation for the transformation of 
the traditional grotesque into the modern grotesque: Donald Fanger hints at the change 
that had occurred when he comments on two different nineteenth-century approaches to 
describing evils in the city: "The twenty-five-year-old Dickens sees them as lurid and 
criminal, where the twenty-five-year-old Dostoevsky sees them as vulgar and empty. -_36 
Dickens' traditional grotesque is noticeably different from the modern grotesque that 
Dostoevsky introduces. 
Chesterton & The Traditional Grotesque 
Perhaps the most obvious example of a traditional grotesque in Chesterton's fiction is 
in The Ball and the Cross. The novel is full of the bizarre combination of the real and 
the fantastic that is an integral part of any grotesque. This is particularly evident in the 
dream sequences that occur in "Chapter 15: The Dream of Maclan" and "Chapter 16: 
The Dream of Turnbull". The dreams that both Maclan and Turnbull experience 
correspond with elements of reality in the novel such as Professor Lucifer's spaceship. 
At the same time, the description of their experiences as dreams precludes a strictly 
realist interpretation. When Turnbull discovers that the judge who sentenced him has 
also been locked up in the lunatic asylum, he is astonished at, this towering 
' Rosemary Jackson, Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1981), p. 99. 
'S Elizabeth MacAndrew, The Gothic Tradition in Fiction (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979), p. 157. 
Fanger, Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism, p. 162. 
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unreality". 37 In the midst of these terrible occurrences, Chesterton inserts the comic 
element that is for him a necessary component of the grotesque. He highlights. "the 
huge and hilarious fact that Cumberland Vane had been locked up as a lunatic. " '8 
The figure of Professor Lucifer provides the clearest example of the traditional 
grotesque in The Ball and the Cross. During his initial appearance, he cries out with a 
"dreadful mirth". 39 When he reappears as the Master later on in the story, he is 
described as having, "a cruel voice which always made all human blood turn bitter. ' 4° 
Elsewhere, the description of the Master confirms his image as a traditional grotesque: 
"The bushes broke and snapped abruptly behind them, and a very tall figure towered 
above Turnbull with an arrogant stoop and a projecting chin, a chin of which the shape 
showed queerly even in its shadow upon the path... They looked up into the eyes of the 
Master, but looked only for a moment. The eyes were full of a frozen and icy wrath, a 
kind of utterly heartless hatred. -, 41 
There is little ambiguity in the evil character that Chesterton creates in The Ball and the 
Cross. Emile Cammaerts writes: "The Master in The Ball and the Cross is called 
pointedly Professor Lucifer, and we had better leave it at that. The moralist has parted 
the sheep from the goats. As in the medieval picture, there is no subtle nuance between 
good and evil, and the devil is always painted black. "42 At the same time, Professor 
Lucifer's fearful appearance is counterbalanced with humour. He is described as, 
"beaming at them all with a sinister benignity"43 [italics mine]. Similarly, the fear that 
he seeks to invoke in Michael becomes rather comical, when in the next breath, 
Michael casually warns him that he is about to crash the spaceship. At another point in 
the opening chapter, Chesterton subverts the terror of the Professor by portraying a 
childish innocence in his response: "Lucifer was looking at him with a bitten lip. "Is 
3' G. K. Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross (1910; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson Ltd, 196-33), p. 227. 
8 Ibid., p. 227. 
'11) Ibid., p. 10. 
40 Ibid., p. 244. 
4' Ibid., p. 241. 
42 Emile Cammaerts, The Laughing Prophet: The Seven ['irtues and G. K. Chesterton (London: Methuen 
& Co Ltd, 1937), p. 161. 
41 Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross, p. 247. 
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that story really true? ' he asked. "44 Moments later, Chesterton reinforces the 
grotesquerie by returning to a description of the Professor at his most terrifying: 
`-Lucifer leapt upon him with a cry like a wild beast's. "45 
Although Professor Lucifer offers us a clear example of the traditional grotesque. The 
Ball and the Cross also anticipates the modern grotesque. Indeed, this is an important 
theme in the novel. Maclan and Turnbull's willingness to fight passionately for the 
truth that they believe in, ultimately leads to their imprisonment in a lunatic asylum. 
Standing in the lunatic asylum, Maclan exclaims: "Turnbull, this garden is not a dream, 
but an apocalyptic fulfilment. This garden is the world gone mad. "46 The world has 
gone mad because it has lost any sense of philosophical absolutes. Turnbull and 
MacIan stand on the verge of the existential predicament that is at the heart of the 
modern grotesque. With his absolute conception of truth, Turnbull reacts violently to 
such an idea. "All the rationalist and plain man revolted within him against bowing 
down for a moment in that forest of deception and egotistical darkness. He wanted to 
blow up that place of delusion with dynamite... "47 The root of the modern grotesque 
that I have alluded to here is something that I will look at further in the following 
chapter. 
Elsewhere in Chesterton's fiction, we find a general absence of the traditional 
grotesque. This is rather surprising in view of Chesterton's love of fairy stories. In 
Orthodoxy he wrote: "My first and last philosophy, that which I believe in with 
unbroken certainty, I learnt in the nursery... The things I believed most then, the things 
I believe most now, are the things called fairy tales. They seem to me to be the entirely 
reasonable things. "48 Not only did Chesterton enjoy talking about the importance of 
fairyland; he also played a part in its continuing influence: "His defence of fairy-tales is 
an important part of the tradition which runs from George MacDonald (and ultimately 
44 Ibid., p. 15. 
4i Ibid., p. 15. 
46 Ibid., p. 240. 
47 Ibid., p. 173. 
48 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, (1908; repr London: The Bodley Head, 1927), p. 85. 
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Coleridge) through himself to C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien... "49 We would expect to 
find Chesterton depicting traditional grotesques in his fairy stories, as the genre is 
ideally suited to such monsters. Yet this is not the case, as, rather surprisingly, 
Chesterton rarely chose to write fairy stories. (There are obvious exceptions to this, 
including: "The Disadvantage of Having Two Heads"50 and "The Dragon at Hide-and- 
Seek". 51 ) 
In the absence of any other definite reason, it is most reasonable to assume that 
Chesterton was simply not interested in writing fairy stories. However, in view of his 
praise of their simple morality, 52 it seems odd that he did not transport the traditional 
grotesque into other fictional genres. In the next two sections, I will look at why this 
was the case. 
Detectives & Criminals 
The traditional grotesque that was present in the early gothic novels gradually changed 
as the gothic genre adapted in the nineteenth century. Robert Spector reminds us that 
the gothic genre did not simply disappear: "... it is clear that something called Gothic 
fiction had come into being by 1764 and thrived until 1820 when, rather than 
disappearing, it dispersed into multiple forms and spread out into a host of different 
fictional possibilities .,, 
53 One of these fictional possibilities was the detective story, a 
point that many critics have noted. In his seminal work on gothic literature, Devendra 
Varma observed the gothic influence on detective fiction: "The machinery, settings, 
9 Stephen Medcalf, "The Achievement of G. K. Chesterton" in John Sullivan, ed., G. K. Chesterton: 
Centenary Appraisal (London: Paul Elek Books, 1974), p. 114. 
50 Found in G. K. Chesterton, The Coloured Lands (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938). 
" Found in G. K. Chesterton, Collected Works Volume 14: Short Stories, Fairy Tales, Allstenn" Stories 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). 
52 "What fairy tales give the child is his first clear idea of the possible defeat of bogey... Exactly what the 
fairy tale does is this: it accustoms him by a series of clear pictures to the idea that these limitless terrors 
have a limit, that these shapeless enemies have enemies, that these infinite enemies of man have enemies 
in the knights of God, that there is something in the universe more mystical than darkness, and stronger 
than strong fear. " Chesterton, "The Red Angel", Tremendous Trifles, pp. 102-3. 
'' Robert Donald Spector, The English Gothic:. 4 Bibliographic Guide to H1'miters from Horace 11'alpole 
to Many Shelley (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 4-5. 
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themes, and characters of these thrillers are deeply reminiscent of Gothic novel S. -54 
Similarly, William Day tells us that: "The detective story is a natural response to the 
Gothic vision. , 55 Day goes on to identify Edgar Allen Poe (1809-1849) as the 
transitional link between the Gothics and detective writers: We can even locate quite 
precisely the link between the two in the work of Edgar Allen Poe..., ' 56 Chesterton too, 
acknowledged the importance of Poe's influence on the origin of detective fiction. In 
his introduction to, A Century of Detective Stories, he explained: The cycle of short 
stories, concerned with crime and detection, has its pivot in the name of Poe. He was an 
origin and very original... "57 
One of the similarities between gothic fiction and detective fiction, is that there is an 
evil to be explained. This is as true of Walpole's, The Castle of Otranto (1764). as it is 
of any of the Sherlock Holmes stories. However, when we look more closely, there is a 
subtle difference in the approach taken by the two genres. In his famous account of 
detective fiction, Julian Symons tells us that, "although the Gothic novel bears a 
relationship to the detective story in the sense that it often poses a mystery to be solved, 
the solution is never in itself of much interest. , 58 Here Symons raises an interesting 
point: The Gothic novel presents us with a mystery of evil, and focuses on that mystery, 
54 Devendra P. Varma, The Gothic Flame (1957; repr. New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, 1987). p. 238. 
$5 William Patrick Day, In the Circle of Fear and Desire: A Study of Gothic Fiction (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 50. 
"' Ibid., p. 50. In a similar vein is Benjamin Fisher's observation that: "Poe's preoccupation with Gothic 
horrors is well known... " in the preface to Michael L. Burduck, Grim Phantasms: Fear in Poe's Short 
Fiction (New York: Garland Publishing, 1992). p. ix. The link between Poe and Chesterton has been 
noted by many, including Professor W. W. Robson: "Chesterton, like all detective story writers, derives 
from Poe. Indeed, it might be said that he derives from a single story of Poe: many of the Father Broxk n 
stories [e. g. "The Invisible Man"] can be regarded as ingenious variations on the theme of 'The 
Purloined Letter'. ", Prof. W. W. Robson, "Father Brown and Others", in Sullivan, ed., G. K. Chesterton. 
.4 
Centenary Appraisal, p. 60. 
G. K. Chesterton, "Introduction", A Century of Detective Stories (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1935). p. 
10. Although Poe was obviously one of the founders of detective fiction, he was by no means the only 
founder. Frederick Crosson sees a three-fold foundation in the birth of the genre: "Brought to birth by 
Poe and Gaboriau, and furthered by Wilkie Collins with The Moonstone, the detective story reached its 
normal or canonical form with the extraordinary success of the tales of Sherlock Holmes. " - Frederick J. 
Crosson, "Father Brown, Sherlock Holmes, and the Mystery of Man" in Rufus William Rauch. ed.. A 
Chesterton Celebration (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 23. 
Julian Symons, Bloody Murder: From the Detective Story to the Crime Novel -A History. Re\ ed. 
(New York: Viking Penguin Inc, 1985), p. 28. 
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whereas the detective story begins with a mystery of evil and focuses on the rational 
solution to that mystery. 
As gothic literature dispersed into many forms, one of which was the detective story. 
the traditional gothic grotesque was transformed into the criminal. Thus the ghost 
became the thief and the murderer. Conan Doyle's, The Hound of the Baskervilles 
helpfully illustrates this development. The perpetrator of the deaths appears to be a 
gothic grotesque. In actual fact, it turns out to be the work of a human criminal and his 
large hound. 
As a result of this connection, we might expect to find traditional grotesques 
resurrected as grotesque criminals in Chesterton's detective stories. Martin Priestman 
warns us that this might not be the case when he identifies a certain ambiguity in 
Chesterton's use of evil characters: 6'A similar double insistence on the absolute 
distinction between good and evil, and on their mirror-like resemblance, runs 
throughout his work... 1-)59 I suggest that there are three main reasons why Chesterton's 
criminals do not normally provide us with traditional grotesques. 
Firstly, Chesterton was keen to avoid dualism. For this reason he generally avoided 
focussing on the criminal in his fiction. In chapter three, I argued that Chesterton was 
unwilling to create a master criminal for Father Brown to struggle against (in the style 
of Doyle's Professor Moriarty) for this reason. In other collections of Chesterton's 
detectives stories, this idea is developed further as the alleged criminals are exonerated. 
In Four Faultless Felons, the alleged criminals turn out to be people that have been 
merely, "misunderstood one way or another. , 60 Hence Ian Boyd's description of the 
tales as ones in which, "we have heroes who look like four different kinds of 
criminals". 61 A similar trait is present in The Club of Queer Trades. Thomas Peters 
explains: "An interesting aspect of The Club of Queer Trades is that in each story there 
appears to have been a crime committed, yet in each case the alleged crime turns out to 
, k' Martin Priestman, Detective Fiction and Literature: The Figure on the Carpet (London: the 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1990), p. 123. 
`'" G. K. Chesterton. Four Faultless Felons (1930; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson Ltd, 1962). p. 223. 
61 Ian Boyd, The Novels of G. K. Chesterton: A Study in Art and Propaganda (London: Paul Elek Books, 
1975), p. 155. 
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be merely an essentially harmless act by a member of the Club... Repeatedly G. K. C. "s 
stories point out that good deeds are sometimes mistaken for crimes... "62 
The second reason behind Chesterton's lack of grotesque criminals is his tendency to 
give a rational explanation for apparently supernatural phenomena. Although the 
traditional grotesque is not intrinsically dependent upon the supernatural, the t« o are 
usually linked together. However, the crime is frequently capable of rational 
explanation and in this process, the criminal loses his potential for grotesquerie. A good 
example of this can be found in the story, "The Shadow of the Shark". A group of 
friends see a grotesque figure that does not appear to be human, staring at them through 
the window. At first Chesterton describes it as, "a large face looking at first rather like 
a green goblin mask in a pantomime. "63 Gabriel Gale then visualises the image as a 
"goblin-headed fish". 64 However, this inhuman grotesque is subsequently explained 
rationally, without reference to the supernatural. Dr Wilkes declares: "... I could see 
plainly enough it was a man playing you a trick of some sort. "65 
Although Chesterton believed in the supernatural, he wanted to explain naturally 
anything that could be explained naturally. In this respect, he followed in the footsteps 
of Aquinas. Chesterton's belief in the supernatural did not stretch to the numerous 
superstitions that surrounded him, and his fiction reflected this. By way of an 
explanation, he wrote: "I believe in the supernatural as a matter of intellect and reason, 
not as a matter of personal experience. I do not see ghosts; I only see their inherent 
probability. , 66 Chesterton's tales often include the fantastic, but they do not usually 
include the fully fledged supernatural that is typically an element in the traditional 
grotesque criminal. 
62 Thomas C Peters, Battling for the Modern Mind: A Beginner's Chesterton (Missouri: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1994), p. 61. 
6' G. K. Chesterton, The Poet and the Lunatics (1929; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson, 1962), p. 59- 
64 Ibid., p. 59. This image echoes Chesterton's poem, "The Fish" (written in the 1890's). 
`'' Ibid., p. 59. W. W. Robson notes a similar tendency in the Father Brown stories: "lt is notable that a 
frequent motif in the stories is the exposure of bogus mages. " See W. W. Robson, "Introduction" to G. K. 
Chesterton, Father Brown. - .4 
Selection (Oxford: World's Classics, 1995), p. xvi. 
66 G. K. Chesterton, "The Perfect Game", Tremendous Trifles, p. 17. 
103 
The third reason behind this absence of grotesque criminals was the fact that Chesterton 
wanted to write fiction that avoided the pessimism he found in so many of his 
contemporaries. Chesterton believed that the Puritans bore some responsibility for this 
pessimistic approach. Through their rejection of the supernatural per se. Chesterton 
thought that they had allowed the world of the imagination to become dominated by 
evil and pessimism: 
Amid all the great work of Puritanism the damning indictment of it consists in 
one fact, that there was only one of the fables of Christendom that it retained 
and renewed, and that was the belief in witchcraft. It cast away the generous 
and wholesome superstition, it approved only of the morbid and the dangerous. 
In their treatment of the great national fairy-tale of good and evil, the Puritans 
killed St. George but carefully preserved the Dragon. And this seventeenth- 
century tradition of dealing with the psychic life still lies like a great shadow 
over England and America, so that if we glance at a novel about occultism we 
may be perfectly certain that it deals with sad or evil destiny. , 67 
Chesterton saw Gothic literature, with its morbid fascination, as the natural 
consequence of this abdication: "But, on the whole, when the serious modern novel has 
dealt with the serious preternatural agency, it has not only been serious but sad. "68 
Chesterton wanted his fiction to have an optimistic outlook. 69 This led him to avoid 
dwelling on evil grotesques in his detective fiction. If the Gothics had removed all of 
the optimism from fairy tales, then Chesterton believed that the detective story 
provided an opportunity to redress the balance: "As a critic said the other day. with 
profound truth, the detective story is really a fairy story. "70 
Chesterton's theological and polemical intentions stopped him from transporting the 
gothic grotesque into his detective fiction. Thus the traditional grotesque was robbed of 
the personality and power it required. Chesterton did not deny the reality of evil spirits: 
``I do not, of course, believe that good and evil spirits are merely allegories that stand 
67 G. K. Chesterton, "A Midsummer Nights Dream", The Common Man (London: Sheed & Ward. 1950). 
p. 20. 
68 G. K. Chesterton, Sidelights on New London and Newer York (London: Sheed & Ward, 1932). p. '-31. 
69 For a more detailed discussion of Chesterton's optimism, see the concluding chapter. 
10 / G. K. Chesterton, "Real Crimes and Imaginary Mysteries", The Illustrated London Vei s (1923; repr. 
Collected iforks I 'olume 33: The Illustrated London News 1923-1925, San Francisco: Ignatius Press. 
1990), p. 26. 
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for abstractions"71, he simply found no place for them in the fictional worlds that he 
wanted to create. 
Spectacles & The Loss Of The Terrible 
In 1919 Sigmund Freud wrote an important essay entitled, "The Uncanny". 72 This was 
an early attempt at approaching the grotesque from a psycho-analytic perspective. 
Much of Freud's discussion was based on the tale by E. T. A. Hoffman, "The Sand 
Man". The story centres around the legend of a bogeyman who puts children to sleep 
by pouring sand into their eyes. In his essay, Freud noted the significance of the eye in 
the story, and related it to the grotesque: "This short summary leaves no doubt, I think, 
that the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand- 
Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed of one's eyes. "73 As critics have pointed out, 
Freud was not the first to notice the symbolic significance of the eye: "Nineteenth- 
century aesthetic theory frequently makes the eye the pre-eminent organ of truth. "74 
It is interesting to look at the way in which Chesterton used the image of the eye and 
the accompanying image of spectacles. On some occasions it has little to do with the 
grotesque. In "The Coloured Lands", the spectacles are simply a way of seeing the 
world afresh. Elsewhere though, they are clearly related to the modern grotesque. Dr 
Bull's grotesque appearance in, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, is primarily 
71 G. K. Chesterton, "A Defence of Jekyll and Hyde", The Illustrated London News (1925; repr. Collected 
Works Volume 33: The Illustrated London News 1923-1925) p. 630-1. 
72 The German word, `unheimlich', literally means `unhomely'. 
73 Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny" (1919; repr. Albert Dickson, ed., The Penguin Freud Library Volume 
14: Art and Literature, London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 351. However, I should point out that while 
I 
agree with Freud that the symbolism of the eye is significant, I disagree with his interpretation of what 
that symbol actually means. He goes on to suggest that the fear of losing your eyes is often a substitute, 
"for the dread of being castrated. " (p. 352. ) 
74 "Introduction" to Carol T. Christ & John 0. Jordan, ed., Victorian Literature and the Victorian Visual 
Imagination (California: University of California Press, 1995), p. xix-xx. This recent compendium of 
essays offers a number of interesting insights into aspects of the visual in Victorian culture. 
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due to his "infernal goggles"; so much so, that the chapter is entitled, The Man in 
Spectacles". 75 
In the traditional grotesque, it was often the eye that was the source of terror. This is 
evident when we consider Professor Lucifer in The Ball and the Cross. One of the 
earliest descriptions of his appearance tells us that: "The Professor's eyes were blazing 
like a maniac's. "76 Conversely, in the character of Michael - the counterpart of 
Professor Lucifer - we discover eyes that are "quite bright, blue, and startled like those 
of a baby ., 
77 The contrast between the two descriptions is striking, and demonstrates 
Chesterton's belief that: "The eye is the lamp of the body. If your eyes are good, your 
whole body will be full of light. But if your eyes are bad, your whole body will be full 
of darkness. "78 
The arrival of spectacles in fiction has an important symbolic value. Spectacles signify 
the man-made additions that modernity has brought to everyday life. (It is interesting to 
find Professor Lucifer wearing them in The Ball and the Cross. 79 Modernity appears to 
have even affected the appearance of the Devil! ) In the modern era, this subtle 
alteration has an important effect. Spectacles replace the eye as the source of terror. 
This transformation is powerfully illustrated in some of Chesterton's short stories. For 
example, in "The Tower of Treason", Bertram Drake's initial realisation that a murder 
has been committed is due to the grotesque nature of the spectacles: "He recognised the 
spectacles on the square and stolid face; they were horn spectacles of the plainest 
pattern, yet they did not somehow suit his figure, which was clothed loosely like an 
ordinary peasant. And in the tragedy of the moment they were almost grotesque. The 
very fixity of the spectacles on the face was one of those details of daily habit that 
suddenly make death incredible. "80 A further example can be found in, "The Trees of 
Pride". At one point the doctor's spectacles cause Mr Cyprian Paynter to become 
'' G. K. Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare (1908; repr. Oxford: World's Classics. 
1996), p. 91. 
Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross, p. 10. 
77 Ibid., p. 217. 
78 Matthew 6: 22-23 (New International Version). 
'`' Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross, p. 10. 
80 Chesterton, "The Tower of Treason", Collected Works I 'ol. 14, p. 301. 
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fearful: "... there seemed suddenly something ominous in the familiar fact that he wore 
spectacles. 81 
In the same way that spectacles are man made, so too is much of the terror of 
modernity. The image of spectacles, symbolises the way in which terror has become a 
human projection. Although the spectacles (i. e. terror) really exist in themselves. they 
do not have that intrinsic property of evil that we saw in the eye. Spectacles only appear 
evil - metaphysically speaking, they are neutral. When they are removed, there is often 
no real evil behind the terror that is projected. This idea is clearly illustrated in the 
Doctor who appears in "The Trees of Pride". We have already referred to the grotesque 
nature of his spectacles. In the rest of the story, other images are used to describe him 
as a grotesque figure of evil. At one point he appears to look like a symbol of death: 
"... he saw a dark figure standing quite still... It was topped by a tall black hat of a 
funereal type, and the whole figure stood so black against the field of crimson fire that 
edged the sky-line that he could not for an instant understand... -82 In another 
description, we read: "What he saw... was the black figure with the black gloves against 
the blood-red sunset, as he had seen it when he came out of the wood, and which had 
always haunted him. ..,, 
83 The fact that the doctor is a medical practitioner - devoted to 
saving life rather than ending it - makes this description particularly poignant. And yet, 
in spite of all the appearances to the contrary, we later discover that the Doctor is 
innocent. Metaphorically speaking, when the spectacles are removed, so too is the evil 
grotesque that generates the sense of terror. 
Spectacles not only provide a modem lens by which we look at the outside world; they 
also reflect the person wearing them. This means that every perception of grotesque 
terror incorporates some aspect of the self within it. In his essay "Wonder and the 
Wooden Post", Chesterton attacked the way in which mirrors encouraged the solipsistic 
thinking of many of his contemporaries: 
R' Chesterton, The Trees of Pride", Collected Works Vol. 1-4, p. 178. 
82 Ibid., p. 189. 
83 Ibid., p. 208. 
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The modern mystic looked for the post, not outside in the garden, but inside, in 
the mirror of his mind. But the mind of the modern m\ stic. like a dandy's 
dressing-room, was entirely made of mirrors. Thus glass repeated glass like 
doors opening inwards for ever; till one could hardly see that inmost chamber- of 
unreality where the post made its last appearance... But I was never interested in 
mirrors; that is, I was never primarily interested in my own reflection - or 
reflections. 84 
The fact that terror no longer has any metaphysical basis in the modem world does not 
diminish its power. This is powerfully illustrated in H. G. Wells' story, The Invisible 
Man: A Grotesque Romance. In this story, Griffin (who is the invisible man). is 
depicted as a grotesque figure. Again the spectacles are significant. The first thing that 
Mrs Hall notices about Griffin is that, "he wore big blue spectacles". 8 She declares: 
And they goggles! Why, he looked more like a divin' helmet then a human man! x6 
Later on there is a further reference to his, "monstrous goggle eyes". 87 Wherever 
Griffin goes, his appearance invokes terror, and yet the spectacles do not mask anything 
qualitative, for Griffin is invisible. But this provides the greatest source of terror in the 
novel, and perhaps in modernity. Nothingness becomes the ultimate terror. This idea is 
forcefully conveyed when Griffin unveils himself for the first time: "Then he removed 
his spectacles, and every one in the bar gasped.. . 
It was worse than anything. Mrs Hall, 
standing open-mouthed and horror-struck, shrieked at what she saw, and made for the 
door of the house. Every one began to move. They were prepared for scars, 
disfigurements, tangible horror, but nothing! "88 
In the modern age, it appeared that `nothingness' had become a chilling alternative to 
the traditional grotesque. Chesterton uses this idea in The Man who Knew Too ! th, ch, 
when Horne Fisher looks for the missing nobleman: "He would have been grieved. but 
not horrified, to come on the nobleman's body dangling from one of his own trees as 
" Chesterton, "Wonder and the Wooden Post", The Coloured Lands, pp. 159-60. Chesterton's use of the 
mirror image has been highlighted by other critics. See M. Versfeld, "Chesterton and St Thomas" 
English Studies In Africa Vol. 4. No. 2 (September 1961), pp. 142-4; and Lynette Hunter, G. K. 
Chesterton: Explorations in Allegory (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1979), pp. 161-2. 
R' H. G. Wells, The Invisible Man. - .4 Grotesque Romance 
(1897; repr. London: Everyman, 1995), p. -t. 
86 Ibid., p. 6. 
87 Ibid., p. 8. 
88 Ibid., p. 32. 
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from a gibbet, or floating in his own pool like a pallid weed. What horrified him \\ as to 
find nothing. "89 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have suggested that the traditional grotesque is a format that 
Chesterton rarely used. This is surprising in light of Chesterton's commitment to 
medieval values, 90 and the fairy stories genre. Two main reasons have been suggested 
to account for this. Firstly, as we saw from his detective fiction, Chesterton's 
theological and polemical commitments made the traditional grotesque an unsuitable 
format. Secondly, Chesterton understood that the traditional grotesque was no longer 
the most relevant source of terror in his age. Projected terror and nothingness had taken 
over from the monsters of the Middle Ages and the ghosts of the Gothics. This 
transformation can be seen in Chesterton's use of the spectacles image. 
Although the first reason is interesting in terms of Chesterton's theology of evil, the 
second reason is more significant in terms of the grotesque. In this respect, Chesterton 
was a man of his age. By the beginning of the twentieth century the source of terror 
was located in the modern grotesque, and Chesterton responded to this. He recognised 
that the traditional grotesque had undergone a significant transformation. Margot 
Northey tells us that: "Increasingly, `gothic' came to stand for a certain mood of terror 
or horror, in which the dark mysteries of life were brought to the fore. "91 As far as 
Chesterton was concerned, the universe had not undergone any ontological 
transformation. The change had occurred in mankind's perception of the universe. This 
point is articulated by Chesterton in his essay, "The Dragon's Grandmother, ': In the 
fairy tales the cosmos goes mad; but the hero does not go mad. In the modern novels 
8) G. K. Chesterton, "The Hole in the Wall", The Man who Knew Too Much (1922; repr. London: Darwen 
Finlayson Ltd, 1961), p. 103. 
90 Chesterton's fascination with the Middle Ages is carefully explored by John Coates in "Chapter 5: The 
Restoration of the Past", of his book, Chesterton and The Edwardian Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull 
University Press, 1984). 
91 Margot Northey, The Haunted Wilderness: The Gothic and Grotesque in Canadian Fiction (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 4. 
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the hero is mad before the book begins, and suffers from the harsh steadiness and cruel 
sanity of the cosmos. "92 
G. K. Chesterton, "The Dragons Grandmother', Tremendous Trifles, p. 98. 
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Chapter 6: The Modern Grotesque 
In his discussion of Chesterton's novel, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. 
John Coates explains that: "Chesterton is pointing out... that there is in every human 
being, an innate fearfulness, which will find some subject... "' Evidence in support of 
this observation can be found in Chesterton's defence of fairy stories: "Fair- tales, then, 
are not responsible for producing in children fear, or any of the shapes of fear; fairy, 
tales do not give the child the idea of evil or the ugly; that is in the child already. 
because it is in the world already. . . 
The baby has known the dragon intimately ever 
since he had an imagination. ,2 The idea that fear will always focus upon something. is 
central to the division between the traditional and modern grotesque. As I suggested in 
the previous chapter, Chesterton leant towards the modern grotesque, because he felt 
that it expressed the fears of his age most effectively. 
Some critics have suggested that the genre of the grotesque is best suited to its modern 
form. In discussing the modern era, Bernard McElroy comments: "... there seems to be 
an affinity which makes the grotesque not only typical of our art, but perhaps its most 
characteristic expression, indeed at times even its obsession, in the same way that 
tragedy was the definitive mode of fifth-century BC Greece or satirical comedy of 
eighteenth-century England. ,3 McElroy's observation echoes Thomas Mann, who said 
"4 of modernity, that, "the grotesque is its most genuine style... 
In this chapter I will examine Chesterton's use of the `modern grotesque', a term that 
was introduced and explained in the previous chapter. We have already noted how the 
traditional grotesque developed into the modem grotesque during the nineteenth 
1 John Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull University Press, 1984). p. 219. 
2 G. K. Chesterton, "The Red Angel", Tremendous Trifles (1909; repr. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 
1926), p. 102. This quotation also raises the question of whether evil is innate, or something that ýýe 
acquire through our experience of the world. Chesterton believed that it was innate - it is in the world 
already" because of original sin. In the next chapter, I examine Chesterton's understanding of original sin 
in more detail. 
Bernard McElro\. Fictions of the , llodern Grotesque (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 
1989). pp. 16- 
7. 
Thomas Mann, Past Masters (Trans. H. T. LoNýe-Porter, London: Martin Secker, 1933). pp. 240-1. 
century. This chapter will begin by exploring the transition to modernity that occurred 
at the turn of this century. I will then go on to look at Chesterton's concept of 
modernity, and demonstrate how he saw its inception in late nineteenth-century 
thought. Chesterton's novel, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, is central to 
my analysis of Chesterton and the modern grotesque. Before proceeding with an 
analysis of this novel, I will explain why it is so significant, and why it benefits from a 
comparison with the writings of Franz Kafka. My subsequent analysis will then be 
broken down into three sections which follow on from one another. These are: physical 
grotesques; the grotesque world; and the paranoid grotesque. 
The Transition To Modernism 
In his account of the history of Europe, Norman Davies comments on the significance 
of the shift to Modernism that occurred at the turn of the twentieth century: "Europe's 
political unease was matched by many of the cultural trends of the fin de siecle, which 
are often subsumed under the omnibus term of Modernism. Modernism involved a 
series of fundamental breaks with tradition that went far beyond the usual ebb and flow 
of intellectual fashion. "' As Davies implies, the term Modernism is somewhat vague. 
Attempting to locate it more precisely, John Coates suggests that: "Many accounts take 
as their starting point an assertion that between around 1910-1914, there was a 
momentous revolution in English literature and culture. ,6 For obvious reasons, the 
advent of the First World War in 1914 acts as a useful signpost for anyone trying to 
Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 854. 
6 John Coates, "Chesterton and the Modernist Cultural Context", in The Chesterton Review Vol. 15 No. I 
&? (February-May 1989), p. 51. Peter Faulkner identifies a similar period: "Looking back from the late 
twentieth century, we can see the arts of the period 1910-1930 as having a clear cultural identity to \lhich 
the term `Modernist' can reasonably be applied... " in Peter Faulkner, ed., . -1 
Modernist Reader: 
Modernism in England 1910-1930 (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1986), p. 13. 
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locate the arrival of Modernism. 7 Another signpost can be found in the death of 
Friedrich Nietzsche in 1900, a figure that I will consider later on in this chapter. The 
need for these signposts underlines the fact that Modernism did not arrive overnikht. 
and suggests the value of identifying some of the important events that marked its 
emergence. 
The publication of Charles Darwin's book, The Origin of Species in 1859. paved the 
way for a philosophy of life in which human beings lost their qualitative distinction in 
the animal kingdom. Evolution appeared to deny that human beings were specially 
created in the image of God; instead suggesting that they were simply a collection of 
molecules that nature had selected for survival. Thus physical reductionism replaced a 
belief in the spiritual dimension of life. While Darwin did not explore the philosophical 
and social consequences of evolution, a number of his contemporaries, including 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), were not so reticent. The evolutionary ideas of Spencer 
(and others) became known as Social Darwinism, 8 and sought to apply the biological 
principle of natural selection (in which the fittest survived) to every area of life. 
Although Social Darwinism was not responsible for the outbreak of the First World 
War, 9 it did affect military strategy during the war. Both sides were willing to fight a 
war of attrition in the belief that the strongest army would eventually be victorious. 
Michael Howard writes: "The armies and nations of Europe thus went to war in 1914 
expecting that there would be heavy losses. . . 
And the casualty lists that a later 
generation was to find so horrifying were considered by contemporaries not an 
The First World War affected every part of society. In this respect, it was the first `total war': The 
immense losses of life and expenditure of munitions during 1915 brought home to people and 
government alike that this was an entirely new kind of war, in which the liabilities were unlimited. the 
commitment indefinite, the whole nation involved. The concept of total warfare, in which professional 
fighting men were but the spearhead and the framework for an all-out national effort in a life-or-death 
struggle, was too new and too horrible to be easily accepted by Englishmen. " David Thomson, England 
in the Twentieth Century (1965; repr. 2nd ed., with revisions by Geoffrey Warner. London: Penguin 
Books, 1981), p. 38. 
8 For an interesting study on the consequences of Social Darwinism, see Richard Hofstadter, Social 
Darwinism in American Thought 1860-1915 (1944; repr. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1945). Another application of evolutionary thought in the sphere of moral philosophy during this period 
can be seen in the interest that many people had in eugenics. Chesterton's objection to eugenics is clearly 
articulated in Eugenics and other Evils (1922). 
`' This point is convincingly argued by Roland N. Stromberg in his book. Redemption by 11'ar: The 
Intellectuals and 1914 (Kansas: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1982), pp. 78-9. 
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indication of military incompetence, but a measure of national resolve. of fitness to 
rank as a Great Power. "10 
The theme of degeneration that is found in writing of the period, ' I expressed the social 
consequences of evolution that were felt at the time. The fullest contemporary account 
of this phenomenon can be found in Max Nordau's seminal study, Degeneration. As 
Tom Gibbons notes: "Degeneration was the Age of Evolution's most influential work 
of literary criticism. "12 This work, published in English in 1895, argued that much of 
the art and literature that emerged from late nineteenth-century Europe was the product 
of mental and physical degradation: "But the physician... recognises at a glance, in the 
fin-de-siecle disposition, in the tendencies of contemporary art and poetry. . . the 
confluence of two well-defined conditions of disease, with which he is quite familiar, 
viz. degeneration (degeneracy) and hysteria... " 13 The `heart of darkness' theme, that is 
also present in literature of this period, 14 can be understood in a similar vein. Both 
themes represent the struggle of the age to assert a human identity beyond the 
animalistic vision offered by the theory of evolution. 
A second important component in early Modernism was Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), 
whose discovery of psychoanalysis provided, "the first instrument for the scientific 
examination of the human mind. "1 5 In assessing his influence, Norman Davies reminds 
10 Michael Howard, "Men against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914" in Peter Paret. ed., 
Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 
522. 
lt For an analysis of the way in which the literature of the period treated this theme, see Stephen Arata, 
Fictions of Loss in the Victorian Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also see 
the article by Adrian Eckersley, "A Theme in the Early Works of Arthur Machen: `Degeneration"', 
English Literature in Transition 1880-1920 Vol. 35 No. 3. (1992). 
Tom Gibbons, Rooms in the Darwin Hotel (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1973). p. 
36. Gibbons' book explores the influence of evolutionary thought on the literature of this period in 
further detail. 
Max Nordau, Degeneration (English Language Edition, 1895; repr. George Mosse, Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1993), p. 15. 
14 Examples of heart of darkness stories, include Stevenson's The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and , 11r 
Hvde (1886); WeI Is' The Island of Dr Moreau (1896); Stoker's Dracula (1897): and Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness (1902). Murray Pittock writes: The hearts of darkness in the fantastic tales of the Nineties are 
the central achievements of the writing characteristic of the period. " - Murray G. H. Pittock, Spectrum of 
Decadence: The Literature of the 1890's (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 117. 
James Strachey, "Sigmund Freud: A Sketch of his Life and Ideas" in The Penguin Freud Library 
Volume 14: Art and Literature (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 17. 
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us that: "His work exercised a profound influence not only on the nascent medical 
sciences of psychology and psychiatry, but on all branches of the humanities concerned 
with the workings of mind and personality. " 16 His environmental determinism 
accompanied the biological determinism of evolution in attacking the concept of human 
free will. " In addition, Freud fostered an obsessive concern with the internal workings 
of the mind, which was subsequently reflected in much of the literature of 
Modernism. 18 
A third area of transition occurred in the Arts, which moved away from their 
representational tradition. The rise of the Impressionists in the 1860's and 1870"s was 
particularly momentous: "Modern painting broke forever with the representational art 
which had prevailed since the Renaissance... " 19 The impact of the Impressionists went 
further than the paintings of artists such as Claude Monet (1840-1926), Edgar Degas 
(1834-1917), Auguste Renoir (1841-1919) and Paul Cezanne (1839-1906). The 
Impressionists spawned other groups such as the Pointillists, the Neo-Impressionists, 
the Synthesists, the Expressionists and the Cubists. Indeed: "Virtually every major 
development in 20t"-century art is traceable back to the Impressionists. -20 The break 
with representational art involved a move away from objectivity towards subjectivity. 
in an attempt to rediscover the real. 
Another crucial change took place in the field of literature, as authors departed frone the 
realism of the classic nineteenth-century novels: "In The Waste Land (1922), for 
example, Eliot replaces the standard flow of poetic language by fragmented utterances, 
and substitutes for the traditional coherence of poetic structure a dislocation of parts, in 
which remote components are related by connections which are left to the reader to 
16 Davies, Europe: A History, p. 861. 
1' Chesterton's rejection of determinism is discussed in chapter seven. 
18 One of the best examples of the neurotic tendencies of modernist literature can be found in the writings 
of D. H. Lawrence. 
19 Davies, Europe: A History, p. 862. 
1" Martin Seymour-Smith, in Alan Bullock, ed., The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (London: 
Fontana Books, 1977), p. 303. The influence of the Impressionists upon Chesterton is discussed later in 
this chapter. 
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discover, or invent. "21 Other modern writers such as Joseph Conrad and Virginia 
Woolf, broke up narrative continuity through the use of techniques such as stream of 
22 consciousness. Both literature and art became increasingly subjective in both form 
and content, reflecting the transformation that was occurring in society: 
Modernism, then, in the literary sense, is seen as developing out of and 
expressing a somewhat sudden failure of confidence in the idea of the rational, 
moral individual. It announces too, a collapse of that confidence in a common 
or shared experience which gave the great Victorian novelists the confidence 
that their audience's perception of life was sufficiently like their own to claim 
assent to what they represented as "reality" and to permit, or even encourage, 
such author's habit of direct address on moral topics. 23 
A fourth area of transformation was the emergence of sociology, through the writings 
of Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920). 24 Both Durkheim and 
Weber referred to society rather than God as their external point of reference. 
(Although they were not particularly original in this, they were very influential. ) 
Because society itself was in a state of flux, sociology inadvertently added to the 
uncertainty and fragmentation that accompanied Modernism. 
Finally, the increasing dominance of the economic sphere became an important episode 
in the development of Modernism. 25 In the nineteenth century, the Industrial 
Revolution brought economics to the forefront of contemporary thought, and this was a 
legacy that Modernism inherited. Marxism provided an obvious illustration of the way 
21 M. H. Abrams, A Glossary of Literary Terms, 5th ed. (London: Holt, Rinehart & Winston Inc. 1988). p. 
109. 
A more thorough discussion of modernist literature can be found in Malcolm Bradbury & James 
McFarlane, ed., Modernism: 1890-1930 (1974; repr. Sussex: The Harvester Press Ltd, 1978). 
2 Coates, "Chesterton and the Modern Cultural Context", p. 53. Modernism also had a profound 
influence on music, through the work of composers such as Stravinsky. 
24 Auguste Comte (1798-1857) was the founding father of sociology as a discipline. However. Durkheim 
and Weber are normally considered to be the two most important figures in the earl\ development of 
sociology, and thus their location in the Modernist period is significant. 
The dominance of economic thought during Modernity was powerfully illustrated by Bruce Barton's 
book, The Alan Nobody Knows (1925), in which Barton presented Jesus as a highly successful 
businessman. This was the best selling non-fiction book in the Unites States between 1925 and 1926. 
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in which economic theory profoundly influenced Modernism. 26 The Russian Bolshevik 
victory of 1917 led to the polarising of the world into two camps - Capitalist and 
Communist. For perhaps the first time in history. the world was divided accordimu to 
economic theory. 
The events outlined make it clear that the roots of Modernism go back into the latter 
part of the nineteenth century. One commentator on the 1890's tells us: The legacy of 
the Nineties was immense: subjectivism, alienation, the apotheosis of the artist, a sense 
of fragmentation at the heart of Western culture... "27 With this in mind, I will go on to 
look at the way in which Chesterton's conception of Modernism was rooted in the late 
nineteenth century. 
Modernism According To Chesterton 
In his article on Modernism, John Coates considers a criticism made by T. S. Eliot in 
1927, that Chesterton was so obsessed with the 1890's that he ignored developments in 
the modernist literature of the period. Coates provides the following response: 
The older man may have been failing to keep abreast year by year with the 
rapidly changing strategies and techniques of 1920's Modernism, but his 
unfashionable preoccupation with the 1890's now looks not merely defensible 
but a mark of deeper philosophical and intellectual understanding. Eliot was 
criticising Chesterton, with apparent plausibility, for a lack of interest in the 
secondary symptoms of Modernism, in the artistic innovations of the day or the 
decade. In fact, Chesterton, taking a far longer view, was concerned with the 
26 The influential Marxist thinker, Raymond Williams, has argued that the theories of Karl Marx had a 
delayed impact on English culture: "Marx was the contemporary of Ruskin and George Eliot. but the 
Marxist interpretation of culture did not become widely effective in England until the thirties of our own 
century. " Raymond Williams, Culture and Society 1780-1950 (1958: repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
1971), p. 258. 
27 P1ttock, Spectrum of Decadence, p. 181. 
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whole cultural, political and religious ground out of which those innovations 
were a relatively late flower. 28 
Chesterton thought that the close of the nineteenth century - also known as the , 
fin de 
siecle29 - marked the start of Modernism. Chesterton suggested that 1880 provided the 
most obvious starting date: "There came a time, roughly somewhere about 1880. when 
the two great positive enthusiasms of Western Europe had for the time exhausted each 
other - Christianity and the French Revolution. "30 
It was in the early 1880's, that Aestheticism, which was an important part of the fin de 
siecle, began to flourish. In a fascinating article, Ian Fletcher explores the geographical 
association that Aestheticism had with the London suburb of Bedford Park. 3 1 This has a 
direct association with Chesterton, who spent some years in Bedford Park during the 
late 1890's, and clearly alludes to it in the opening pages of The Man who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare. 32 
Pessimism was another central feature of the fin de siecle, a point which Chesterton 
attributed to the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860). Introducing a dramatic 
adaptation of his novel, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, Chesterton 
explained: "I can remember the time when pessimism was dogmatic, when it was even 
orthodox. The people who read Schopenhauer regarded themselves as having found out 
28 Coates, "Chesterton and the Modernists Cultural Crisis", pp. 55-6. Coates is not alone in highlighting 
the role that the 1890's played in the emergence of Modernism. Karl Beckson refers to, "the crucial role 
that Aestheticism and Decadence played in the development of Modernism", London in the 1890 's.. -1 
Cultural Histon' (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992), p. 381. A similar idea is also present in 
David Weir's book, Decadence and the Making of Modernism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1995), where he argues that the decadent movement was central to the shift from romanticism to 
Modernism. 
29 'Fin de siEcle', seems the most appropriate term to describe an array of interconnected developments 
that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. Holbrook Jackson's famous study of the period. The 
Eighteen Nineties, begins with a chapter entitled, "Fin de Siecle - 1890-1900". 
G. K. Chesterton, The Victorian Age in Literature (1913; repr. London: Williams & Norgate, 1923), p. 
206. 
31 Ian Fletcher, "Bedford Park: Aesthetes' Elysium? " in Ian Fletcher, ed., Romantic Mythologies 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967). 
' In the novel, Chesterton renames the suburb, Saffron Park. Bedford Park was a place of some 
importance to Chesterton, partly because he met his wife Frances there in 1896. In his . 
autobiography, 
Chesterton names one of the chapters after Bedford Park, calling it, "The Fantastic Suburb". 
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everything, and found that it was nothing. , 33 A similar allusion to Schopenhauer is 
made by Dr Bull in The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. when he describes the 
Anarchist Council as a, "powerful and fanatical church, a church of eastern pessimism, 
which holds it holy to destroy mankind like vermin. "34 
Although it is unlikely that Chesterton studied Schopenhauer in much depth. his 
analysis was essentially correct. Chesterton rightly identified pessimism as being at the 
heart of Schopenhauer's philosophy, a point which Christopher Janaway confirms in 
his summary of Schopenhauer's position: "Life has no purpose. Being ourselves is not 
something which has any positive value... Such uncomfortable, challenging thoughts 
represent his distinctive contribution to modern culture. , 35 Chesterton also recognised 
the influence that Schopenhauer exerted on the wider literary tradition. John Lester 
writes: "As a matter of cultural history, it is worth noting the extraordinary spread of 
Arthur Schopenhauer's influence coincidentally with the impact of pessimism between 
1880 and 1914... the spread of Schopenhauer's Weltanschauung must indicate a strong 
measure of influence on the pessimistic mood as it developed in the late nineteenth 
century. "36 Thomas Hardy provides an obvious example of a writer whose pessimism 
found considerable affinity with the philosophy of Schopenhauer. 37 
G. K. Chesterton, "Foreword" to Mrs Cecil Chesterton & Ralph Neale, The Man who was Thursday: 
Adapted from the Novel of G. K. Chesterton (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1926), p. 4. 
G. K. Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare (1908: repr. Oxford: World's Classics, 
1996), p. 108. In the explanatory notes that accompany this edition, Stephen Medcalf agrees that the 
phrase "church of eastern pessimism" is probably a reference to Schopenhauer. 
Christopher Janaway, Schopenhauer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 100. 
John A. Lester, Jr, Journey Through Despair 1880-191-1: Transformations in British Literary Culture 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 62. 
'' In discussing the influence of Schopenhauer (and von Hartmann) on Hardy, Irving Hostie \\ rites: 
"[Hardy] did not need their help, or anyone else's, in order to reach his `twilight view of man's 
diminished place in the universe, but he did find in their philosophic speculation a support - he might 
have said a confirmation - for his own temperamental bias. " In Thomas 
Hardy, Rev. ed. (London: The 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), p. 134. It is difficult to argue for a more direct influence, as Hardy did not 
begin to read Schopenhauer until the late 1880's; well after his most formative period. Hoy\ever, 
Hardy 
did find a great affinity in the pessimism of Schopenhauer. He read and owned a number of 
Schopenhauer's writings, including his doctoral dissertation, which was published in English 
in 1889 
\4 ith the title On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. It is also 
interesting to note that 
Hardy, "had a great liking for Schopenhauer's own favourite author, the seventeenth-century 
Spanish 




Another important figure for Chesterton in the rise of Modernism was Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900), who, "articulated many of the eras most shocking thoughts". -`8 
His famous parable, "The Madman", symbolised a new dawn in Western culture: 
Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of 
empty space? Has it not become colder? Is more and more night not coming on 
all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything 
yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell 
anything yet of God's decomposition? - gods, too, decompose. God is dead. 
God remains dead. And we have killed him. 39 
Although there is no direct evidence to suggest that Chesterton was familiar with the 
parable of "The Madman", it is interesting to see how he recreates the figure of 
Zarathustra (who represents Nietzsche, ) in the character of Lucian Gregory - the one 
true anarchist in The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. Gregory declares his 
intention, "to abolish God", 40 and preaches it to anyone that will listen. 
Nietzsche's cultural analysis of Christianity, in which he introduced the concept of the 
death of God, had a profound effect on writers of the period. As John Lester points out, 
"the theme reverberates through the fin de siecle". 41 Another critic describes Nietzsche 
as "the writer who can be considered the dominant intellectual figure of the fin de 
siecle, and whose work embodies all its various strands". 42 Nietzsche's influence upon 
Modernism stretched beyond the fin de siecle, into the early-twentieth century, as John 
Foster points out when he refers to, "Nietzsche's overwhelming importance for a group 
of writers in the early-twentieth century. "43 Nietzsche's works began to be translated 
8 Davies, Europe: A History, p. 854. 
-'9 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882; repr. in A Nietzsche Reader, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 203. 
Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 20. 
Lester, Journey Through Despair 1880-1914, p. 50. 
42 Bergonzi, Bernard, The Early H. G. Wells: A Study of the Scientific Romance (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1961), p. 9. 
-`' John Burt Foster, Jr, Heirs to Dionysius: A Nietzschean Current in Literary Modernism (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 23. For further comment regarding the influence of Nietzsche on 
various Modernist writers, see Keith M. May, Nietzsche and Modern Literature: Themes in Yeats. Rilke. 
Mann and Lawrence (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988) The most complete anal,, sip of 
Nietzsche's reception in England is provided by David S. Thatcher in his book, Nietzsche in Englcmd 
1890-1914: The Growth of a Reputation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). 
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into English in 1895, although it was A. R. Orage who first popularised Nietzsche ww ith 
his two books: Friedrich Nietzsche; The Dionysian Spirit of the Age (1906). and 
Nietzsche in Outline and Aphorism (1907). 
Nietzsche's belief in the will to power was linked with evolutionary thought: -The 
effect of the Nietzsche cult, from around 1890 to 1914, was to confirm and to intensify 
the already prevalent evolutionary myth... "44 Nietzsche saw the natural consequences 
of Darwin's theory; that the survival of the fittest would lead to the emergence of the 
superman. Chesterton was concerned at the way in which writers such as George 
Bernard Shaw seemed to embrace this idea. Parodies of the evolution of the superman 
can be found in "How I Found the Superman" in Alarms and Discursions (1910), as 
well as the character of Lord Ivywood in The Flying Inn (1914). Chesterton was also 
concerned at the way in which evolution threatened individual identity. At the 
beginning of The Ball and the Cross, Chesterton wrote: "For the world of science and 
evolution is far more nameless and elusive and like a dream than the world of poetr\ or 
religion; since in the latter images and ideas remain themselves eternally, while it is the 
whole idea of evolution that identities melt into each other as they do in a nightmare. -45 
The melting of identity that permeated Nietzsche's evolutionary thought, resembled the 
philosophy of the Impressionists and the Decadents in the late-nineteenth century: "A 
resounding philosophic expression of decadence is obviously found in the thought of 
Nietzsche, who wrote at the very heart of the period and who became the self-ordained 
philosopher of decadence. , 46 Chesterton's use of the term Impressionism was not 
limited to the artistic school of that name, although it did not exclude it either. 
Chesterton considered Impressionism to be a general philosophical position: "What 
Chesterton encountered was not Impressionism, a certain technique, or a school of 
French painting, but `Impressionism' as seen by [George] Moore, a set of attitudes. or a 
way of perceiving, hostile to Chesterton's childhood vision, his sense of the 
44 Coates, "Chesterton and the Modern Cultural Context", p. 62. 
, G. K. Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross (1910; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson Ltd, 1963), p. 7. 
46 Suzanne Nalbantian, Seeds of Decadence in the Late-Nineteenth-Century Novel: .4 
Crisis in Values 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1984), pp. 1-2. 
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relationship of object to object in the material world. "47 Chesterton explained this in his 
Autobiography: "But I think there was a spiritual significance in Impressionism. in 
connection with this age as the age of scepticism. I mean that it illustrated scepticism in 
the sense of subjectivism. " 48 Discussing Impressionism, Chesterton continued: 
"Whatever may be the merits of this as a method of art, there is obviously something 
highly subjective and sceptical about it as a method of thought. It naturally lends itself 
to the metaphysical suggestion that things only exist as we perceive them, or that things 
do not exist at all. The philosophy of Impressionism is necessarily close to the 
philosophy of Illusion. " 49 
Understood in this wider philosophical sense, Impressionism was closely linked to the 
Decadent Movement. Both considered the objectivity of existence to be an illusion, and 
thus emphasised the autonomy of art, with its ensuing subjectivity. Chesterton's 
relationship with the decadents is carefully explored by Gillian Cross in her thesis, G. K. 
Chesterton and the Decadents: "When the question has been fully discussed, it will be 
seen that although the `literary influence' of the Decadence upon Chesterton's work, in 
strict terms, is not very great, his absorption of and subsequent fear of the Decadent 
mood is of far greater importance to his thinking and his mode of expression than has 
ever been suggested before .,, 
50 Although Chesterton ostensibly rejected decadent 
thought, his style was clearly influenced by the decadents. One example can be found 
in his use of colour: "But his own passion for gaudy colour is not simply toy-theatre 
heraldry, it is also Nineties aestheticism. , 51 Another can be found in Chesterton's 
typical description of the poet in his fiction: "Likewise Chesterton's idea of the poet, 
Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 196. The impact of George Augustus Moore 
(1852-1933) on the emergence of impressionism is discussed by Coates in further detail in chapter nine 
of his book. For an outline of Chesterton's response to Moore, see Chesterton's essay, The Moods of 
Mr George Moore" in Heretics (1905). 
48 G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 88. 
49 Ibid., p. 89. 
Gillian Cross, G. K. Chesterton and the Decadents (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Sussex Universit}, 
1973), p. iii. 
" P. N. Furnbank, "Chesterton the Edwardian", John Sullivan, ed.. C. K. Chesterton: .4 
C'entenarv 
Appraisal (London: Paul Elek, 1974), pp. 18-9. The symbolic importance of colour in Chesterton's 
fiction is a theme that I return to in the concluding chapter. 
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flaming-haired and gorgeous-tongued, is Wildean; it is Swinburne as transmitted by 
,, 52 Wilde. 
Oscar Wilde was probably the most important figure in the English decadent 
movement: "Wilde's death at the end of 1900 served to confirm the nineties as a decade 
apart, and to fix Wilde's place at the centre of it. "53 Chesterton agreed with this 
perception of Wilde's importance. His discussion of the period in The l ictorian . -age in 
Literature, concludes that Wilde was the bandmaster of the Decadent and Aesthetic 
movement. 54 If Wilde was the bandmaster of the English decadent movement, then his 
novel, The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891) was surely the theme tune. ' S 
The Picture of Dorian Gray captured two elements of English decadence that derived 
from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. First, it expressed the need for sensational 
experiences to counter the decadent's weariness with existence: "This weary but 
desperate search after sensation, then, was the heart of the English Decadence. " 56 This 
was the natural consequence of Schopenhauer's belief in the futility of the universe. 
Chesterton commented: "That beautiful faith in human nature and in freedom... seemed 
slowly and sadly to be drying up. "57 Second, Wilde's novel conveyed the loss of 
identity and reality that resulted from Nietzsche's denial of objectivity. In the novel, the 
distinction between art and reality breaks down, as Dorian's destiny becomes entwined 
with that of his portrait. In the preface to the novel, Wilde tells us that: "It is the 
52 Ibid., p. 19. 
53 Matthew Sturgis, Passionate Attitudes: The English Decadence of the 1890's (London: The Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1995), p. 299. Gillian Cross also notes the importance of Oscar Wilde to the decadence 
movement in her thesis. See Cross, G. K. Chesterton and the Decadents, p. 3. 
54 Chesterton, The Victorian Age in Literature, p. 218. John Coates has highlighted the influence of 
Walter Pater on Wilde and the Decadents: "Yet, restrained as Pater characteristically is, his position is 
open to abuse by coarser minds, such as that of Oscar Wilde.. . 
In this sense, Pater's are the views behind 
that 1890's dabbling with the bizarre against which Chesterton reacted. " Coates, Chesterton und the 
Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 180. Wilde had read Pater's Studies in the History of the Renaissance at 
Oxford, and later admitted to being greatly influenced by what he had read. 
In their preface to Decadence and the 1890's, Ian Fletcher & Malcolm Bradbury state that. 
it is 
difficult to isolate any purely decadent novel other than The Picture of Dorian Gray or George Moore's 
Alike Fletcher. ", Ian Fletcher, ed., Decadence and the 1890's (New York: Holmes & Meier Publisher 
Inc, 1980), p. 12. 
' Cross, G. K. Chesterton and the Decadents, p. 9. 
Chesterton, The I "ictorian Age in Literature, p. 209. 
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spectator, and not life, that art really mirrors. "58 This caused Chesterton to respond xN ith 
the observation: "Impressionism was, I think, an expression of scepticism. '9 
Chesterton personally encountered and rejected Impressionist philosophy during his 
time at The Slade School of Art in 1893-1895. John Coates confirms that Moores 
Impressionism dominated Slade during this period: "Moore's single-handed crusade on 
behalf of Impressionism (c 1887-95) overlaps Chesterton's years at Slade... Throughout 
Chesterton's time at the Slade, the school was associated with a new combatively 
expressed view of painting of which Moore was the fugleman., '60 This was a formative 
period in Chesterton's life, as he admitted at the start of the appropriate chapter of his 
Autobiography; "I deal here with the darkest and most difficult part of my task, the 
period of youth which is full of doubts and morbidities and temptations; and which, 
though in my case mainly subjective, has left in my mind for ever a certitude upon the 
objective solidity of Sin. , 61 Describing the philosophy he met with at The Slade. 
Chesterton wrote: "In the time of which I write it was also a very negative and even 
nihilistic philosophy. And though I never accepted it altogether, it threw a shadow over 
my mind... 5. )62 It was the Impressionism that he experienced at The Slade (which, as we 
have seen, represented the thought of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and the Decadents), 
that formed the basis of Chesterton's conception of modernity. Cecil Chesterton 
pointed out that this was at the heart of Chesterton's numerous polemics against 
modernity: ``What is the essence of Mr Chesterton's attack on modern thought? Briefly, 
I think it may be summarized as follows. The scepticism of the cleverest thinkers has 
made man doubtful about those axioms which cannot safely be the subject of doubt, 
"63 and has consequently left their minds derelict on a sea of indecision. 
58 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray(] 891; repr. Herts: Wordsworth Classics, 1994), p. 6. 
'` G. K. Chesterton, "When I was Young", (1925; repr. The G. K. Chesterton Quarterh" No. 3, Summer 
1997), p. 6. 
60 Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 197. 
61 Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 77. (Chesterton makes it clear that this chapter refers to his time at The 
Slade: "In this chapter, the period covered is roughly that of my going to an art school... " p. 87. ) 
62 Ibid., p. 88. 
63 Cecil Chesterton, G. K. Chesterton:. -1 Criticism (London: Alston Rives Ltd, 1908), p. 144. 
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Understanding The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare (With Reference To 
Kafka) 
At the start of The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, Chesterton includes a 
dedication to his childhood friend, Edmund Clerihew Bentley, which provides a vital 
clue as to the novel's meaning. The third stanza begins: "This is a tale of those old 
fears, even of those emptied hells. "64 In the foreword to a dramatic adaptation of his 
novel, Chesterton explained the substance of those `old fears : 
There is a great deal in the modern world that I think evil and a great deal more 
that I think silly; but it does seem to me to have escaped from this mere prison 
of pessimism. Our civilisation may be breaking up... But it is not merely closing 
in; and therefore it is not a nightmare, like the narrow despair of the 
'nineties.. 
. and 
it was in the middle of a thick London fog of these things that I 
sat down and tried to write this story, nearly twenty years ago. 6' 
In discussing the nightmare of the 1890's, Chesterton singles out science and art. He 
writes: "Science announced nonentity and art admired decay. "66 The `nonentit> of 
science' referred to the melting of identity involved in evolution, while `art's decay' is 
a reference to the decadent's weariness with existence. 
While the crisis described in his dedication was deeply personal, Chesterton also 
thought that it had ramifications for the wider culture. This is alluded to when he 
mentions the "City of Mansoul"; a reference to Bunyan's Holy War. In Pilgrim 's 
Progress, Bunyan described the personal struggle of an individual. In the Holy War, he 
described the struggle of an entire culture. Although Chesterton's novel clearly has an 
autobiographical dimension, we should not ignore the wider cultural overtones. Indeed, 
the solution that Chesterton found to his own personal crisis, is the same solution that 
he offered to his culture: "We have found common things at last, and marriage and a 
creed. "67 Elsewhere Chesterton explained the importance of the church in this regard: 
64 Chesterton, "Dedication", The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. 
`'s Chesterton, "Foreword" to Mrs Cecil Chesterton & Ralph Neale, The Man who was Thursday: 
Adapted from the Novel of G. K. Chesterton (London: Ernest Benn Ltd, 1926), p. 4. 




"I have said that my morbidities were mental as well as moral; and sounded the mt 
appalling depths of fundamental scepticism and solipsism. And there again I found that 
the Church had gone before me and established her adamantine foundations: that she 
affirmed the actuality of external things... "68 
All attempts to understand and explain The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. face 
an interpretative dilemma. As one reviewer remarked upon the book's publication: 
But when he [Chesterton] asks, in the introductory poem, dedicating it to an old 
friend, "Oh, who shall understand but you; yea, who shall understand? '' we are grateful 
to him for acknowledging the difficulties of the reader. , 69 
The first common mistake made when reading the novel, is trying to fit the whole story 
into too tight an interpretative scheme. John Coates risks this error when he says: 
"Much might be written about the design of The Man who was Thursday and critics 
have suggested how carefully every detail in the novel fits within the whole intellectual 
scheme... '. )70 Chesterton is unable to limit himself to a single intellectual scheme in 
most of his short stories, let alone in his novels. When writing about The Man who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare, Chesterton admitted that the moral of the story did not cover 
every detail of the story: "I tried to turn this notion of resistance to a nightmare into a 
topsy turvey tale about a man who fancied himself alone among enemies, and found 
that each of the enemies was in fact on his own side, and in his own solitude. That is 
the only thing that can be called a meaning in the story; all the rest of it was written for 
fun... 
The second mistake that critics of the novel sometimes make is either ignoring the 
subtitle, or marginalising its importance. When the novel was published, one reviewer 
wrote: "The Man who was Thursday, then, is a story, in the form of a dream. of a 
68 Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 353. 
69 Unsigned review, The Westminster Gazette, March 7,1908, p. 5. 
70 Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis, p. 217. 
71 Chesterton, "Foreword" to Mrs Cecil Chesterton & Ralph Neale, The Alum who was Thursday: 
.4 
dapted from the Novel of G. K. Chesterton, p. 5. 
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nightmare that is ended. "72 Elsewhere, Kingsley Amis described the tale as. "a half- 
decipherable message about life being a bewildering but good-natured and all- 
reconciling joke. , 73 In more recent times, Stephen Medcalf has suggested that 
Chesterton's understanding of `nightmare' is no more threatening than the dreamlike 
style he found in Shakespeare's, A Midsummer Night's Dream. 74 These attempts to 
diminish the centrality of the nightmare were strongly resisted by Chesterton: "To do it 
justice, by its own description, it is not a novel, but a nightmare. And. . . that sub-title is 
perhaps the only true and reliable statement in the book... 57 For Chesterton at least, if 
not always for the critic, the subtitle was the essential point of the story: "But the point 
is that the whole story is a nightmare of things, not as they are, but as they seemed to 
the young half-pessimist of the `90's... "76 
It is the nightmare element within The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, that 
prompted Jorge Luis Borges to draw a parallel between Chesterton, and the Czech 
writer, Franz Kafka. Borges explained: "... Chesterton restrained himself from being 
Edgar Allen Poe or Franz Kafka, but something in the makeup of his personality leaned 
towards the nightmarish, something secret, and blind, and central. "77 
In my analysis of the modern grotesque within The Man who was Thursday: A 
Nightmare, I will draw comparisons with the work of Franz Kafka. (1883-1924). The 
7Unsigned review, The Morning Post, March 9,1908, P. 2. 
73 Kingsley Amis, "The Poet and the Lunatics", (1971: repr. Denis Conlon, ed., G. K. Chesterton: . -I 
Half 
Century of Views, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 271. 
74 This idea is found in Stephen Medcalf s informative introduction to the edition of The Man who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare that I have used throughout. Medcalf writes: "We can find what he meant by a 
nightmare in his remarks in 1904 on A Midsummer Night's Dream. " (p. xxxiv) While this might appear 
to be a plausible suggestion, I suggest that it is mistaken in light of the various comments that Chesterton 
makes regarding the tale (see the comments that follow in the text above). In addition. Chesterton's 
description of `the nightmare' in his essay of the same name (see Alarms and Discursions, 1910) clearly 
suggests something beyond the dreamlike quality of Shakespeare's play. 
Chesterton, "Foreword" to Mrs Cecil Chesterton & Ralph Neale, The Man who was Thursdal: 
. -I 
dapted from the Novel of G. K. Chesterton, p. 3. Later on in the foreword, Chesterton is careful to 
distinguish his nightmare from the new nightmares being described in 1926, which he considers to 
be 
essentially "frivolous. " (p. 4. ) Chesterton also emphasised the importance of the subtitle 
in an article 
published in the Illustrated London News, (1936, repr. G. K. Chesterton, The Man who n a. ý 
Thursday: A 
, Vightmare London: Penguin Books, 1986), pp. 185-6. 
7`' Chesterton. Autobiography, p. 99. 
Jorge Luis Borges, Other Inquisitions (1952; trans. Ruth L. C. Simms, London: Souvenir Press Ltd. 
1973), p. 84. 
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reason for doing so is that Kafka is a vitally important figure for anyone seekinL, to 
understanding the modern grotesque. He is the first author that Bernard %1cElroy turns 
to when analysing the modem grotesque, and it is easy to see why. W. H. Auden 
declared: "Had one to name the artist who comes nearest to bearing the same kind of 
relation to our age that Dante, Shakespeare and Goethe bore to theirs, Kafka is the first 
one would think of. "78 Auden continued: "Kafka is important to us because the 
predicament of his hero is the predicament of the contemporary man. "79 Milan Kundera 
also observed that Kafka was able, "to say things about our human condition (as it 
reveals itself in our century) that no social or political thought could ever tell us. "'" By 
comparing The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare with the writings of Kafka. I ww ill 
demonstrate how effectively Chesterton expressed the modem grotesque, and helped to 
develop our understanding of it. 
The connection between Kafka and Chesterton has been noted before by various 
Chesterton critics apart from Borges. 81 C. S. Lewis noticed a connection between the 
two writers which led him to comment that: "... both give a powerful picture of the 
loneliness and bewilderment which each one of us encounters in his (apparently') 
single-handed struggle with the universe... "82 Although critics have connected 
Chesterton and Kafka, they have remained acutely aware of the different worldviews 
held by the two writers: "The similarity is, of course, not total; Kafkas work has the 
unqualified single-mindedness of an intense poetic vision... Chesterton, however. fights 
78 W. H. Auden, "The Wandering Jew" The New Republic (10th February, 1941), p. 185. 
79 Ibid., p. 186. 
80 Milan Kundera, The.. 1rt of the Novel (1986; trans. Linda Asher, London: Faber & Faber, 1988). p. 117. 
Interestingly enough, Kafka also makes it into Harold Bloom's treatise on the Western Canon, as one of 17. the definitive writers of the twentieth century. See Harold Bloom, "Chapter 20: Kafka: Canonical 
Patience and Indestructibility", The ilestern Canon (London: Papermac, 1995). 
8! For example: Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis. p. 220; Dudle} Barker. G. K. 
Chesterton (London: Constable & Company Ltd, 1973), pp. 175-6; and Gary Wills, Chesterton: Van 
and. 14ask (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), see "Chapter 3: Paradox and Nightmare". 
82 C. S. Lewis, "Period Criticism", Of This . And 
Other Worlds (London: Fount Books, 1982), p. 151. 
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the possibility of the monstrous, which is for him only one element in a much more 
complex view of reality... "83 
Despite their differences, there is clearly a sufficient degree of commonality beul een 
Chesterton and Kafka to justify comparative study. Both writers lived amid the onset of 
modernity, and both struggled personally with the philosophy it entailed. Both writers 
were influenced by similar pieces of literature. These included Dickens, 84 the Book of 
Job, 85 and fairy stories. 86 Perhaps the most significant link between them though is the 
fact that Kafka appears to have read Chesterton. Gustav Janouch recalls his 
conversations with Kafka, and tells us: 
I was given two books by G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy and The Man who ºwwas 
Thursday. 
Kafka said, "He is so gay, that one might almost believe he had found God " 
"So for you laughter is a sign of religious feeling? " 
"Not always. But in such a godless time one must be gay. It is a duty. The ship 's 
orchestra played to the end on the sinking Titanic. In that way one saps the 
foundation of despair. " 
"Yet a forced gaiety is much sadder than an openly acknowledged sorrow. " 
"Quite true. Yet sorrow has no prospects. And all that matters is prospects, 
hope, going forward. There is danger only in the narrow, restricted moment. 
83 Cross, G. K. Chesterton and the Decadents, p. 51. Gary Wills writes along similar lines when he states: 
"Kafka's heroes become dogs, beetles, and prisoners at the blink of a blood-veined eye; Chesterton's 
become, in a twinkling, kings and heroes. " Wills, Chesterton: Man and Mask, pp. 49-50. 
84 Chesterton wrote a number of pieces on Dickens including his two books, Charles Dickens (1906) and 
Appreciations and Criticisms of the Works of Charles Dickens (1911). Kafka's interest in Dickens is 
carefully documented by Mark Spilka in his study, Dickens and Kafka: A Mutual Interpretation 
(London: Denis Dobson, 1963). 
85 Chesterton wrote his introduction to the "Book of Job" in 1907, although he was clearly familiar \N ith 
the book at an earlier date. See his comments in The Defendant (1901; repr. London: J. M. Dent & Co 
Ltd, 1918), pp. 69-70. Kafka's interest in Job is discussed by Max Brod, Fran_ Kafka: A Biography, 
7"d 
ed. (1960; trans. G. Humphreys Roberts & Richard Winston, New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), pp. 180- 
184. 
86 Chesterton's passion for fairyland is legendary: "The things I believed most then, the things I 
belie\e 
most now, are the things called fairy tales. " G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908, repr. London: 
The 
Bodley Head Ltd, 1927), p. 85. Concerning Kafka we read: "Kafka read and loved fairy tales all 
his 
life. ", David Zane Mairowitz & Robert Crumb, Kafka for Beginners (Cambridge: Icon Books, 1993). p. 
110. 
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Behind it lies the abyss. If one overcomes it, everything is diff rent. Onlj- the 
, 87 moment counts. It determines life. 
Physical Grotesques 
Modernism distorts aspects of existence, rendering them physical grotesques. This can 
be seen in the members of the Anarchist Council that we meet in The Man ii'ho gras 
Thursday: A Nightmare: "At his introduction to the others on the Council. the novel 
starts to earn its subtitle, A Nightmare. They are not only hateful, they are physically 
monstrous in a way that seems to body forth the evil in their souls. "88 Numerous 
examples of grotesque council members can be found in the novel. 
The ascetic secretary - Monday - has a crooked smile that strikes fear into the heart of 
Syme: 
Many people have this nervous trick of a crooked smile, and in many it is even 
attractive. But in all Syme's circumstances, with the dark dawn and the deadly 
errand and the loneliness on the great dripping stones, there was something 
unnerving in it. There was the silent river and the silent man, a man of even 
classic face. And there was the last nightmare touch that his smile suddenly 
went wrong. 89 
What frightens Syme is not that he faces an embodiment of evil in the form of a 
traditional grotesque, but that he discovers physical features which appear innocent. 
8' Gustav Janouch, Conversations with Kafka, 2°d ed. (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd, 1968). pp. 94-5. 
Since their publication, Janouch's records have been a controversial source for scholars studying Kafka. 
Many Kafka scholars quote freely from them, believing them to be authentic. At the time of their 
publication, Max Brod - Kafka's friend and executor, and Dora Dyment - 
Kafka's final romantic 
interest, confirmed their authenticity. However, a number of other Kafka scholars have since cast 
doubt 
on their reliability. These include William J. Dodd, Kafka and Dostoevsky: The Shaping of 
lnflucnce 
(London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992), p. 4: & Roy Pascal, "Critical Approaches to Kafka" in Angel 
Flores, ed., The Kafka Debate: New Perspectives for our Time (New York: Gordian Press. 
1977). p. 46. 
In using Janouch as evidence for Kafka's familiarity with Chesterton, I am presuming at 
least a degree of 
reliability in Janouch, which, given the circumstances, seems reasonable. 
88 Kingsley Amis, "Four Fluent Fellows: An Essay on Chesterton's Fiction", in Sulli' an, ed.. G. K. 
Chesterton: 
.4 
Centenary Appraisal, p. 35. 
S`' Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, pp. 45-6. 
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and yet turn out to be grotesque. Later on, the secretary is said to have a. "sudden. shrill 
voice which was as startling and discordant as his crooked smile. --C)" 
Other members of the Anarchist Council also appear to be physically grotesque. 
although in each instance, it is a normal characteristic that is distorted. What makes 
Tuesday grotesque, is the contrasts that Syme notices in him: "One man indeed stood 
out at even a superficial glance.. . 
The effect of this figure.. . 
had every diablerie that can 
come from the utterly grotesque. If out of that stiff tie and collar there had come 
abruptly the head of a cat or a dog, it could not have been a more idiotic contrast. ""' In 
the case of Saturday, it is his spectacles that makes him appear grotesque (a point that I 
discussed in the previous chapter): 
There was nothing whatever odd about him, except that he wore a pair of dark, 
almost opaque spectacles. It may have been merely a crescendo of nervous 
fancy that had gone before, but those black discs were dreadful to Syme: they 
reminded him of half-remembered ugly tales... They took away the key of the 
face... Syme even had the thought that his eyes might be covered up because 
they were too frightful to see. 92 
The physical grotesques of the council members culminate in the person of Sunday. 
Once again, Sunday is not frightening in the manner of a traditional grotesque. He is 
not a monster or a dragon. His grotesquerie stems from the fact that he is a man; and 
yet he is also something more than a man: 
His vastness did not lie only in the fact that he was abnormally tall and quite 
incredibly fat... This man was planned enormously in his original 
proportions... His head, crowned with white hair, as seen from behind looked 
bigger than a head ought to be. The ears that stood out from it looked larger 
than human ears. He was enlarged terribly to scale; and this sense of size was so 
staggering, that when Syme saw him all the other figures seemed quite suddenly 
to dwindle and become dwarfish. 93 
90 Ibid., p. 47. 
91 Ibid., p. 49. 
92 Ibid., p. 52. 
9' Ibid., p. 48. 
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Sunday is certainly terrifying, but he is also comic, a combination that \\e have 
previously seen to be integral to the grotesque. He has a. "horrible, happy laughter. "94 
In the chase scene that occurs towards the end of the novel, the President escapes on an 
elephant stolen from the local zoo. This is clearly a terrifying event: "The six unhappy 
detectives flung themselves into cabs and followed the elephant, sharing the terror 
which he spread though the long stretch of the streets. , 95 At the same time, the image 
of a large white haired man riding through the streets of London on an elephant is also 
comical. 
Syme is well aware that the physical grotesques he find among the council members 
are of the modern variety: "Each man had something about him, perceived perhaps at 
the tenth or twentieth glance, which was not normal, and which seemed hardly human. 
The only metaphor he could think of was this, that they all looked as men of fashion 
and presence would look, with the additional twist given in a false and curved 
mirror. , 96 The modern grotesque distorts the normal rather than embodying an external 
evil. 
Kafka's famous short story, The Metamorphosis, expresses a similar form of the 
modern grotesque. Gregor Samsa turns into a giant beetle, providing an obvious 
example of a physical grotesque. In The Metamorphosis, the modem nature of Kafka's 
grotesque is symbolised by the role of the family. Kafka uses Gregor's family to create 
a sense of ambiguity as to who Gregor's real enemy is. His family help to feed him, 
thus keeping him alive. The same family also destroy him. Syme faces a similar 
difficulty in The Man who was Thursday. A Nightmare. The physical appearance of 
those he meets does not make it clear whether they represent good or evil. This is the 
confused world of the modern grotesque. Appearance is detached from reality. and the 
sense of the grotesque is increased: 
Syme began to feel a new sickness and despair. The Doctor's smile and silence 
were not at all like the cataleptic stare and horrible silence which he had 
`' ` Ibid., p. 51. 
9ý Ibid., p. 142 
96 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 
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confronted in the Professor half an hour before. About the Professor's make-up 
and all his antics there was always something merely grotesque, like a golli\vog. 
Syme remembered those old woes of yesterday as one remembers being afraid 
of Bogy in childhood, But here was daylight; here was a healthy, sgUare- 
shouldered man in tweeds... 97 
The physical grotesques in Chesterton and Kafka, are both real and imagined. It is this 
juxtaposition that makes them so representative of the modern grotesque. The three 
lodgers that appear in The Metamorphosis illustrate this. Upon discovering Gregor, 
they inform Gregor's family that they wish to quit their place of lodging immediately. 
And yet their complaint is not particularly emotive or dramatic. They do not appear to 
be unduly worried by the dramatic appearance of a human beetle. While the reader 
finds Gregor shocking, the lodgers merely find him an inconvenience. Through this 
technique, Kafka makes the terror of Gregor's appearance contingent on the eyes of the 
beholder. The same technique recurs throughout Kafka's bizarre tale, as the fantastic 
occurs amid everyday reality. One of Gregor's first concerns upon discovering his 
metamorphosis, is the gruelling nature of his job: "'Oh God, ' he thought, `what a 
gruelling job I've picked! Day in, day out - on the road ... 
I've got the torture of 
travelling, worrying about changing trains, eating miserable food at all hours, 
constantly seeing new faces, no relationships that last or get intimate. "98 
A similar technique is used in The Man who was Thursday. A Nightmare. Sy-me 
struggles to understand the cause of the physical grotesques he encounters. He asks 
himself whether they are the result of the universe he inhabits, or simply the result of 
his own imagination. Syme sees Professor de Worms, and thinks that the world has 
turned him into a grotesque: "He really looked as if he had been twisted out of shape by 
the tortuous streets he had been threading. "99 Elsewhere, Syme cannot help thinking 
that his own imagination is responsible for the physical grotesques he perceives among 
the other members of the Anarchist Council: Such were the six men who had sworn to 
destroy the world. Again and again Syme strove to pull together his common sense in 
q? 
Ibid., pp. 87-8. 
9R Franz Kafka, The Metamorphosis (1915, trans. Stanley Corngold, New York: Norton & Company. 
1996), pp. 3-4. 
" Chesterton. The I%Ian who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 68. 
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their presence. Sometimes he saw for an instant that these notions were 
,> 100 subjective... 
The Grotesque World 
The expression of the modem grotesque in Chesterton and Kafka goes further than the 
physical grotesques that we have noted so far. The whole world becomes a 
grotesquerie, and this is represented through the nightmarish atmosphere. In The . 11cnn 
who was Thursday :A Nightmare we are told: "For Syme thirsted first and last to get 
clear of the whole poisonous atmosphere. "' 01 One group of images that Chesterton 
consistently uses to express the totality of the novel's mood are the atmospheric 
conditions. These change with the mood of the novel. For example, the new sense of 
hope that concludes the tale is symbolised by Chesterton's observation that: -Dawn 
was breaking over everything in colours at once clear and timid... ), 102 In the rest of the 
novel, the atmospheric conditions are normally ominous: "Over the whole landscape 
lay a luminous and unnatural discoloration... " 103 It is interesting to discover that 
Kafka's uses a similar image in The Trial. Joseph K. visits the offices of the law courts, 
and begins to feel faint. An official suggests, "that the gentleman's faintness is due to 
the atmosphere here, and the best thing to do - and what he would like best - is not to 
take him to the sick-room at all, but out of these offices altogether. " 104 Another official 
tries in vain to encourage Joseph K., telling him: "By the time you've come twice or 
thrice you'll hardly notice how oppressive it is here. " 105 
Another image used in these novels to capture the universal sense of the modern 
grotesque is the maze or labyrinth. In The Trial, the law courts are like a labyrinth for 
10° Ibid., p. 53. 
101 Ibid., p. 64. 
101 Ibid., p. 163. Chesterton's symbolic use of colour is a subject that I return to in chapter nine. 
'c'' Ibid., p. 43. 
104 Franz Kafka, The Trial (1925; trans. Willa & Edwin Muir, Fran: Kafka - The Complete . ovels. 
London: Minerva Books, 1994), p. 47. 
"" Ibid., p. 46. 
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Joseph K., in which he cannot find his way. He says to the Law-Court Attendant: 
`'Show me the way, there are so many lobbies here, I'll never find the wati' . 
-106 In The 
Castle, the whole world is a labyrinth to K., who forever looks for a route to the Castle 
without success. This has led many critics to view the book as a modern Pilgrim 's 
Progress in which there is no progress. Towards the end of the story. K. enters a 
passage that is reminiscent of a maze, symbolising his hopeless search for the Castle: 
"The passage was just high enough for one to walk without bending one's head. A1 ong 
both sides the doors almost touched each other... At last they stopped before a door 
which was not in any way different from the others... "' 07 In The Magi who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare, a similar image describes the adventures that Sunday' has led 
them through. Inspector Radcliffe complains that, "we five idiots were running after 
each other like a lot of confounded babies playing blind man's bluff. "' 08 
It is possible that the source for Chesterton and Kafka's image of a labyrinth-like world 
was Dickens' novel, Bleak House. In the opening page of his novel, Dickens' describes 
the oppressive atmosphere of London at that time, in which no one can see clearly: 
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and 
meadows; fog down the river, where it rolls defiled among the tiers of shipping, 
and the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city. Fog on the Essex 
marches, fog on the Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the cabooses of collier- 
brigs; fog lying out on the yards, and hovering in the rigging of great ships: fog 
drooping on the gunwales of barges and small boats. Fog in the eyes and throats 
of ancient Greenwich pensioners... Chance people on the bridges peeping over 
the parapets into a nether sky of fog, with fog all around them... 109 
106 Ibid., p. 45. 
107 Franz Kafka, The Castle (1926; trans. Willa & Edwin Muir, Franz Kafka - The Complete , %ov els, 
London: Minerva Books, 1994), p. 411. Mark Anderson has suggested that this endless searching for 
something that he can never find is fundamental to Kafka's status as a modern writer: If he is the Dante 
of the modern age (as Auden called him), it is because the way out of Hell is forever barred to 
him... 
Kafka's Clothes: Ornament and Aestheticism in the Hasburg Fin de Siecle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1992), p. 5. 
108 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: ,A 
Nightmare, p. 109. 
109 Charles Dickens, Bleak House (1853: repr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 1. 
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Chesterton commented in an introduction to Dickens' novel that: The fog of the first 
chapter never lifts. "110 He went on to write: "Dickens meant that twilight to be 
oppressive; for it was the symbol of oppression. "11 Explaining the context in which he 
wrote The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, Chesterton stated: "... it was in the 
middle of a thick London fog of these things that I sat down and tried to write this 
story, nearly twenty years ago. " 112 The influence of Bleak House upon Kafkas novels, 
especially The Trial, has been discussed by Mark Spilka in chapters ten and eleven of 
his book, Dickens and Kafka: A Mutual Interpretation. The idea that the two authors 
found a common inspiration in Bleak House remains a speculative suggestion, although 
the circumstantial evidence is quite compelling. 
Earlier on I argued that the physical grotesques in these books are essentially modern. 
because there is an ambiguity regarding whether or not their reality is perceived or 
actual. The same can be said of the nightmarish atmosphere found in these tales, in 
which the whole world becomes grotesque. The poisonous atmosphere in The Man who 
was Thursday; A Nightmare is contingent upon the reality of this world (as opposed to 
the distinct secondary world found in genres such as fairy stories'' 3): For even the 
most dehumanized modern fantasies depend on some older and simpler figure; the 
adventures may be mad, but the adventurer must be sane. The dragon without St 
George would not even be grotesque. " 114 This is also true of The Trial. The grotesque 
unreality of Joseph K. 's arrest, conviction and sentence; is contingent upon the 
existence of an apparently normal man. Without Joseph K., there is no trial. The result 
of this grotesque universe, in which reality and fantasy combine, is that the protagonists 
cannot find their place in the world. Their alienation leads me on to the third aspect of 
the modern grotesque that I wish to look at: The Paranoid Grotesque. 
1 10 G. K. Chesterton, Appreciations and Criticisms of the Works of Charles Dickens (1911; repr. as 
Chesterton on Dickens, London: Everyman, 1992), p. 153. 
Ibid., p. 159. 
"' Chesterton, "Foreword" to Mrs Cecil Chesterton & Ralph Neale, The Man who was Thursday. 
. -I 
dapted from the Novel of G. K. Chesterton, p. 4. 
For a discussion of how fairy tales create a secondary world - the land of Fairie - see 
J. R. R. Tolkien's 
essay, "On Fairy Stories". 
114 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 43. 
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The Paranoid Grotesque 
Because of the way in which the nightmare world alienates its inhabitants, it is hardly 
surprising that we should find an increased level of paranoia among the protagonists. 
As a condition, paranoia is inherently grotesque. The three aspects of the grotesque that 
I have previously established in chapter four are all present. There is a combination of 
the comic and the terrible in the beliefs that are articulated; there is a combination of 
reality and fantasy in the confused mind of the individual; and there is a sense of 
distortion or exaggeration in the individual's perception of the physical universe. 
I will examine paranoia in Chesterton and Kafka's fiction via four categories, which 
seem to me to be integral to the paranoid mode of thinking. These are delusion, 
suspicion, hostility, and an exaggerated perception of personal value. I'' 
The paranoid individual is deluded in the sense that he sees or perceives things that do 
not objectively exist. We see this illustrated in the whipping room scene that occurs 
during The Trial. Joseph K. opens the door to the bank's lumber room and discovers his 
original warders beings whipped. He cannot, "get the warders out of his head", ' 16 and 
yet they do not appear to exist anywhere else. No-one else at the bank notices the 
whipping. Delusion is also a problem that Syme suffers from in the Wood: 
Was he wearing a mask? Was anyone wearing a mask? Was anyone anything? 
This wood of witchery, in which men's faces turned black and white by turns. 
in which their figures first swelled into sunlight and then faded into formless 
night, this mere chaos of chiaroscuro (after the clear daylight outside), seemed 
to Syme a perfect symbol of the world in which he had been moving for three 
days, this world where men took off their beards and their spectacles and their 
noses, and turned into other people... Was there anything that was apart from 
what it seemed? The Marquis had taken off his nose and turned out to be a 
These four categories are a shortened adaptation of seven categories suggested by David Swanson 
& 
Philip Bohnert & Jackson Smith in the introductory chapter to their book, The Paranoid (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1970). The seven characteristics they list are: projective thinking; hostility; suspiciousness: 
centrality; delusions; fear of loss of autonomy; grandiosity. (pp. 8-19. ) 
116 Kafka, The Trial, p. 57. 
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detective. Might he not just as well take off his head and turn out to be a hobgoblin? 
Chesterton explains that delusional thinking is the natural consequence of the 
philosophy of Impressionism: For Gabriel Syme had found in the heart of that sun- 
splashed wood what many modern painters had found there. He had found the thing 
which the modern people call Impressionism, which is another name for that final 
scepticism which can find no floor to the universe. " '8 Stephen Medcalf underlines the 
centrality of this idea in Chesterton's thought: "He was haunted by a constant fear of 
discovering that there is no real link between our selves and things: or that there is no 
world external to our selves, that only our selves exist. "19 
Delusion is also prevalent in The Castle. K. constantly searches for Klamm and the 
Castle, without ever finding them. He begins to wonder whether or not he is deluding 
himself. Early on in the novel, K. catches a glimpse of Klamm through a peephole in 
the bar. 120 But the only reason he believes that the figure he sees is Klainni, is that 
Frieda tells him it is. As both K. and the reader subsequently discover, Frieda is not the 
most reliable of sources. K. 's constant inability to find Klamm only heightens his belief 
that he must exist. Without a `floor to his universe', K. becomes increasingly deluded. 
The second trait within paranoia is a suspicion of everyone and everything. This is one 
of the most disturbing aspects of The Trial. The narration of the opening lines casts 
suspicion on the fairness of Joseph K. 's arrest: "Someone must have been telling lies 
about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine 
morning. " 121 As the story unfolds, Joseph K. becomes increasingly distrusting of the 
offers of help that he receives. This can be seen in his relationship with the Advocate. 
Joseph K. eventually becomes so suspicious, that he dismisses his Advocate: At long 
last K. had made up his mind to take his case out of the Advocate's hands. He could not 
117 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, pp. 112-3. 
118 Ibid., p. 113. 
119 Stephen Medcalf, "The Achievement of G. K. Chesterton", in Sullivan, ed.. G. K. Chesterton: . -1 
C'entenaii' Appraisal, p. 8 1. 
°l Kafka, The Castle, p. 296. 
Kafka, The Trial, p. 13. 
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quite rid himself of doubts about the wisdom of this step, but his conviction of its 
necessity prevailed. " 
1 22 
Suspicion also characterises the relationship between the members of the Anarchist 
Council in The Man who was Thursday. A Nightmare. Each of the six council members 
believes that he is the lone detective among a council of murdering anarchists. When 
Professor de Worms asks Syme whether he is a policeman, Syme denies it, only to 
discover that his mistrust is misplaced. The problem for Syme is that he feels isolated. 
which makes him even more suspicious than he might otherwise be: "Syme was ready 
to believe anything about the perversion of this dehumanized brotherhood... " 123 
Another trait in paranoia is hostility, or believing the whole world to be against \ ou. 
This is what frightens Syme and his fellow detectives as they make their last stand on 
the beach. Syme voices their common understanding of the situation, when he declares 
that: "The power of this whole planet is against us... " 124 This perception results t'rom 
the central tenet of Kafka and Chesterton's nightmare. The protagonists believe that 
they are alone in a hostile universe. This is the "prison of pessimism", 12ý that 
Chesterton depicts in his nightmare. A sense of the world conspiring against the 
individual also dominates The Trial. It is reinforced when Titorelli explains to Joseph 
K. that no-one can ultimately help to acquit him. Joseph K. 's isolation is also felt by 
Gabriel Syme: "Through all this ordeal his root horror had been isolation, and there are 
no words to express the abyss between isolation and having one ally. "126 At this point, 
the distinction between Chesterton and Kafka emerges. Whereas Syme gradually 
discovers that he is not alone on the Anarchist Council, The Trial concludes with 
Joseph K. 's execution. Joseph K. 's hostility is ultimately shown to have been justified. 
1 22 Ibid., p. 96. 
12 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 64. 
Ibid., p. 131. 
Chesterton, "Foreword" to Mrs Cecil Chesterton & Ralph Neale, The Man ti+who u as Thursday: 
Adapted from the Novel of G. K. Chesterton, p. 4. 
126 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 78. 
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The final ingredient of paranoia is an exaggerated perception of personal value. This 
can either be in the sense of believing yourself to be more important than you are, or it 
can involve believing yourself to be worthless. In the fiction of Chesterton and Kafka. 
the paranoid individual normally has no self worth. Self worth always has some 
external frame of reference. This comes either from outside praise, or from our own 
perception of an ability to do something relating to the outside world. Thus the solipsist 
rejection of the outside world undermines the normal basis for assessing personal value. 
Syme illustrates this when he encounters Impressionism in the wood: That tragic self- 
confidence which he had felt when he believed that the Marquis was a devil had 
strangely disappeared now that he knew that the Marquis was a friend". 127 Syme's self 
confidence goes from one extreme to another, as he struggles to find a floor to the 
universe. Inspector Radcliffe is also affected by the alien universe in which he finds 
himself. He exclaims, "we are not much, my boy, in Sunday's universe. "128 A similar 
instance occurs at the end of The Trial. Having had his self confidence stripped away 
by a universe that no longer makes sense, Joseph K. utters his final words as the knife 
is thrust into his heart: "'Like a dog! ' he said: it was as if he meant the shame of it to 
outlive him. " 129 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that Chesterton considered solipsism to be at the heart of 
Modernism, a point that he illustrated through the modern grotesque in The Man i 'ho 
tii'as Thursday: A Nightmare. He believed solipsism to be a direct consequence of the 
work of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Impressionism; and he thought that it had come 
to the fore with the fin de siecle of the 1890's. Chesterton's perspective is one specific 
slant on Modernism, but it seems to be justified. It was central to Nietzsche. who might 
be seen as a spokesman for Modernism: "... what Nietzsche actually says is that the 
thing-in-itself is nonsense. There are only appearances and relationships. . . 
It is on 
'27 Ibid., p. 112. 
128 Ibid., p. 111. 
129 Kafka, The Trial, p. 128. 
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account of this attitude, among others, that Nietzsche might be regarded as the poets 
philosopher. " 130 
Chesterton believed that solipsism was a nightmarish state to be in. In The Defendant 
he wrote: 
And in modem times this terror of one's self, of the weakness and mutability of 
one's self, has perilously increased... Now, it is this horrible fairy tale of a mail 
constantly changing into other men that is the soul of the decadence... And the 
end of all this is that maddening horror of unreality which descends upon the 
decadents, and compared with which physical pain itself would have the 
freshness of a youthful thing. ' 31 
Gabriel Gale makes a similar point in The Poet and the Lunatics: "Anybody ývho has 
been in that centre of the cosmos knows that it is to be in hell. " 132 This was a nightmare 
with which Chesterton was personally familiar. 133 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the fact that the worst of the fears are internal rather than external does not diminish the 
terror involved: "Now I fancy that if everyone of those queer indestructible dreads \\ ere 
sympathetically examined it would be found that in each case the core of the terror was 
spiritual. "134 
Chesterton's similarity to Kafka exists in his use of aspects of the modern grotesque to 
express the nightmare of modernity. Where the two writers differ is in their response to 
this nightmare. For Kafka, the nightmare is perpetual. Whether his stories are 
considered nihilist or existential, the nightmare remains, and the individual is always 
alienated from the universe. In contrast, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare 
expresses a nightmare that Chesterton gradually emerged from. Chesterton came to 
1 "() May, Nietzsche and Modern Literature, p. 3. 
I., 11 Chesterton, The Defendant, pp. 33-4. 
132 G. K. Chesterton, The Poet and the Lunatics (1929; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson. 1962). p. 91. 
1" For an illustration of Chesterton's personal acquaintance with the nightmare, see his poem 
The 
Mirror of Madman", written in the mid to late 1890's. 
G. K. Chesterton, "Fear", The Daill, News (6 August, 1910; repr. in The Chesterton Review Vol. 23 
No. 4, November 1997), p. 40 3. In a similar vein is Chesterton's comment on the evil figures that appear 
in the writing of George MacDonald: "When the evil things besieging us do appear, they 
do not appear 
outside but inside. " G. K. Chesterton, "George MacDonald", G. K. C. as , 1/. C. (London: 
Methuen & Co 
Ltd, 1929), pp. 165-6. 
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believe that the universe was not as bleak as had been suggested in the fin de . sk 
cle. 
Syme thinks to himself: "The place was not only pleasant, but perfect, if once he could 
regard it not as a deception but rather as a dream. "' 35 In the final chapter. I will go on to 
consider the solution to the nightmare that finally enabled Chesterton to see the 
universe in a more positive light. However, before I do so, I want to address the second 
of my two original questions concerning evil - the question of why it exists. This is a 
question that Syme wrestles with in the final chapter of The Man Who Was Thursdai':. 1 
Nightmare. It is only when he begins to answer this question, that he is truly able to put 
the nightmare behind him. 
Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday:. - Nightmare, p. 7. 
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Chapter 7: The Problem of Evil and the Free Will Defence 
In the four previous chapters, I examined Chesterton's understanding of the priv. vati\ e 
nature of evil and his use of the grotesque as a means for expressing this in his fiction. 
The privative understanding of evil has significant consequences for the origin of evil. 
Frederick Copleston explains: "If God created all things, and evil is a thing, we should 
have to say that God created evil directly... But if evil is a privation, it is not necessary 
to speak of it as having been created by God on the grounds that God created all 
things. "' The principle of causality extends to all things that begin to exist. , but 
according to the theory of privation, evil is not a thing that exists in any ontological 
sense. Therefore, as Frederick Copleston points out, evil does not have to be caused as 
such. Anthony Kenny, another Aquinas scholar, makes the same point: "Evils are in a 
manner uncaused, because they are not realities in the same way as good things are.... 
Although the theory of privation might avoid the need for any direct formal cause. it 
does not fully account for the origin of evil. Aquinas admitted this in his treatise, On 
Evil: 
Nevertheless evil must have a cause in some way. For it is clear that since evil 
is not something existing of itself but inheres in something as a privation - 
which is a lack of that which a thing is designed by nature to have but does not 
have - that it is not of a thing's nature that it be evil. .. 
But anything which does 
not belong naturally to a thing must have some cause ... 
4 
The question of where evil comes from cannot be ignored. Douglas Geivett, in his 
analysis of Aquinas on this subject, provides some indication of the sort of solution that 
we are looking for: "In other words, a privation as such is susceptible to neither a 
F. C. Copleston, Aquinas (1955; repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 151. 
2 This definition is taken from William Lane Craig. See William Lane Craig & Quentin Smith. Thi'is171, 
Atheism and Big Bang Cosmology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 4. 
Anthony Kenny, 
. 
Aquinas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 11. 
' St Thomas Aquinas, On Evil (Trans. Jean Oesterle, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 1995). p. 
21. 
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formal cause nor a final cause. Hence, the proper way to speak of the cause of evil. if 
evil is a privation, is by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally'. "' 
In this chapter I will examine the way in which Chesterton dealt with the origin of evil. 
Following Aquinas (and the wider Catholic tradition), Chesterton explained the origin 
of evil `by way of an agent'. The doctrine of free will explains how moral agents are 
responsible for the evil that we find in the world. I will begin by outlining what has 
come to be known as the Free Will Defence, showing how Chesterton can be seen as a 
part of this theological tradition. I will then go on to look at two areas in which 
Chesterton's understanding of free will can be seen: his rejection of determinism, and 
his belief in the doctrine of the Fall. This will lead us to reflect critically upon the Free 
Will Defence, and consider the extent to which it provides a satisfactory explanation of 
the origin of evil. Before drawing this chapter to a conclusion, I will look at two other 
issues that are raised by this discussion: natural evil, and the role of Satan. 
A History Of The Free Will Defence 
As with any apology, the Free Will Defence is given in response to something. In this 
case, it is given in response to the charge of logical incoherence that is levelled against 
theism. 6 Gerard Hughes explains: 
At its simplest, the problem of evil can be put like this: is it possible to reconcile 
the existence of evil in the world with the existence of a God who is morally 
admirable, omnipotent, and omniscient?. . . 
If God is omniscient, he knows what 
this world is like; if he is omnipotent, he could either have created it differently 
in the first place, or intervened to correct it; and if he does neither of these 
things, he would seem to be morally at fault, and hence not good. '7 
Douglas Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993). p. 20. 
6 My focus in this chapter is on the logical problem of evil. In the next chapter, I will examine the wad in 
vv hich the Free Will Defence engages with both the evidential and existential forms of the problem of 
evil. 
Gerard Hughes, The Nature of God (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 153. 
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Orthodox Christian theology, rejecting any suggestion of dualism, argues that God is 
the creator of everything, and thus that creation is good. While privation might explain 
how evil can co-exist in a world made by God, there is still the need to explain how 
God allowed evil to come about, especially in light of his omniscience. 8 The problem is 
this: "We believe that everything that exists comes from the one God, and yet we 
believe that God is not the cause of sins. What is troubling is that if you admit that sins 
come from the souls that God created, and those souls come from God. pretty soon 
you'll be tracing those sins back to God. "9 
Aquinas explains how the Free Will Defence is used to defend the coherence of theism: 
--sin is caused by the free will according as it turns away from God. Hence it does not 
follow that God is the cause of sin, although He is the cause of free will. -'O The 
argument is simply this; that God gave mankind free will, and that it was through the 
misuse of this free will that sin and evil entered the world. Therefore, because mankind 
chose to sin by disobeying God, God cannot be held responsible for the evil that 
resulted. 
The Free Will Defence primarily relates to moral evil as opposed to natural evil: The 
former is evil that results from some human being's going wrong with respect to an 
action that is morally significant for him; any other evil is natural evil. '. In the 
philosophy of religion, the focus has been on moral evil, 12 and this is certainly where 
Chesterton and Aquinas' interests lie. However, as I will show later on in this chapter. a 
x The way in which we understand God's omniscience effects the way in which we understand the 
interaction between free will and providence. This is a subject to which I return in chapter eight. 
9 St Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will (Trans. Thomas Williams, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1993), p. 3. 
Aquinas, On Evil, p. 106. 
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 166. Most philosophers 
do not differ significantly in their definition of the two. For example, John Hick defines moral e% il as 
"evil that we human beings originate", and natural evil as "the evil that originates independently of 
human actions". John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 3rd ed. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1985). 
p. 12. Also, see J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). p. 162. 
12 In his comprehensive assessment of theodicy, Barry Whitney notes that, "there has not been as much 
%N ork [comparatively]" on natural evil. Barry L. Whitney. Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the 
Problem of Evil 1960-1990 (NcwN York: Garland Publishing Inc, 1993), p. 123. 
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number of thinkers believe that the Free Will Defence can be extended to cover natural 
evil as well as moral evil. 
In recent years, Alvin Plantinga has been the most important exponent of the Free \V ill 
Defence. 13 In his "Self profile", Plantinga notes that the first use of the phrase 'Free 
Will Defence' was by the atheist Anthony Flew, in his essay, "Divine Omnipotence and 
Human Freedom". '4 However, as Plantinga readily acknowledges, the essence of' the 
Free Will Defence is not original to the twentieth century. In various guises, it has been 
the historic response to evil by orthodox Christianity since the church began. 
Plantinga notes that Augustine used a form of the Free Will Defence, 16 and we have 
already seen Aquinas' articulation of it. Along with theologians, many Christian 
literary writers have utilised the Free Will Defence in some form. In this respect. Brian 
Horne has pointed out that the theological foundation upon which Dante's Inferii0 is 
built is the doctrine of free will". ' 7 John Milton also participates in this tradition, 
which is evident in Paradise Lost, and, even more so in Areopagitica. ' 8 In the twentieth 
century, advocates of the Free Will Defence include Charles Williams, 19 and C. S. 
Lewis. Indeed, Lewis based his apologetic work, The Problem of Pain, on a version of 
the Free Will Defence: "... Christianity asserts that God is good; that He made all things 
good and for the sake of their goodness; that one of the good things He made. namely, 
I' This observation is made on the grounds that he is consistently cited by other writers as the main 
authority on the Free Will Defence. (e. g. See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, pp. 365-3371. & J. L. 
Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, pp. 162-176. ) 
James Tomberlin & Peter Van Inwagen, ed., Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1985), p. 41. Flew's essay can be found in A. Flew & A. Macintyre, ed., New Es. Lgy. s in 
Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955). 
', While the Free Will Defence has been the dominant theodicy in church history, it has not been the only 
theodicy. For example, in recent years, John Hick has argued that an alternative theodicy can be traced 
back to the thought of Irenaeus. See Hick, "Part 3: The Irenaean Type of Theodicy", Evil and the God of 
Love. 
16 The way in which Augustine did so is further developed by G. R. Evans in her book, Augustine Wi Evil 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
ý1 Brian Horne, Imagining Evil (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1996), p. 58. 
'x For a more detailed discussion of Milton's emphasis on free will, see Dennis Richard Danit. kon. 
,1 Eilton 's Good God. - . -1 Studly in Literary 
Theodicy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982). 
especially "Chapter 4: Milton and the Free Will Defence". In addition, C. S. Lewis offers an interesting 
discussion of Milton and St Au`ustine, in chapter ten of his book, .4 Preface to Paradise 
Lost (191?; 
repr. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
19 Brian Horne says that Charles Williams, "located evil firmly in the place in which both Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas located it: the human will. ", Imagining Evil, p. 109. 
146 
the free will of rational creatures, by its very nature included the possibility of evil: and 
that creatures, availing themselves of this possibility, have become evil. "'" 
Chesterton is also an integral part of this classical Christian tradition. His emphasis on 
free will has prompted Thomas Peters to declare: "... Chesterton's very conception of 
God and his philosophy of humanity took the free will of the human being as a 
foundational article of faith. "21 The philosopher Quentin Lauer, sees a similar train of 
thought within the writing of Chesterton. He explains that for Chesterton, if evil is to 
exist at all it has to be introduced by beings who are more than merely natural, beings 
who alone can in the moral sense be either good or evil, precisely because they can 
both know and freely will. "22 Peters and Lauer are able to place Chesterton within the 
free will tradition because Chesterton is so adamant about his own position. In his 
essay, "The Outline of Liberty", Chesterton explains the centrality of free will in 
accounting for the origin of evil in this world: "Will made the world; Will wounded the 
world; the same Divine Will gave to the world for the second time its chance, the same 
human Will can for the last time make its choice. , 23 
Chesterton's belief in the significance of free will was one of the things that attracted 
him to Aquinas: 
And in exactly this sense he emphasised a certain dignity in Man, which was 
sometimes rather swallowed up in the purely theistic generalisations about 
God... But let us not forget that its upshot was that very Free Will, or moral 
responsibility of Man, which so many modern liberals would deny. Upon this 
sublime and perilous liberty hang heaven and hell, and all the mysterious 
drama of the soul. 24 [italics mine] 
-` C. S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (1940; repr. London: The Centenary Press, 1946), p. 57. 
2' Thomas Peters, Battling for the Modern Mind: A Beginner's Chesterton (Missouri: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1994), p. 151. 
22 Quentin Lauer, C. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio (New York: Fordham Uni\crsit\ 
Press, 1988), p. 53. 
'' G. K. Chesterton, "The Outline of Liberty", The Common Man (London: Sheed & Ward, 1950), p. 236. 
-)4 G. K. Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas (1933; repr. London: Hodder Stoughton, 1938), pp. 38-9. 
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Chesterton was critical of those who rejected the doctrine of free ýv ill. hence his 
qualified praise of the optimistic theism he heard from Stopford Brooke, 25 durinL his 
youth: "It was a full and substantial faith in the Fatherhood of God, and little could be 
said against it, even in theological theory, except that it rather ignored the free-will of 
man. , 26 Chesterton's belief in the inadequacy of any theory which ignores free will can 
also be seen in "The Doom of the Darnaways". Father Brown has to remind those 
around him that free will is of fundamental importance in explaining what has taken 
place: "It was murder; but murder is of the will, which God made free. "27 
Chesterton's belief that free will was an essential part of our humanness led him to 
conclude that it could not be overridden. Our will could be influenced and affected by 
external factors, but ultimately, man was responsible for his own actions. Father Broý\ n 
observes: "A man isn't fated to fall into the smallest venial sin, let alone into crimes 
like suicide and murder. You can't be made to do wicked things against your will 
because your name is Darnaway... "28 This belief in man's free will meant that 
Chesterton was unwilling to blame our sin on Satan and his cohorts. Having free will 
meant that the choice to do either right or wrong, was finally ours: You don't think the 
holy angels took him and hung him on a garden tree, do you? And as for the unholy 
angels - no, no, no. The men who did this did a wicked thing, but they went no further 
than their own wickedness... "29 Chesterton was quick to defend human responsibility, 
which explains his attraction to Shakespeare's play, Macbeth: "I think `Macbeth' the 
one supreme drama because it is the one Christian drama ... I mean 
by Christian (in this 
matter) the strong sense of spiritual liberty and of sin, the idea that the best man can be 
as bad as he chooses... You cannot call Macbeth anything but a victim of Macbeth. The 
evil spirits tempt him, but they never force him... "30 Chesterton reinforces this view 
I, Stopford Brooke was the Unitarian minister at Bedford Chapel, where Chesterton used to go as a child 
with his father. 
10 G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 174. 
' G. K. Chesterton, "The Doom of the Darnaways", The Incredulity of Father Brown (1926. repr. 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1958), p. 165. 
28 Ibid., p. 159. Darnaway is the name of the family in Chesterton's tale who are supposed to be cursed. 
2'' G. K. Chesterton, "The Miracle of Moon Crescent", The Incredulity of Father Broiwwn. p. 93. 
iÖ G. K. Chesterton, "Free Will in Life and in the Drama", The Illustrated London Vetics (1912: repr. 
Collected (forks t "ollmie 29: The Illustrated London News 1911-1913, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1988), p. 260. 
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through the words of Father Brown: "Anybody can be wicked - as wicked as he 
chooses. We can direct our moral wills... "31 
Chesterton's Rejection Of Determinism 
In 1908, Chesterton wrote: "According to most philosophers, God in making the world 
enslaved it. According to Christianity, in making it, He set it free. ""3' Inherent within 
this affirmation of human freedom is a rejection of determinism, which is interesting to 
explore. Determinism may be defined as the belief, "that every event and state of affairs 
is `causally necessitated' by preceding events and states of affairs". 33 Deterministic 
theories can take different forms. For example, biological determinism argues that our 
D. N. A. determines our actions, while behaviourism suggests that we are determined by 
the conditioning of our environment. 34 In Chesterton's novel Manalive, the character 
Arthur Inglewood describes his belief in the inevitability of determinism: "Nothing can 
ever alter it; it's in the wheels of the universe... "3' 
Chesterton's rejection of determinism stemmed from his realisation of its 
consequences. Taken to its logical conclusion, determinism argues that the future is 
already fixed, thus absolving man of any moral responsibility for his actions. A. J. Ayer 
once wrote that, "it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise that I 
am held to be morally responsible for what I have done. "36 If we are determined. we 
could not have acted otherwise, and thus we cannot be held to be morally responsible. 
G. K. Chesterton, "The Strange Crime of John Boulnois", The Wisdom of Father Brown (1914: repr. 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 181. 
32 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908: repr. London: The Bodley Head, 1927), p. 141. 
'z Gary Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 2. Elsewhere, determinism is 
defined as the thesis that, "any event of any kind is an effect of a prior series of effects, a causal chain 
with every link solid", a thesis in which, "future events are as fixed and unalterable as the past is 
fixed 
and unalterable". Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p. 194. 
34 One famous example of a scientific determinist in the area of biology is Francis Crick, the co- 
discoverer of D. N. A. The most famous behaviourist is probably B. F. Skinner. 
G. K. Chesterton, Manalive (1912; repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1947), p. 34. 
'`' A. J. Ayer, "Freedom and Necessity" in Watson, ed., Free Will, p. 15. 
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This interpretation of determinism is one that takes the theory to its logical extreme. but 
Chesterton thought that this was unavoidable. In his story, "The Wrong Shape". this is 
the basis upon which Dr James Harris commits murder. Harris confesses: "I am a man 
who has ever since boyhood believed in Nature and in all natural functions and 
instincts, whether man called them moral or immoral. "37 
Chesterton not only thought that determinism threatened morality; he also believed that 
it was a meaningless philosophy of life. In Orthodoxy he wrote: "The determinists 
come to bind, not to loose. They may well call their law the `chain of causation. It is 
the worst chain that ever fettered a human being. , 38 Without free will, man's life is no 
longer meaningful, for there can be no hope. Boethius explained: It is pointless, 
therefore, to hope for anything or pray to escape anything. What can a man hope for, or 
pray to escape, when an inflexible bond binds all that can be wished for? --"' In 
Orthodoxy ("Chapter 2: The Maniac"), Chesterton suggests that this is one of the 
causes of madness. He also alludes to this point in his Autobiography: "It was the 
Determinist who told me, at the top of his voice, that I could not be responsible at all. 
And as I rather like being treated as a responsible being, and not as a lunatic let out for 
the day, I began to look around for some spiritual asylum that was not merely a lunatic 
asylum. , 40 
Chesterton's dislike of determinism was not confined to his arguments with the 
scientific materialists. Chesterton saw Calvinism and superstitious fatalism as two other 
branches of determinism. (By superstitious fatalism, I mean the superstition that results 
from a belief in the pervasive power of fate. ) In "The Outline of Liberty' he declared: 
The instant a breach, or even a crack, had been made in the dyke of Catholicism. there 
poured through it the bitter sea of Calvinism, or in other words, of a very cruel form of 
fatalism. Since that time, it has taken the much duller form of Determinism. "4' John 
'' G. K. Chesterton, "The Wrong Shape", The Innocence of Father Brown (1911; repr. The Annotated 
Innocence of Father Brown, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 156. 
Chesterton, Orthodo_y1', p. 41. 
Boethius, The Consolation of ' Philosophy (Trans. V. E. Watts, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1969). P. 
153. 
40 Chesterton, . -1 utobiographv, p. 
182. 
 Chesterton, "The Outline of Liberty", The Common Man, p. 237. 
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Martin notes that Chesterton saw Calvinism as, "a kind of determinism in theological 
costume". 42 The link that Chesterton made between determinism and Calvinism is also 
acknowledged by Quentin Lauer: "... he chose as his favourite adversaries certain 
scientists with their advocacy of determinism and the Calvinists with their advocacy of 
predestinationism... "43 
Chesterton intensely disliked Calvinism, a form of Christianity that he considered 
"atrocious". 44 Indeed, his dislike of Calvinism seems to have been a well known point 
of jest among his friends. Martin Gardner notes that Chesterton's friend. Max 
Beerbohm, once drew a cartoon which depicted Hillaire Belloc trying to convert 
Chesterton from the errors of Calvinism. 45 In rejecting Calvinism, Chesterton often 
painted an extreme caricature of his opponents position, as I will go on to illustrate. An 
exaggerated description of his opponents ideas is a common trait in Chesterton's 
writings, and has led some critics to suggest that it indicates a failure on Chesterton's 
part to appreciate what it is that his opponents are trying to say. Yet this is not 
necessarily the case. We have already noted that Chesterton was an extremely symbolic 
writer and thinker. 46 A lack of interest in detail does not equate to a failure to 
understand detail. Depending on one's perspective, we might either conclude that 
Chesterton misunderstood Calvinism, or that his caricature was remarkably perceptive. 
The main reason for Chesterton's objection to Calvinism was that he considered it 
heretical. 47 In his story, "Hammer of God", Chesterton even goes as far as suggesting 
42 John Martin, "Some Theological Implications of Chesterton's Style", The Chesterton Review Vol. 5. 
No. 1 (1978-9), p. 136. 
4, Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio, p. 102. 
`' G. K. Chesterton, The New Theology and Modern Thought", The Illustrated London Nretivs (1907; 
repr. Collected Works 27: The Illustrated London News 1905-1907, San Francisco: Ignatius Press. 
1986), 
p. 424. 
4' Recorded by Martin Gardner in his annotated notes to Chesterton, The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 
240. 
46 See chapter two. 
47 Chesterton understood heresy as something slightly different from the normal 
interpretation of the 
word. For Chesterton, the words `wrong' and `heretical' were practically interchangeable. 
His use of the 
term as a label for any opinion with which he disagreed can be seen in his book, 
Heretics (1905). as can 
his jovial use of the term. 
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that the blacksmith, a Calvinistic Presbyterian, is not a Christian. 48 Chesterton's 
concern for defending orthodoxy against modem heresies is clearly evident in his book 
Heretics. In St Thomas Aquinas he explained exactly why he considered Calvinism to 
be heretical: "The old Manicheans taught that Satan originated the whole work of 
creation commonly attributed to God. The new Calvinists taught that God originated 
the whole work of damnation commonly attributed to Satan. "49 Other thinkers have 
shared Chesterton's concern with the fact that Calvinism, with its. "concept of 
constitutional depravity and volitional determinism makes God the author of sin. ' ° 
At this point it is helpful to comment on Chesterton's rejection of the Calvinist doctrine 
of constitutional depravity. Chesterton did not believe that man was inherently wicked 
and unable to choose to do good. However, despite his belief in free will, he did believe 
that man had a sinful nature. Augustine explained how these two beliefs could be 
reconciled using the analogy of a pair of scales, with equal balance pans: one 
representing good and one representing evils' Free will involves man weighing up the 
choice of good and evil, and then acting accordingly. Augustine argued that since the 
Fall, our sinful nature meant that man's weighing scales were weighted in favour of 
evil. Although man remained free to choose either good or evil, the scales now had a 
bias towards evil. In the fifth century, Pelagius had argued, to use the analogy, that the 
scales remained evenly balanced after the Fall. Thus Pelagius rejected the idea that 
original sin had resulted in a sinful nature. In The Everlasting Man, Chesterton referred 
to Pelagius' ideas as the opposite heresy to Manicheism. 52 
The other reason that Chesterton disliked Calvinism was that he considered it morbid. 
53 
It was totally opposed to his optimistic outlook on life. 54 As I have already noted. 
48 Chesterton, "The Hammer of God" The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 194. 
49 Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas, p. 124. 
so C. Samuel Storms, Tragedy in Eden: Original Sin in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Langham: 
University of America Press, 1985), p. 207. 
The analogy that follows is highlighted by Auster E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), pp. 372-373. 
G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man (1925; repr. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), p. 229. 
It should be pointed out that Calvinists would not have agreed with Chesterton's prognosis. 
' See my discussion of Chesterton's optimism in chapter nine. 
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Chesterton believed that determinism made life essentially meaningless. This «-as also 
true of Calvinism. If God had already determined the future, as Calvinism appeared to 
suggest, then life seemed pointless and futile. Chesterton could not help but notice. "the 
sense of doom in the Calvinist". 55 This also explains the physical caricature that 
Chesterton had of Calvinists: "Yet his wide white beard, cherubic face, and sparkling 
spectacles... made it hard to believe, somehow, that he had even been anything so 
morbid as... a Calvinist. "56 
In his essay on the difference between Chesterton and Thomas Hardy, Brocard Sewell 
describes how Chesterton disliked the morbid atmosphere he found in Hardy's novels 
(e. g. Jude the Obscure). Sewell goes on to connect Hardy's pessimism with Calvinism, 
when he quotes the Hardy critic, John Heath-Stubbs: "The rule of Hardy's universe is 
the cruel predestinating deity of Calvinism... "57 Following Hardy's death, Chesterton 
wrote an article in which he admitted that he did not sympathise with Hardy's 
philosophy of life. 58 
Chesterton saw superstitious fatalism as another branch of Determinism, in the same 
mould as scientific materialism and Calvinism. Father Brown describes the similarity: 
"I don't see a pin to choose between your scientific superstition and the other magical 
superstition. They both seem to end in turning people into paralytics, who can"t move 
their own legs or arms to save their own lives or souls. "59 Father Brown warns: "It's 
drowning all your old rationalism and scepticism, it's coming in like a sea; and the 
name of it is superstition. , 60 Father Brown's dislike of superstition is a constant 
surprise to those around him who expect him to be superstitious by virtue of his faith. 
55 Chesterton, "The Honour of Israel Gow", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 121. 
"' Chesterton, "The Three Tools of Death", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 240. 
'' Quoted in Brocard Sewell, "Thomas Hardy and G. K. Chesterton: A Sketch in Two Temperaments", 
The Chesterton Review Vol. 5 No. I (1978-9), p. 108. 
58 Ibid., p. 117. Chesterton's ambivalent relationship with Thomas Hardy can be seen 
in G. K. Chesterton. 
"The Great Victorian Novelists", The Victorian Age in Literature (1913; repr. London: Williams 
& 
Norgate, 1923). 
'o Chesterton, "The Doom of the Darnaways", The Incredulity of Father Brown, p. 165. 
60 Chesterton, "The Oracle of the Dog", The Incredulity of Father Brown, p. 70. 
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He constantly has to put them straight: "You see, I am not superstitious. "61 Father 
Brown goes on to explain that, "Superstition is irreligious". 62 This is because of the 
way in which it abuses the Christian idea of mystery. Within Christian theology, 
mystery has a legitimate function, as I will explore in the next chapter. Ho« ever. when 
nothing is explained, and everything is consigned to the realm of mystery. a belief is 
superstitious rather than Christian. This is at the heart of Father Brown's admonition in 
The Purple Wig": "I know the Unknown God... I know his name; it is Satan. The true 
God was made flesh and dwelt among us. And I say to you, wherever you find nien 
"63 ruled merely by mystery, it is the mystery of iniquity. 
Chesterton & The Fall 
In his discussion of the Father Brown stories, Frederick J. Crosson writes: 
The labyrinth which is our puzzle as readers is the work of evil, and Father 
Brown's unique power to map the labyrinth is not due to any religious intuition 
but to natural insight into the human heart, an insight made more penetrating by 
what his religion has disclosed to him of the malice of which every child of 
Adam is capable. 64 
Crosson is referring to the methodology of Father Brown which I dealt with in chapter 
three - Father Brown identifies with the human heart which he knows to be sinful. 
However, Crosson's comments also allude to the belief upon which this methodology is 
based. Father Brown thinks that humans are sinful because he subscribes to the doctrine 
of original sin, which he understands as the consequence of the Fall. 
Chesterton revealed the means by which man misused his free will in the closing pages 
of his book, The Everlasting Man, where he described a "strange story of treason in 
`'' G. K. Chesterton, "The Blast of the Book", The Scandal of Father Brown (1935; repr. London: Penguin 
Books, 1982), p. 61. 
01 Chesterton, "The Wrong Shape", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 147. 
`" Chesterton, "The Purple Wig", The Wisdom of Father Brown, p. 118. 
64 Frederick J. Crosson, "Father Brown, Sherlock Holmes and the Mystery of Man", Rufus William 
Rauch, ed., A Chesterton Celebration (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 28. 
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heaven and the great desertion by which evil damaged and tried to destroy a cosmos 
that it could not create. "65 The doctrine of original sin explained that the reason \t by 
men were sinful was that they descended from sinful ancestors who had used their 
freedom to turn away from God. 66 The centrality of this doctrine in Chesterton's 
thinking is also highlighted by Brocard Sewell: "For one thing, Chesterton believed. as 
an orthodox Christian, in the doctrine of Original Sin. " As far as Chesterton was 
67 
concerned, the doctrine of original sin could not be dismissed as an irrelevant religious 
dogma. In actual fact, it was a fundamental part of reality: 
Men who wish to get down to fundamentals perceive that there is a fundamental 
problem of evil. Men content to be more superficial are also content with a 
superficial fuss and bustle of improvement. The man in the mere routine of 
modern life is content to say that a modern gallows is a relatively humane 
instrument or that a modern cat-o'-nine tails is milder than an ancient Roman 
flagellum. But the original thinker will ask why any scourge or gibbet was ex er 
needed, or ever even alleged to be needed? And that brings the original thinker 
back to original sin. , 68 
Chesterton was aware that many of his contemporaries had ceased to recognise the 
inherent sinfulness of man. Although it is a simple point, it is one that Father Brown 
has to communicate to those around him: "I have told you his secret. It is a secret of the 
soul. He is a bad man. , 69 It is not a secret in the sense that it is hidden, but in the sense 
that it has been forgotten. Father Brown is quick to admit his own sinfulness: "I am a 
man, and therefore have all devils in my heart. "7° 
Father Brown's awareness of our common sinful nature allowed him to avoid judging 
the criminals he caught and absolved. Indeed, as far as Father Brown is concerned, the 
0 Chesterton, The Everlasting Man, p. 245. 
66 It seems probable that Chesterton believed this literally - that sin was physically passed down through 
the generations. Although he did not discuss the point explicitly, he was keen to defend a traditional 
understanding of original sin. In the final chapter, I will explore the way in which he reconciled this ý\ ith 
his belief in the innocence of childhood. 
6' Sewell, "Thomas Hardy and G. K. Chesterton", The Chesterton Review, p. 108. 
`'x G. K. Chesterton, "On Original Sin", Come to Think of lt... (London: Methuen & Co Ltd. 1930). P. 
155. 
`'`' Chesterton, "The Crime of the Communist", The Scandal of Father Brown, p. 113. 
,o Chesterton, "The Hammer of God", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 195. 
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one spiritual disease is, "thinking one is quite well". 71 This has led Garry Wills to 
comment that: "Man's need for absolution is the theme of the best Father Brown 
stories, those contained in The Secret of Father Brown. "72 Wills has a particularly high 
regard for "The Chief Mourner of Marne". In this story, Chesterton attacks those 
suffering from the spiritual disease of thinking that `one is quite well'. Father Brown 
declares: "Go on your own primrose path pardoning all your favourite vices and being 
generous to your fashionable crimes; and leave us in the darkness, vampires of the 
night, to console those who really need consolation; who do things really indefensible, 
things that neither the world nor they themselves can defend; and none but a priest will 
pardon. , 73 In making this statement, Father Brown observes that those w\ ho need 
pardoning do not attempt to defend their crimes. Instead, they acknowledge their fault, 
as the doctrine of original sin teaches: "We are taught that if a man has really bad first 
principles, that must be partly his fault. "74 
In chapter three, I looked at the way in which the parasitic nature of evil led to a 
slippery slope of corruption and perversion. Chesterton was clearly aware of the extent 
of evil that resulted from the Fall. Father Brown comments that: "Even the most 
murderous blunders don't poison life like sins... Yet, in spite of his awareness of the 
horrific sins of which man was capable, Father Brown retained the ability to be shocked 
by what he encountered: "What a horrible talk of hatred! What a vengeance for one 
mortal to take on another! Shall we ever get to the bottom of this bottomless human 
heart 
...? 
"76 The problem of the bottomless human heart is a problem for every 
philosopher. However much we like to believe in our progress and evolution into a 
higher species, the problem of moral evil remains. Perhaps this is why Chesterton was 
drawn towards the story of the Fall. It provided him with an explanation of the evil that 
" Chesterton, "The Eye of Apollo", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 199. 
7' Gary Wills, Chesterton: Man and Mask (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), p. 164. Although these 
stories do convey man's need for absolution, I would not agree with Wills that they rank as the best of 
the Father Brown stories. 
7' G. K. Chesterton, "The Chief Mourner of Marne", The Secret of Father Brown (1927; repr. Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 168-9. 
'a Chesterton, "The Eye of Apollo", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 206. 
'-; Chesterton, "The Three Tools of Death", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 252. 
'`' Chesterton, "The Vanishing of Vaudrey", The Secret of Father Brown, p. 108. 
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men do, and caused him to declare that the Fall was ultimately good news rather than 
bad news: "Well, anyhow, it must be obvious to anybody that the doctrine of the Fall is 
the only cheerful view of human life. "77 This is because it explains that man. in his 
sinful state, is not what he was created to be. 78 
Elsewhere Chesterton declared: "The Fall is a view of life. It is not only the only 
enlightening, but the only encouraging view of life. It holds.. . that we have misused a 
good world, and not merely been entrapped into a bad one. It refers evil back to the 
wrong use of the will, and thus declares that it can eventually be righted by the right 
use of the will. "79 As we can see, Chesterton believed that the story of the Fall 
explained how man's misuse of free will introduced sin into the world. Chesterton was 
convinced that when combined with the story of the Fall, the Free Will Defence 
provided a satisfactory explanation of the origin of evil, as well as defending the logical 
coherence of Christianity. In order to understand how Chesterton justified this position, 
I will now go on to examine an apology for the Free Will Defence. 
An Apology For The Free Will Defence 
The Fall of Man, with its recognition of free will, explains the origin of the evil that is 
in the world, but it does not necessarily justify it. In this section my intention is to 
'' Chesterton, Autobiography, p. 179. 
78 In the concluding chapter, I shall look at the way in which Chesterton's emphasis on the doctrine of 
creation enabled him to reconcile his optimism with the reality of evil. For now, it is interesting to note 
that Chesterton was also aware of the brokeness of creation. As Thomas Hart has pointed out: If 
creation is primary among Christian doctrines for Chesterton, the fall is a close second. The doctrines are 
correlative, together constituting what Chesterton regards as the Christian vision of the universe. " 
Thomas N. Hart, G. K. Chesterton's Case for Christianity (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Graduate 
Theological Union, 1974), p. 31. (The interplay between these ideas is something that I will return to in 
the concluding chapter. ) 
'`' G. K. Chesterton, The Thing (1929: repr. London: Unicorn Books, 1939), p. 220. This comment should 
not be interpreted as a Pelagian response to original sin. Earlier on in this chapter. we noted that 
Chesterton thought Pelagius to be a heretic. In this context, the `right use of the will' presumably refers 
to a decision to choose the solution to sin that is found in Jesus. However, it is difficult to be sure of this 
in view of Chesterton's failure to elaborate on his soteriology. This is a point that I will consider further 
in the next chapter. 
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explain exactly how the Free Will Defence rescues Christianity from the charge of 
logical incoherence. 
One of the assumptions of the Free Will Defence is that freedom is valuable. God 
allowed evil to enter the world because he chose to give mankind freedom, but does 
this justify God? This is an objection raised by Mackie, who discusses the fact that God 
must at least have had some awareness of what might result from his gift of freedom: 
If so, he was taking, literally, a hell of a risk when he created Adam and Eve, no less 
than when he created Satan. Was the freedom to make unforeseeable choices so great a 
good that it outweighed this risk? "80 In response, Lauer observes how Chesterton 
acknowledged `God's risk', and yet considered it worthwhile: "Over against all this it 
is Chesterton's contention that freedom is indeed the first of God's gifts to human 
beings - even though a mighty risky gift. It is freedom that makes for the dignity of the 
human, but it is freedom too that makes for the possibility of sin. "81 
To show how God valued freedom in spite of its possible consequences, Chesterton 
wrote a little-known play called The Surprise. It was actually written in 1932, although 
the manuscript was not written up until after Chesterton's death, when his secretary and 
executor, Dorothy Collins, prepared the script for performance. The play, a "profoundly 
religious play dealing with the problem of free will in the context of the Creation. the 
Fall of Man, and the Incarnation, "82 was first performed on 5t" June 1953 at Hull 
University. 
In the play, a character called the Author creates a number of puppets \\ ho 
subsequently perform a play for a visiting Friar in which they only do good. However, 
the Author is not satisfied with his creation. Without their freedom. there is something 
80 Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, p. 176. The concept of a `greater-good' underlies the Free Will 
Defence, as Stephen Davis has explained: "What the FWD must insist on is, first, that the amount of evil 
that in the end will exist will be outweighed by the good that will then exist, and second, that this 
favorable balance of good over evil was obtainable by God in no other way. " Stephen Davis. ed., 
Encountering Evil. Live Options in Theodicy (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd, 1981), p. 71. This is a subject 
that I return to in the next chapter. 
81 Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher Without Portfolio, p. 101. 
82 Dennis Conlon, "Introduction", Collected Works t'olume 11. Plays, Chesterton on Shaw (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), p. 28. 
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artificial about the puppets. The Author declares: "They are everything else except 
alive. They are intelligent, complex, combative, brilliant, bursting with life, and Yet 
they are not alive. , 83 This is at the heart of the Author's problem: I want them to he 
and not to do. I want them to exist. , 84 At the request of the Author, the visiting Friar 
asks God for a miracle, and the puppets gain their own wills. They then repeat the play' 
that they performed in Act I, only this time, the results are very different. Chesterton's 
play is an analogy of God's original dilemma in creating man. He could have left man 
without free will and lifeless, or he could have given man free will in order that he 
might, "be and not merely do". 
Chesterton's understanding of God's initial dilemma, which we find illustrated in The 
Surprise, was at the root of his response to the problem of evil. This is why he hints at 
the outline of The Surprise in his book, Orthodoxy, written twenty-four years earlier: 
"God had written, not so much a poem, but rather a play; a play he had planned as 
perfect, but which had necessarily been left to human actors and stage-managers. who 
had since made a great mess of it. "85 It is interesting to note another connection to The 
Surprise, this time with C. S. Lewis. 86 Lewis wrote an essay entitled The Obstinate 
Toy Soldiers", 87 that along with the notes that follow it, takes a similar approach to The 
Surprise. Like Chesterton, Lewis considers and rejects the other possibility, that God 
could have created a set of creatures without wills of their own; lifeless but good. 
8. G. K. Chesterton, The Surprise, (1953; repr. Collected Works Vol. I1), p. 324'. 
84 Ibid., p. 323. 
8 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p. 141. 
8( Much has been made of the connection between Lewis and Chesterton. Lewis admitted in a letter to 
Sheldon Vanauken that Chesterton's, The Everlasting Man, was the best apologetic work he knew. This 
is noted in an essay by lain T. Benson, "The Influence of the Writings of G. K. Chesterton on C. S. Leww is: 
The Textual Part". This essay is found in an issue of the Chesterton journal that was devoted to the 
connection between the two writers, The Chesterton Review Vol. 17. No. 3-4 (August-November 1991). 
(The connection between these writers is also explored in the book by Michael H. Macdonald & Andre' 
A. Tadie, ed., The Riddle of Joy: G. K. Chesterton and C. S. Lewis, London: Collins, 1989. ) 
8-7 Found in C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (1952; repr. London: Fontana Books, 1964). Note that this 
essay was originally published in 1944. Although this is after the date that The Surprise was ýN ritten. 
it is 
before the date that The Surprise was performed, and therefore it appears that Lewis did not dra\ti on 
Chesterton's play for his own essay. 
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The paradoxical relationship between freedom and happiness has often been noted. In 
his book, The Literary Underground, 88 John Hoyles discusses it under the twin signs of 
two of Dostoevsky's characters, `The Grand Inquisitor' and The Underground Man'. 
This theme is also central to the novel by Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, in vv hich 
the authorities try to ensure collective happiness at the expense of individual freedom. 
Their argument follows the Grand Inquisitor's in Dostoevsky's The Brothers 
Karamazov, who claims credit "for at last having conquered freedom and having done 
so in order to make people happy. "89 When the white-robed angel presents a similar 
argument to Maclan in The Ball and the Cross, Maclan realises the true identity of the 
angel - Lucifer. 
90 Chesterton's response to the tension between freedom and happiness 
is clear: "I could not cease to think that a God who made men and angels free was finer 
than one who coerced them into comfort. "91 
I have shown how Chesterton argued that freedom was more valuable than comfort and 
superficial happiness, thus justifying God's decision to give man free will. The other 
challenge for the Free Will Defence concerns whether or not God was able to determine 
man so that he would always freely choose the good. If He was able to do this. then 
surely it was His moral responsibility to do so. This being the case, God is morally 
responsible for the evil in the world. This argument, has been articulated by many 
philosophers, including Flew and Mackie: 
1. An omnipotent God can achieve anything that is logically possible. 
2. It is logically possible for a free moral creature to be constituted in such a 
way as to always freely choose the good. 
3. Therefore, an omnipotent God could create a being who would always freely 
choose the good. 92 
A` John Hoyles, The Literary Underground (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
89 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880; trans. David McDuff, London: Penguin Books, 
1993), p. 289. 
90 Chesterton, "Chapter 15: The Dream of Maclan", The Ball and the Cross. 
91 G. K. Chesterton, The Catholic Church and Conversion (1926; repr. London: Burns & Oates, 1951), p. 
86. 
`', This outline of the argument is taken from Geivett, Evil and the Evidence for God, p. 189. 
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Advocates of the Free Will Defence object to point three on the grounds that contrary 
to point two, it is not logically possible for a free moral creature to be constituted in 
such a way as to always freely choose the good. Plantinga explains: 
Now God can create free creatures, but He can't cause or determine them to do 
only what is right. For if He does so, then they aren't significantly free after all: 
they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good. 
therefore, He must create creatures capable of moral evil; and He can't give 
these creature the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them 
from doing evil. 93 
Elsewhere Plantinga reminds us that, point two is wrong because if God, "causes them 
always to do only what is right, then they don't do what is right freely". 94 C. S. Lewis 
declared: "Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no 
possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be 
bad 
.,, 
95 Both Plantinga and Lewis agree with Aquinas, who, as Horne points out, 
believed the same: "It is not possible, Thomas argues, for God to have created a world 
in which human beings can make real, free choices and at the same time make sure that 
the way of rejection and negation is never chosen. "96 In The Surprise, the Friar puts the 
point even more succinctly when he explains the ultimate consequence of free will: "It 
is their play now. , 97 
The debate we have observed between thinkers such as Mackie and Plantinga, 
ultimately revolves around the definition of the word freedom. While Mackie advocates 
a compatibilist approach, Plantinga argues for an incompatibilist understanding of 
freedom. Compatibilists believe, "an action is free, whether or not it was causally 
determined, provided only that it was done by an agent whose faculties were operating 
normally, and was done because the agent chose or preferred to do it. "98 Defined in this 
`'' Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (1974: repr. Michigan: Eerdmans, 1991) p. 30. 
91 Plantinga, "Self Profile", in Tomberlin & Inwagen, ed., Alvin Plantinga, p. 41. 
q' Lewis, Mere Christianity, pp. 48-9. 
`"' Horne, Imagining Evil, p. 54. 
97 Chesterton, The Surprise, p. 325. 
98 Found in the introduction by the editors to Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams. ed., 
The Problem of E01 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 12. 
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manner, freedom is compatible with a God who has determined how the world will he 
(and is thus responsible for it). Incompatibilists reject this definition, believing instead 
that, 6'a free action must not only have been done because an agent "hose faculties 
were operating normally chose or preferred to do it; the agents' choice or preference 
must also not have been causally determined (though it may certainly have been 
influenced)... "99 Incompatibilists do not believe that free will is compatible with 
determinism. The debate between the Compatibilists and the Incompatibilists is one 
that can be traced back to the theological debate between John Calvin and Jacob 
Arminius. ' 00 While the debate continues to rage, ' °1 it is important to note that the Free 
Will Defence relies on a incompatibilist definition of freedom. As Plantinga admits. "if 
compatibilism is correct, the Free Will Defence fails. " 102 
Natural Evil 
There are several possible explanations for the origin of natural evil. However, these 
are not our immediate concern. Instead, I wish to look briefly at the theories that extend 
arguments from free will to cover natural evil as well as moral evil. Although my 
coverage will be brief, it will illustrate that the Free Will Defence is not necessarily 
limited to the sphere of moral evil. By outlining a number of logically possible 
99 Ibid., p. 12. John Moskop has noted that: "Thomas's explication of the concept of free will (liberurn 
arbitrium) also seems much closer to the libertarian than to the compatibilist conception of freedom. " 
John C. Moskop, Divine Omniscience and Human Freedom: Thomas Aquinas and Charles Hartshorne 
(Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1984), p. 23. 
10 For a collection of responses to Calvinism that are more sympathetic to Arminianism, see Clark 
Pinnock, The Grace of God, The Will of Alan (Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1989). 
"" For a compatibilist response to Plantinga, see Nelson Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary 
Action", The Philosophical Review 74 (1965), and Nelson Pike, "Divine Foreknowledge, Human 
Freedom and Possible Worlds", The Philosophical Review 86 (1977). For a defence of Plantinga against 
Pike's criticism, see Philip L. Quinn, "Plantinga on Foreknowledge and Freedom", in Tomberlin & 
Inwagen, ed., . 4/vin 
Plantinga. In addition, see my discussion of chance and providence in chapter eight. 
102 Plantinga, "Self Profile", in Tomberlin & Inwagen, ed., Alvin Plantinga, p. 45. Bruce Reichenbach 
has argued that The Free Will Defence causes a particular problem for Calvinist and Reformed 
theologians: "... the argument from evil seems particularly telling against one important and influential 
theistic tradition which, in its traditional formulation, rejects the libertarian view of freedom. " Bruce 
Reichenbach, "Evil and a Reformed View of God", International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 
Vol. 24 (1988). p. 82. 
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arguments, I will demonstrate that the Free Will Defence is comprehensive in its 
explanation of the origin of evil. 
Bruce Reichenbach and Stuart Hackett both see natural evil as a natural part of a free 
universe. Reichenbach explains how this results from a belief in free will: 
This creation, in order to make possible the existence of moral agents (in this 
case, human persons), had to be ordered according to some set of natural laws. 
Consequently, the possibility arises that sentient creatures like ourselves can he 
negatively affected by the outworking of these laws in nature, such that w\ e 
experience pain, suffering, disability, disutility, and at times the frustration of 
our good desires. " 1 03 
Aquinas argues along similar lines when he explains that evils (both natural and 
voluntary), are an inevitable by-product of God's creation. He writes: Now. the order 
of the universe requires... that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, 
fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, 
"1consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruption of things... "ý 
Richard Swinburne takes a slightly different approach to natural evil. He believes that 
for humans to be significantly free to commit moral evil, they must possess a 
knowledge of good and evil. Without this, their choices are not truly free. Natural evils 
exist to provide humans with the knowledge of evil that is a necessary part of their 
freedom. Swinburne writes: "... I believe that the occurrence of natural evils (i. e. evils 
such as disease and accidents unpredictable by humans) is required for humans to have 
the power to choose between doing significantly good or evil to their fellows... "' 
05 
A more speculative explanation of natural evil concerns the role of fallen angels (i. e. 
Satan and his cohorts). Plantinga outlines this position: "All natural evil is due to the 
10' Bruce Reichenbach, Evil and a Good God (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), p. 101. 
1u4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 49, Article 2 (Vol. 1, Trans. English 
Dominican Fathers, London: Burns & Oates, 1947), p. 255. 
105 Richard Swinburne, "Some Major Strands of Theodicy", in Daniel Howard-Snyder, ed.. The 
Evidential -lrgument from Evil (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 31. Also, see 
Sýý inburne's 
article "Natural Evil" and the response by Eleonore Stump, "Knowledge, Freedom, and the 
Problem of 
Evil", in Michael L. Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings (Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1992). 
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free activity of non-human persons; there is a balance of good over evil with respect to 
the actions of these non-human persons; and there is no world God could have created 
which contains a more favourable balance of good over evil with respect to the free 
activity of the non-human persons it contains. "106 This is a line of thought that 
Plantinga finds in St Augustine. 107 Plantinga chooses to leave his suggestion at a more 
general level rather than make a specific reference to the fall of Satan from heaven that 
is implied in the Bible. However, the idea that natural evil is the result of fallen anuels 
exercising their free will in opposition to God, is one that easily fits into the biblical 
narrative. As we noted earlier in this chapter, Chesterton believed that evil could be 
explained by a "strange story of treason in heaven and the great desertion by which evil 
damaged and tried to destroy a cosmos". 108 Although this account of natural evil is an 
extension of the Free Will Defence that is quite convenient; that does not guarantee its 
truth. Indeed, Eleonore Stump notes Richard Swinburne's objection on these grounds: 
This suggestion he also rejects, on the grounds that the hypothesis of the existence and 
evil action of fallen angels is blatantly ad hoc; there is no independent evidence for the 
hypothesis, and it seems to have been brought in just to handle this otherwise 
intractable problem. "' 09 
The Fall of man is also at the heart of another `ad hoc' account that holds sin 
responsible for natural evil: 
It is the voluntary break with God which makes the human race liable to suffer 
physical evils, and makes it vulnerable in this world. . . 
In his original, sinless 
and flawless state, mankind was bursting with health, so that viruses and other 
pathogens, which are all the more dangerous when an organism is weakened, 
caused him no harm whatsoever. He no doubt had intuitive wisdom and such 
finely tuned premonitory sense - far sharper than those of the most amazing of 
10`' Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 192. (The same point is made in Plantinga, God, Freedom and 
Evil, p. 58. ) 
"" Ibid., p. 192. 
108 Chesterton, The Everlasting Man, p. 244. 
109 Stump, "Knowledge, Freedom and the Problem of Evil", in Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil: 
Selected Readings, p. 328. 
164 
today's animals - that volcanic eruptions were incapable of causing him any danger. 110 
The idea that natural evils were of no consequence before the Fall was an idea that was 
popular in the theology of the early church. ' 11 
The Role of Satan (& His Cohorts) 
Earlier on I looked at the way in which Chesterton defended human responsibility, 
rejecting any attempt to shift the blame on to others (in the form of either fate or other 
non-human beings). At the same time, Chesterton maintained a firm belief in the 
existence of the Devil, which he expressed through Father Brown. In The Incredulity of 
Father Brown, Father Brown tells us on two separate occasions: "I believe in the 
Devil. "' 12 Father Brown's belief in Satan is not merely allegorical. He is very aware of 
the reality of the Devil's supernatural working: "A miracle is startling; but it is 
simple... It is power coming directly from God (or the Devil) instead of indirectly 
through nature or human wills. " 113 [italics mine] 
If, in spite of the existence of the Devil, sin is man's responsibility, what is the role of 
the Devil? In answer to this question, Chesterton followed the thinking of Aquinas. 
Aquinas taught that the Devil persuades people to sin: "But God is not the cause of 
sin... It remains then that nothing else is directly the cause of human sin but the will. 
Therefore it is evident that the devil is not properly the cause of sin, but only in the 
manner of one persuading. "< 14 He does not force man to sin, primarily because he 
cannot force man to sin - God's gift of free will is absolute. Thus, although the Devil 
has a role in the process of sin, he is not a necessary part of that process. The way in 
10 Henri Blocher, Evil and the Cross (1990; trans. Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994), p. 58. 
"' This point is made by Charles Journet, The Meaning Of Evil, (1961; trans. Michael Barry London: 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1963), p. 218. 
"' Chesterton, "The Dagger with Wings" & "The Doom of the Darnaways", The Incredulity of Father 
Brown, p. 134. & p. 152. 
Chesterton, "The Wrong Shape", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 153. 
114 Aquinas, On Evil, p. 116. 
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which the Devil uses persuasion to entice people into sin is explored by Chesterton in 
his poem, "The Aristocrat". In this poem, the Devil is portrayed as a gentleman who 
offers good things, but does not ultimately, "keep his word". ' 15 
Although Chesterton agreed with Aquinas about the persuasive role of Satan. he 
disagreed about the Devil's level of involvement. Aquinas made the point that. not all 
sins are committed at the instigation of the devil but some are due to the liberty of the 
will and the corruption of the flesh... "I 16 This statement is in keeping with the 
somewhat passive role that Aquinas assigned to the Devil. Although Aquinas clearly 
believed in the Devil, he discussed him in rather an abstract sense, and never really 
seemed that comfortable with the influence of Satan in daily affairs. In contrast, Father 
Brown gravely makes the point that: "All evil has one origin... " 117 Inherent in this is 
Chesterton's belief that the Devil and his cohorts are very much involved in our daily 
lives. Although the responsibility for sin is finally ours, Satan is very active in his 
attempts to persuade us to sin. Chesterton recognised that this was a model that could 
be seen in the Garden of Eden when the serpent persuaded Eve to disobey God. 
However, as we saw in chapter five, although Chesterton ascribed an active role to 
Satan and his cohorts, he was wary of genres and techniques that bordered on 
theological dualism. The tension as to how much emphasis should be given to Satan 
and his cohorts, was one that Chesterton never fully resolved. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown how Chesterton used the Free Will Defence to explain the 
origin of evil and defend the logical coherence of Christianity. The Free Will Defence, 
which has been the historic Christian position, was shown to be integral to Chesterton's 
own thought. His understanding of the Fall meant that he was convinced that the Free 
Will Defence was the orthodox Christian position. Chesterton believed that free \\111 
Ili G. K. Chesterton, The Aristocrat", (1912; repr. Collected Works 6olume 10: Collected Poetrv part I. 
San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), p. 426. 
' "' Aquinas, On Evil, p. 122. 
1' Chesterton, "The Dagger With Wings", The Incredulity of Father Brown, p. 130. 
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rather than determinism provided an adequate explanation of the moral evil «e find 
around us. Although Chesterton did not address the issue himself, I also looked at the 
way in which some thinkers have extended the Free Will Defence to cover natural evil. 
This was done to demonstrate the ability of the Free Will Defence to provide a 
comprehensive answer to the origin of evil. Finally, I looked at Chesterton's 
understanding of the role of Satan within the context of the Free Will Defence. 
Chesterton believed that the story of the Fall, which explains how we misused our free 
will, was ultimately good news. In his mind, free will was more than just a defence. it 
was an answer. Free will allowed us to believe that the universe was essentially good; 
the evil in it resulting from our misuse of free will. In his book on Aquinas he 
explained: "That `God looked on all things and saw that they were good' contains a 
subtlety which the popular pessimist cannot follow; or is too hasty to notice. It is the 
thesis that there are no bad things; but only bad uses of things. " 118 
Chesterton's commitment to the Free Will Defence, and his belief that it was ultimately 
good news, should not be misunderstood as shallow optimism. In the final chapter I 
will examine the true nature of Chesterton's optimism, showing that it was based on a 
real understanding of evil. However, in the meantime, it is important to recognise that 
although Chesterton used the Free Will Defence to explain the origin of evil, he knew it 
was only part of the story. The whole story, as summarised in the Apostles' Creed, ' 19 
was necessary for a more comprehensive treatment of evil. Earlier on I examined 
Chesterton's play The Surprise, observing the way in which it defends God's decision 
to give man free will. During the second half of this play, the Author has to watch his 
creation misuse their freedom. This raises an important issue. Even if we can explain 
the origin of evil, there is also the question of why God apparently does not do anything 
about it. Chesterton ends his play by hinting at God's answer to that very question. As 
the puppets start trying to kill one another, the Author sticks his head through the 
scenery: "And in the devil's name, what do you think you are doing with my play? 
" Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas, p. 125. 
119 In Orthodox, (p. 18), Chesterton declares that the core of Christian theology is summarised in the 
Apostles' Creed. 
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Drop it! Stop! I am coming down. "120 At the heart of the Christian story is the doctrine 
of the Incarnation; which explains that God, having seen how man was misusing his 
freedom, decided to come down and do something about it. As we read in the Gospel of 
John: The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. " 121 
120 Chesterton, The Surprise, p. 340. 
121 John 1: 14 (New International Version). 
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Chapter 8: Suffering and the Problem of Evil 
In the previous chapter I looked at the Free Will Defence, explaining why, it holds 
human beings responsible for bringing evil into the world. At the heart of this defence 
is the belief that the gift of free will merits the price that had to be paid for it. This was 
something that Chesterton firmly believed. He wrote: "I might cease to believe in a 
God of any kind; but I could not cease to think that a God who had made men and 
angels free was finer than one who coerced them into comfort. " 
Suffering provides the Free Will Defence with its greatest challenge. Furthermore. the 
philosophical account of the origin of evil offered by the Free Will Defence can 
sometimes appear inadequate in the face of personal suffering. The value that 
Chesterton placed upon free will is not shared by everyone. In The Brothers 
Karamazov, Ivan Karamazov challenges his younger brother to defend God"s gift of 
free will in light of the countless examples of human suffering that have ensued: 
Tell me yourself directly, I challenge you - reply: imagine that you yourself are 
erecting the edifice of human fortune with the goal of, at the finale, making 
people happy, of at last giving them peace and quiet, but that in order to do it it 
would be necessary and unavoidable to torture to death only one tiny little 
creature, that same little child that beat its breast with its little fist, and on its 
unavenged tears to found that edifice, would you agree to be the architect on 
those conditions, tell me and tell me truly? "2 
Ivan Karamazov thinks that the cost of freedom is too high: "It isn't God I don't accept, 
Aloysha, it's just his ticket that I most respectfully return to him. ,3 
Suffering raises particularly acute questions for theism, which involve both the 
evidential problem of evil, and the existential problem of evil. The evidential argument 
from evil argues that: "Even if it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for 
' G. K. Chesterton, The Catholic Church and Conversion (1926; repr. London: Burns & Oates, 1951). p. 
86. 
Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (1880, trans. David McDuff, London: Penguin Books, 
1993), p. 282. 
Ibid., p. 282. 
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creating the sort of world we experience... the facts of evil constitute evidence against 
the hypothesis that the world was created, and is governed, by an omnipotent, 
omniscient, perfectly good God. "4 The existential problem of evil follows on from this. 
Michael Peterson explains: "For present purposes, the existential problem involves hoýý 
the experience of evil conditions one's attitude toward God and perhaps toward the 
world. This problem cannot simply be reduced to an emotional or psychological one or 
divorced from the structure of one's belief and values. Rather it arises when the 
experience of evil creates a crisis for religious faith. "5 
Chesterton was well aware of the problem that suffering posed. In The Sins of Prince 
Saradine", Father Brown admits that this world is not as fair as it should be: "I mean 
that we are here on the wrong side of the tapestry. The things that happen here do not 
seem to mean anything; they mean something somewhere else. Somewhere else 
retribution will come on the real offender. Here it often seems to fall on the wrong 
person. "6 
Some of Chesterton's contemporaries accused him of ignoring grief and suffering in his 
fiction. One suggested that, "he seems almost completely ignorant of the existence of 
sorrow or suffering. "7 In response to this accusation, one could cite the example of 
Flambeau grieving over the death of Pauline Stacey in "The Eye of Apollo'". 8 
Admittedly, there are relatively few examples of this type in Chesterton's fiction, but 
surely this can be attributed to a general failure on his part to develop his characters 
rather than suggesting that he deliberately ignored the reality of suffering in the world. 
On a personal level, Chesterton was familiar with the suffering of bereavement. His 
' "Introduction" to Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert Merrihew Adams, ed., The Problem of* Evil 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 16. There are many different forms of the evidential 
argument from evil. A number of these (along with rebuttals) can be found in Daniel Howard-Snx der, 
The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1996). 
"Introduction" to Michael L. Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings (Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 7. 
6 G. K. Chesterton, "The Sins of Prince Saradine", The Innocence of Father Brown (1911 - repr. The 
Annotated Innocence of Father Brown, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 169. This is a rare 
example of eschatology within Chesterton's fiction. Elsewhere, it is conspicuously absent; probably 
owing to his fascination with this world, and his desire to remind others of the wonder of creation. 
7 Henry Murray, "Gilbert Keith Chesterton", The Bookman, May 1910, p. 64. 
x Chesterton, The Eye of Apollo", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 205. 
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elder sister, Beatrice, died when he was only three years old. Later on in life. at the end 
of the First World War, Chesterton also lost his brother, Cecil Chesterton. Discussing 
this second bereavement, Joseph Pearce notes that: "Gilbert was utterly devastated by 
the news of his brother's death and completely unconsolable. "9 
This chapter will look at Chesterton response to human suffering and the questions that 
it raises. In doing so, I will address aspects of the problem of evil that were ignored in 
the previous chapter. I will begin by asking whether or not theism should try to explain 
every instance of suffering. Having considered this, I will go on to think about sin. a 
subject that was central to Chesterton's understanding of evil. Two questions arise in 
regard to this: `How much does it explain? ' and, `What solution does God provide to 
it? ' After discussing these two questions, I will be in a position to analyse the Free Will 
Defence in greater detail. Even then, a number of questions remain unanswered. With 
this in mind, the rest of the chapter is devoted to the Book of Job and the place of 
mystery in Chesterton's theodicy. I will conclude by suggesting that Chesterton's 
ultimate response to the problem of evil involved integrating the Free Will Defence 
with the lessons that he discovered in the Book of Job. 
Does All Suffering Require An Explanation? - Implications Of The Free Will 
Defence 
In an essay entitled, "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God", Peter Van 
Inwagen makes the following suggestion: "I want to suggest that much of what goes on 
in the world, even much of what seems important and significant to us, is no part of 
God's plan - and certainly not a part of anyone else's plan - and 
is therefore due 
simply to chance. "10 It is important that we understand Inwagen's argument correctly. 
He is not suggesting that evil per se is without explanation: "I want to deny only that 
`' Joseph Pearce, Wisdom and Innocence: A Life of G. K. Chesterton (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
1996), p. 239. 
' Peter Van Inwagen, "The Place of Chance in a World Sustained by God", in Thomas Morris. ed., 
Divine and Human . Action: Essays in the 
Metaphvsics of Theism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1988). 
P. 221. 
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there is any reason to suppose that, for every individual misfortune, God has a reason 
for not preventing that misfortune. " II Nor is he proposing a form of deism. in \\ hich 
God is no longer involved in the world. His thesis is simply that God sustains the VN orld 
by sustaining causal laws of nature, and that the operation of these laws, has certain 
accidental by-products, which can be referred to as chance events. 
An important question in this discussion is the meaning of the word 'chance'. Imw-agen 
elaborates: "What I shall mean by saying that an event is a 'chance' occurrence... is 
this: The event or state of affairs is without purpose or significance; it is not a part of 
anyone's plan; it serves no one's end; and it might very well not have been. " 2 An 
alternative to this definition can be found in the writings of Boethius: "Whenever 
something is done for some purpose, and for certain reasons something other than what 
was intended happens, it is called chance... We may therefore define chance as an 
unexpected event due to the conjunction of its causes with action which is done for 
some purpose. "13 The interesting thing about both definitions is that chance maintains 
its compatibility with the belief that God is the designer of the Universe. Chance is seen 
as a by-product of God's design. This understanding concurs with the argument 
presented in the previous chapter: in designing the world, God did not dictate 
everything that would occur in it. The greatest variable in His design was free will. 
Chesterton describes this state of affairs as, "an idea of free will operating under 
conditions of design". 14 
This emphasis on chance appears, at first, to challenge the Christian doctrine of 
Providence. ' 5 It certainly rejects the Calvinistic view of providence as a state of affairs 
in which everything that occurs in the world, is directly determined by God. However. 
" Ibid., pp. 232-3. 
' Ibid., p. 220. 
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (Trans. V. E. Watts, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 1969). p. 
148. Boethius' subtle discussion of the interplay between free will and providence can be 
found in book 
five of The Consolation of Philosophy. 
'4 G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man (1925; repr. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), p. 246. 
', For a more detailed look at various perspectives on the role and meaning of providence, see 
William 
Lane Craig, The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to 
S, uiri' 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988). In this book, Craig examines the thought of: Aristotle. Augustine. Boethius, 
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Molina, and Suarez. 
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it does not necessarily contradict the Thomistic view of providence. Aquinas believed 
in God's providence, and argued that, "all things are subject to divine providence-. '`' At 
the same time, Brian Davies points out that: "He does not think that e\ cry natural 
process must be the inevitable outcome of causes operating in a deterministic way. For 
one thing, he believes in the reality of human freedom... "1 7 
Aquinas argued that human beings only had free will because God had determined that 
they should. Thus he saw no contradiction between his belief in providence and free 
will: "For him, God does not interfere with created free agents to push them into action 
in a way that infringes their freedom... He makes them to be what they are. namely 
freely acting agents. "' 8 As Aquinas explained: "God, therefore, is the first cause, Who 
moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes lie 
does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not 
deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in 
them ... "19 
Chesterton made the same point more succinctly: "Man was free, not 
because there was no God, but because it needed a God to set him free. "2° 
Without compromising the biblical concept of providence, chance can be seen as an 
inherent part of the Free Will Defence. Thus the theist does not need to try and account 
for every occurrence of suffering. 21 Chesterton believed chance to be a good thing, 
because it turned life into an exciting adventure story: "But the point is that a story is 
exciting because it has in it so strong an element of will, of what theology calls free- 
"' Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 22, Article 2 (Vol. 1, Trans. English Dominican 
Fathers, London: Burns & Oates, 1947), p. 122. 
17 Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 161. 
8 Ibid., p. 177. 
19 Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 83, Article 1, Reply Objection 3, p. 418. 
,°G. K. Chesterton, "The Chartered Libertine", A Miscellany of Men (1912, repr. London: Methuen & Co 
Ltd, 1926), p. 251. 
I An important distinction needs to be made here between the cause of an event and the event itself. I 
have argued that the cause of an event does not always have a meaning. Therefore ýN e should not alway s 
seek to explain why God caused an instance of suffering to occur. However, this does not stop 
God 
bringing some meaning out of the event. Aquinas thought that God must have a reason 
for not al\%a\ s 
intervening to stop suffering. (The reason behind God's decision not to always intervene 
is carefully 
explored by Eleonore Stump in her essay, "Aquinas and the Sufferings of Job" 
in Howard-Sn` der. ed.. 
The Evidential : -l rgument 
from Evil. ) 
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will. You cannot finish a sum how you like. But you can finish a story how- y ou like. " 
Throughout his life, Chesterton cultivated this spirit of adventure. In his 
Autobiography, he describes how he made the decision to move to Beaconsfield. Both 
he and Frances went out one day, "upon a journey into the void, a voyage deliberately 
objectless. "23 When they arrived at a nearby train station, Chesterton asked to go 
wherever the next train went. Upon reaching Slough they went for a walk, ended up in 
Beaconsfield, and made the decision to move there. Chesterton thought that the sense 
of adventure he found in Christianity set it apart from more deterministic beliefs. In his 
discussion of other philosophies and religions in The Everlasting Man, Chesterton 
declared: "There is none of them that really grasps this human notion of the tale. the 
test, the adventure; the ordeal of the free man. Each of them starves the story-telling 
instinct, so to speak, and does something to spoil human life considered as a 
romance... "24 Commenting on the necessity of freedom for any adventure story, 
William Isley writes: "The human life is a dramatic adventure story, and an adventure 
story or a romance is not determined. , 25 
The human adventure story does not take place in an individual, autonomous realm. 
This is because it is effected by the consequences of the free activity of other moral 
agents. While some instances of suffering have no explanation, others can be explained 
in terms of the activity of other free moral agents. Aquinas drew a distinction between 
evil suffered (malum poenae) and evil done (malum culpae). Evil suffered can often be 
explained as a chance occurrence without any direct cause, but evil done (or sin), is far 
more deliberate, and explains a great deal of the evil that we find in the world. 
22 G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy, (1908; repr. London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1927), p. 252. 
2. G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 220. 
24 Chesterton, The Everlasting Man, p. 246. 
', William L. Isley, Jr, The Adventure of Life: Romance in the Writing of G. K. Chesterton (Unpublished 
PhD Thesis: Drew University, 1986), p. 195. Isley devotes a section of his thesis to the link between 
human freedom and adventure (pp. 191-6) Further discussion of this theme can be 
found in "Chapter 6: 
Chesterton and Adventure" of John Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian 
Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull 
University Press, 1984). 
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Sin - An Explanation26 
In the previous chapter I looked at the way in which Chesterton saw the Fall of man as 
the best explanation of our sinful nature. Along with Aquinas, Chesterton believed that 
sin provided the focal point for any discussion of evil. On one occasion he wrote a 
letter to The Times in response to a challenge it had given to its readers to write in and 
explain what was wrong with the world. His reply was simply: "Dear Sir, I am. Yours 
faithfully" [Italics mine]. There are a number of reasons behind this emphasis on sin 
which are worth highlighting. 
Chesterton recognised that it made sense to begin with what we know. Amid the many 
mysteries that surround the problem of evil, sin offers a concrete explanation that is 
easily identified. When Wilfred Bohun discovers that his brother has been murdered in 
"The Hammer of God", he declares: "My brother is dead. What does it mean? What is 
this horrible mystery? "27 In response, the cobbler replies: "Plenty of horror sir, but not 
much mystery. "28 Wilfred Bohun's appeal to mystery is particularly ironic in light of 
the fact that he has committed the crime himself. Chesterton uses this incident to 
remind us that people sometimes seek a mysterious solution to evil in order to mask 
their own responsibility for it. The idea that free moral agents have introduced evil into 
the world is central to the Free Will Defence. 
Another reason behind Chesterton's emphasis on sin was that he perceived it to be a 
large causal factor. For every example of unexplained evil, there are a multitude of 
examples that can be explained by sin. This has prompted Charles Joumet to make the 
following suggestion: "The sea of suffering which breaks upon humanity is not simply 
the result of what we have inherited from Adam, but incomparably more is it the result 
of man's own wilful actions, his pride, his ambitions, his jealousies, his hatreds. his 
'`' This section will explore further Chesterton's awareness of the brokeness of creation, a theme that eke 
began to look at in the previous chapter. The way in which this relates to Chesterton's emphasis on the 
doctrine of creation is looked at in the next chapter. 
ý^ Chesterton, "The Hammer of God", The Innocence ofFather Brown, p. 184. 
28 Ibid., p. 184. 
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»29 cruelties, and his follies. In an increasingly secular world, the Christian concept of 
sin seems to have little purchase on the minds of the population. And yet, it is probably 
the single greatest contribution that Christianity has to offer to the problem of evil: 
``[Christianity] teaches that the place to begin in grappling with the problem of evil is 
not the evils without but the evils within, not the evils that just happen or that are 
charged to others but one's own contribution to the problem. "30 It is interesting that in 
recent years, the problem of evil has tended to emphasise moral evil (which can be 
explained by sin) rather than natural evil. Stephen Davis explains: 
One interesting fact to emerge from recent discussions of the problem of evil is 
that the paradigm evil event to which virtually all theodicists now refer... is the 
Holocaust, i. e., the murder of six million Jews and others by the Nazis during 
World War II. At one time the paradigm evil event referred to by theodicists 
was the infamous Lisbon earthquake of November 1,1755. Followed by fires 
and even a flood of the Tagus, the disaster destroyed the city and killed tens of 
thousands of people. The Lisbon earthquake is an example of natural evil, the 
Holocaust, of moral evil. Although both are apt symbols of human suffering, it 
is perhaps fitting that the one has replaced the other in our minds as the evil 
event. 31 
A further reason for Chesterton's particular emphasis was his understanding of the 
corrosive nature of sin. Father Brown is quick to point out its destructive nature to 
Flambeau: "Men may keep a sort of level of good, but no man has ever been able to 
keep on one level of evil. That road goes down and down. The kind man drinks and 
turns cruel; the frank man kills and lies about it. Many a man I've known started like 
you to be an honest outlaw, a merry robber of the rich, and ended stamped into 
slime. , 32 Part of the reason that sin is so destructive was highlighted in chapter three 
when we looked at its parasitic nature. According to Aquinas, another reason is that bad 
acts have no redeeming qualities. "With `evil suffered' there is always an explanation 
in terms of goodness and (ultimately) in terms of God as the Maker of good things. But 
, `' Charles Journet, The Meaning of Evil (1961; trans. Michael Barry, London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1963), 
p. 222. 
Marilyn M. Adams, "Redemptive Suffering: A Christian Solution to the Problem of Evil", in Peterson, 
ed., The Problem ofEvil: Selected Readings, p. 173. 
Introduction" to Stephen Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicl" (Edinburgh: T&T 
Clark Ltd, 1981), p. 6. 
32 Chesterton, "The Flying Stars", The Innocence of Father Brown, p. 99. 
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with `evil done', says Aquinas. there is no similar explanation... The evil involved here 
"33 has no concomitant good. 
If you believe, as Chesterton did, that sin is the worst of all evils. then finding a 
solution to it becomes one of life's primary goals. This is why the concept of sin and 
man's need for forgiveness is so important to the Christian faith. Chesterton claimed 
that it was the reason behind his eventual conversion into the Roman Catholic Church 
in 1922. In his Autobiography, he informs us that he joined the Roman Catholic 
Church: "To get rid of my sins. "34 He continues: "For there is no other religious system 
that does really profess to get rid of people's sins. It is confirmed by the logic, which to 
many seems startling, by which the Church deduces that sin confessed and adequately 
repented is actually abolished; and that the sinner does really begin again as if he had 
never sinned. "35 
The final reason behind Chesterton's focus on sin was that he believed it to be a 
tremendous abuse of a tremendous privilege. The Free Will Defence is based on the 
belief that the gift of free will was the most valuable thing that God could have given to 
humanity. Hence the Free Will Defence's belief that God is justified in allowing the 
possibility of evil in the world. As a result, sin, which is a misuse of this gift. is 
declared to be a terrible thing. Chesterton recognised this when he wrote: In so far as I 
am Man I am the chief of creatures. In so far as I am a man I am the chief of sinners. "36 
Chesterton elaborated on this elsewhere: "For sin, whatever else it is, is not mereh, the 
dregs of a bestial existence. It is something more subtle and spiritual, and is in some 
way connected with the very supremacy of the human spirit. , 
37 
Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 95. 
Chesterton, , -1 utobiography, p. 
340. 
Ibid., pp. 340-1. 
"'Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p. 171. 
G. K. Chesterton. Come to Think of It... (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1930), p. 156. 
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Sin -A Solution 
Although sin accounts for a considerable amount of suffering by holding humanity 
responsible, the Free Will Defence still has a case to answer. If God is good, and able 
to do anything that is logically possible, then surely God has a responsibility to 
intervene. In response, it might be argued that the effects of sin (i. e. suffering) are 
deserved, and therefore, that a just God is under no obligation to intervene. While this 
argument has some merit, it appears to be counter-intuitive. Any loving parent v oiild 
surely do anything possible to help alleviate their child's suffering. With this in mind, 
David Griffin attacks the Free Will Defender: "According to their position, since God 
freely created human freedom, God could interrupt it at any time. Hence they must 
explain why God does not interrupt it to prevent at least some of the more horrendous 
moral evils that occur. , 38 
It was because he agreed that God should do something, that Chesterton placed the Free 
Will Defence within the broader Christian framework of the Apostles' Creed. 39 At the 
heart of the Christian message is the news that God has done something about sin and 
its consequences. This was most graphically described by Chesterton in his play, The 
Surprise, which I looked at in the conclusion to the previous chapter. The play ends 
with the puppet master choosing to get involved in the lives of the creatures that he has 
created. Hugh Kenner reminds us of the importance of the Incarnation in Chesterton" s 
writing: "Indeed, the Incarnation can be said to bring every strand of Chesterton's 
perception to a focus. "40 
38 David Griffin in Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, p. 180. 
"These essays are concerned only to discuss the actual fact that the central Christian theology 
(sufficiently summarized in the Apostles' Creed) is the best root of energy and sound ethics. " 
Chesterton. 
Orthodoxy, p. 18. 
40 Hugh Kenner, Paradox in Chesterton (London: Sheed & Ward, 1948), p. 91. Kenner goes on to tell us 
that The Everlasting Man is, "the most valuable single record of the place of the Incarnation 
in his 
[Chesterton's] thinking. " (p. 14). ) 
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Although the Incarnation describes God's intervention in the world, it does not solve 
the problem of sin by itself. 4' The solution is found in the death and resurrection of 
Jesus. Through the Atonement, God deals with the sin of humanity. Thomas Hart has 
suggested that Chesterton's treatment of this subject is inadequate: "What is weak in 
Chesterton's treatment of Christ is his handling of the centrally kerygmatic events of 
Christ's death and resurrection. We saw a hint, in connection with the Book of Joh. of 
the value Chesterton finds in Christ's suffering and death, but in general he does not 
have too much to offer on the score of soteriology. "42 It seems to me that Hart's 
criticism of Chesterton on this point is fair, although it does require some qualification. 
The centrality of the cross in Chesterton's thinking is visible in his preface to a book by 
A. H. Baverstock entitled, The Unscathed Crucifix: "In the following suggestive and 
far-reaching reflections, Mr Baverstock has made it [the cross] the key to all kinds of 
suffering in a time when we all suffer... He and we, after all the centuries, set up again 
this ancient ensign of wood against the ensigns of the new evils... "4' Elsewhere, 
Chesterton's most sustained discussion of the cross can be found in The Everlasting 
Man, in a chapter entitled "The Strangest Story in the World". Yet even here, 
Chesterton did not elaborate in regard to his soteriology. Although Chesterton 
acknowledged the importance of the Cross, he never managed to explain how or why it 
was important. This is especially surprising in view of his prolific writings on virtually 
everything else. One possible explanation for this is the suggestion that Chesterton 
spent his life shaking off the beliefs of his Unitarian upbringing.. '` In The Catholic 
Church and Conversion, he stated that, "it was from a position originally much more 
detached and indefinite that I had been converted, an atmosphere if not agnostic at least 
pantheistic or unitarian. , 45 If this was the case, it would explain Hugh Kenner's 
observation that: "The Crucifixion fascinated him more and more as he grew older... . 46 
41 At the same time, within the field of Christology, it is virtually impossible to maintain a strict 
distinction between the person of Christ and the work of Christ. The doctrine of the Incarnation involves 
aspects of soteriology. 
42 Thomas N. Hart, G. K. Chesterton's Case for Christianity (Unpublished PhD Thesis: Graduate 
Theological Union, 1974), p. 215. 
43 G. K. Chesterton "Preface" to A. H. Baverstock, The Unscathed Crucifix (London: The Faith Press, 
1916), p. 10. 
44 Chesterton's parents were Unitarians. 
45 Chesterton, The Catholic Church and Conversion, p. 19. 
4" Kenner, Paradox in Chesterton, p. 100. 
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Alternatively, we might simply explain the lack of detail by remembering that he was a 
highly symbolic thinker and writer who was quite prone to ignoring such details. 47 
If Chesterton was unsure of exactly how God had dealt with the problem of man's sin, 
he was at least clear as to the result: Humanity could be forgiven, As one of the Biblical 
writers declares: "If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just and will forgive us our 
sins and purify us from all unrighteousness. "48 Chesterton believed that some of the 
continuing evils in the world were the result of our failure to grasp hold of the 
opportunity of repentance. He declared: "We have lost the idea of repentance; 
especially in public things; that is why we cannot get rid of our great national 
abuses. .. 
"49 His Roman Catholic faith led him to believe that the church had a vital role 
to play in pardoning men's sins. This is illustrated throughout the Father Brown stories. 
Father Brown is more interested in hearing confessions than he is in acquiring 
convictions. When challenged about this in "The Chief Mourner of Marne", Father 
Brown responds passionately: "Go on your own primrose path pardoning all your 
favourite vices and being generous to your fashionable crimes; and leave us in the 
darkness, vampires of the night, to console those who really need consolation; who do 
things really indefensible, things that neither the world nor they themselves can defend; 
and none but a priest will pardon. , 50 As this quotation indicates, Chesterton thought 
that God's solution to sin was sufficient enough to cover every type of sin. All that was 
left, was for individuals to confess. 
Sin & The Free Will Defence - Further Reflections 
By placing the Free Will Defence within its Christian framework, we have seen how it 
answers additional questions concerning suffering. Sin is the primary cause of most 
47 Chesterton's symbolism is discussed further in chapter two. It is interesting to note that his symbolism 
stands in contradistinction to the Unitarians, who were not at all symbolic. 
48 1 John 1: 9 (New International Version). 
49 Chesterton, "The Mediaeval Villain", A Miscellany of Men, p. 234. 
50 G. K. Chesterton, "The Chief Mourner of Marne" in The Secret of Father Brown (1927; repr. 
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1974), pp. 168-9. 
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human suffering, which makes mankind responsible for much of its own suffering. 
Nevertheless, Christianity argues that God, because of His love for mankind, has acted 
in history to solve the human predicament of sin. However. this still does not fülle 
explain the problem of suffering. Christ's atonement may provide a long term solution 
to suffering by overcoming sin, but what about the countless instances of suffering that 
continue to occur. The obvious answer to this is to argue that if God continually 
intervened, then our free will would no longer be meaningful. While this is true, both 
Scripture and Church history suggest that God has intervened on certain occasions to 
alleviate suffering. Thus we cannot escape the problem of why God has chosen to act in 
the way that He does. For example, why did He heal some of the sick people in the 
New Testament, while apparently refusing to intervene during the Holocaust? (As I 
have already suggested, the Holocaust raises some particularly difficult questions for 
any theodicy or theological system. Hence John Roth's comment that: "Common 
Christian assumptions about God, Jesus, and the future are tested by the Holocaust at 
every turn... , '5 I) The problem for Christianity is articulated by Oliver Leaman: 
Now, we know that many terrible events do take place in the world, terrible 
events which God could prevent, or at least limit, were he to think it desirable. 
If our notion of God is of a being who remains interested in the world but is 
determined not to intervene, not to prevent things happening which cause 
immense suffering, then we are left with a rather unattractive concept of the 
deity. 52 
Aquinas acknowledged this problem in his Summa Theologica in his discussion of 
providence. As he saw it, the objection was as follows: "Further, a wise provider 
excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But 
we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not 
" John K. Roth, A Consuming Fire: Encounters with Elie Wiesel and the Holocaust (Atlanta: John Knox 
Press, 1979), p. 11. In a similar vein is Graham Walkers's observation that: "Elie Wiesel claims that the 
Holocaust is an event with divine ramifications that shatters current theological images of God. ", 
Graham B. Walker, Jr., Elie lFiesel: A Challenge to Theology (North Carolina: McFarland and Company 
Inc, 1988), p. 1. Elie Wiesel is a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust who has written a number of books 
exploring the meaning of the Holocaust. The most famous of these. and perhaps the most disturbing. is 
his novel, Fight (1958). 
'1 Oliver Leaman, Evil and Suffering in Jewish Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\ersitý Press. 
1995), p. 195. 
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omnipotent; or else He does not have care for anything. In response. Aquinas argued 
that: "Since God, then, provides universally for all beings, it belongs to His providence 
to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may 
not be hindered... "54 According to Aquinas, God's limited intervention in history has 
been in the best interests of the whole universe rather than particular situations. This 
argument is difficult to assess. It is logically possible that this is the case, and, since no 
human has the knowledge necessary to know what actions will work out for the 
universal good of the creation, we cannot demand that God should have acted 
otherwise. At the same time, his response appears insensitive to the numerous examples 
of horrendous suffering that have occurred throughout history. In terms of the 
Holocaust, was there really no alternative? 
Upon investigation, it seems that the Free Will Defence raises almost as many 
questions as it answers. Furthermore, some of the answers that it gives are speculative. 
and others, though logically possible, seem harsh. This must eventually lead us to 
question exactly how successful the Free Will Defence is as a theodicy. By way of a 
prolegomenon to this question, we must first decide what is expected from a theodicy. 
Historically, the expectations placed on theodicy appear to have altered. Neither 
Augustine or Aquinas were trying to defend the existence of God when they devised 
their theodicies. They were simply trying to explain why God created and sustained the 
world in the way that He did. The change in emphasis began to occur with Gottfried 
Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716). By the time that David Hume (1711-1776) had 
finished his critique of theism, the main task of the theodicist was to defend the 
existence of God in the face of evil. In more recent years, the role of theodicy has again 
been questioned. Some argue that theodicy should try to explain the compossibility- of 
evil and theism, " while some suggest that it need only show that such a compossibility 
S" Aquinas. Summa Theologica Part I. Question 22. Article 2, Objection 2, p. 122. 
Ibid.. Part 1, Question 22, Article 2, Reply Objection 2, p. 123. 
Among others, this position was adopted by both Augustine and Aquinas. 
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is logically possible. 56 Others have gone as far as suggesting that these sorts of 
philosophical discussions are an inappropriate response to human suffering. '' 
Michael Peterson tells us that the difference between defence and theodicy is one of the 
main areas of debate in contemporary discussion on the problem of ev il., 8 The 
discussion centres around whether theism is able to explain why evil occurs, or whether 
it must resign itself to explaining why it might occur: 
In practice, of course, the probability of a defence will never be high on theism: 
if the defenders of theism knew of a story which accounted for the sufferings of 
the actual world and which was highly probable on theism, he would employ it 
as a theodicy. We may therefore say that, in practice, a defence is a story Which 
accounts for the sufferings of the actual world and which (given the existence of 
God) is `true for all anyone knows'. 59 
Whether or not the Free Will Defence should be classified as a theodicy or a defence is 
the subject of much debate. In essence, it is surely a theodicy, as the explanation it 
offers - that moral agents freely introduced evil into the world - is `highly probable on 
theism'. Elsewhere though, it can offer no more than a defence of theism. This can be 
seen in the possible extensions of the Free Will Defence to cover natural evil (which I 
explored in the last chapter); and with Aquinas' non-verifiable belief that God is 
justified in not intervening to prevent each particular instance of suffering because He 
has to think about the good of the whole universe. 
The inability of either sin or the Free Will Defence to explain evil in its entirety does 
not necessarily constitute a problem for theism. Indeed, the Book of Job would appear 
to suggest that some element of mystery is actually quite desirable. 
In contemporary philosophy of religion, the most obvious example is Alvin Plantinga. He is keen to 
point out that he is arguing for a defence rather than a theodicy. 
5' An example of this can be found in Terrence W. Tilley, The Evils of Theodicv (Washington: 
Georgetown University Press, 1991). In the introduction, he writes: "As the predominant modern 
theological and philosophical discourse practice about God and evil, theodicy misportraý s and effaces 
genuine evils. " (p. 1. ) 
58 See Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, pp. 14-7. 
Peter Van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, of Air, and of Silence", in God, Knowledge, und. 1I sterv: 
Essays in Philosophical Theolo y (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), p. 74. 
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The Book Of Job & The Place Of Mystery 
The outline of the Book of Job is relatively simple. Job is a good, devout, successful 
man, who becomes the subject of a wager between Satan and God. Would Job still 
worship God if he suffered more? As a result, Job begins to endure terrible sufferings. 
He loses his wealth and his family. Later on he is afflicted with painful sores all over 
his body. Unable to explain the cause of his suffering, Job consults with his friends, 
who tell him that in some way, he must be personally responsible for his suffering. 
Eventually Job challenges God to explain His actions, and in response. God reminds 
him that there is a great deal that Job does not know about the universe. Job accepts this 
charge, and the story concludes with Job worshipping God, and God blessing Job. The 
significance of the story lies in the question it raises: "In a manner of speaking, this 
book is a philosophical forum put in the format of an old folk tale. It addresses the most 
perplexing of human problems: Why do the innocent suffer? "60 Indeed, the Book of 'Job 
has subsequently become a classic statement of the problem of evil: For Western man 
Job has been the pre-eminent symbol of innocent suffering. '"6' Eugene Goodheart 
reminds us of the literary legacy that the Book of Job has left behind. He writes: 
"Behind much of the modern literature of suffering is the greatest single work of the 
Bible, The Book of Job. We hear echoes of Job in books as different from one another 
"62 as The Brothers Karamazovv, Jude the Obscure, and The Castle. 
Chesterton was heavily influenced by the Book of Job. According to one recent critic, 
the struggles that he experienced during the 1890's, "left him engrossed with the 
problem of evil, and with that book of the Old Testament which treats it most 
explicitly. " He continues: "References to the Book of Job crop up in all sorts of 
apparently unlikely places... "6' Christopher Hollis makes a similar comment in his 
book on Chesterton: "Of the books of the Old Testament that which was the main 
60 Michael Peterson, in Peterson, ed., The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings, p. 23. 
61 "Introduction" to Paul S. Sanders, ed., Twentieth-Century Interpretations of the Book of Job (Neve 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1968), p. 1. 
62 Eugene Goodheart, "Job and the Modern World", in Sanders, ed., Twentieth-Century Interpretations pof 
the Book of Job, p. 98. 
6" "Introduction" to Russell Sparkes, ed., Prophet of Orthodoxy: The Wisdom of G. K. ('hesiL'rton 
(London: Harper Collins, 1997), p. 63. 
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influence on him was the book of Job, for it was there that he found this problem of evil 
more frankly confronted than anywhere else in literature. "64 Chesterton was aware that 
virtually everyone questions suffering at some point in their life. The relevance of Job 
to these questions was one of the things that drew him to the story: The world is still 
asking the questions that were asked by Job. "65 Chesterton believed that the ý, vay in 
which the Book of Job treated suffering made it more valuable than many other 
philosophical works on the subject. He wrote: "The Book of Job is better worth hearing 
than any modern philosophical conversation in the whole modern philosophical 
world. "66 
God's answer to Job leaves a number of Job's questions unanswered. Chesterton 
thought that this was central to understanding the tale: "The Book of Job stands 
definitely alone because the Book of Job definitely asks, `But what is the purpose of 
God? ' Is it worth the sacrifice, even of our miserable humanity? ... 
It is because of this 
question that we have to attack as a philosophical riddle the riddle of the Book of 
Job. "67 Mystery is at the heart of the Book of Job, as Peter Kreeft reminds us: If Job is 
about the problem of evil, then Job's answer to that problem is that we do not know the 
answer. "68 
The mistake that is often made when interpreting the Book of Job is trying to explain 
away everything that occurs to Job. This is exactly what Job's friends, or comforters 
attempt: "They will keep on saying that everything in the universe fits into everything 
else: as if there were anything comforting about a number of nasty things all fitting into 
64 Christopher Hollis, The Mind of Chesterton (London: Hollis & Carter Ltd, 1970), p. 42. Chesterton's 
fixation with the Book of Job is confirmed by Dudley Barker's observation that: "His 
love-letters are 
spattered with quotations from the Book of Job. " See Dudley Barker, G. K. Chesterton: A 
Biography 
(London: Constable & Company, 1973), p. 98. Chesterton's interest in the Book of Job goes back a Iona 
way. One of his Notebooks, dated around 1892, lists the Book of Job as his 
favourite poem. (See 
A'otebook 73321 B, 1892, p. 27., "The Department of Manuscripts", British Library, London. ) 
65 G. K. Chesterton, The Well and the Shallows (London: Sheed & Ward, 1935), p. 66. 
6" G. K. Chesterton, "On Long Speeches and Truth", The Illustrated London News (1906; repr. Collected 
JLorks I 'o1wne ? 7: The Illustrated London News 1905-1907, San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986). p. 132. 
6' G. K. Chesterton, The Book of Job" (1907; repr. in G. K. Chesterton, Selected Essurs. London: 
Methuen & Co Ltd, 1949), p. 96. 
68 Peter Kreeft, Three Philosophies of Life (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), p. 61. 
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each other. -69 Later on in his introduction to the Book of Job, Chesterton expands upon 
his criticism of the answers given by Job friends. He explains: 
The mechanical optimist endeavours to justify the universe avowedly upon the 
ground that it is a rational and constructive pattern. He points out that the tine 
thing about the world is that it can all be explained. That is one point, if I may 
put it so, on which God, in return, is explicit to the point of violence. God says, 
in effect, that if there is one fine thing about the world, as far as men are 
concerned, it is that it cannot be explained... God will make Job see a startling 
universe if He can only do it by making Job see an idiotic universe. 70 
Brian Home concurs with Chesterton's view that the meaning of Job defies 
explanation. He tells us that, "there is no `solution', there is only submission to the 
inexplicable facts. "" 
Chesterton did not think that the mystery in the Book of Job should be regarded as a 
failure on the part of theism. Instead he viewed it as something positive. There ý'w ere a 
number of reasons for this. To begin with, an element of mystery is central to a proper 
understanding of faith. Chesterton expanded on this early on in his writings: 
It is significant that in the greatest religious poem existent, the Book of 'Job. the 
argument which convinces the infidel is not (as has been represented by the 
merely rational religionism of the eighteenth century) a picture of the ordered 
beneficence of the Creation; but, on the contrary, a picture of the huge and 
undecipherable unreason of it. `Hast Thou sent the rain upon the desert where 72 
no man is? ' This simple sense of wonder... is the basis of spirituality... 
(Chesterton's comment here is an attack on rationalism rather than rational thought. a 
distinction that he made clear in Orthodoxy - "Chapter 2: The Maniac". ) 
According to Chesterton, the mystery of suffering also has a paradoxical ability to offer 
comfort to those who are suffering: "It is the lesson of the whole work that man is most 
69 Chesterton, "The Book of Job", Selected Essays, p. 98. 
"' Ibid., p. 101. For a more detailed examination of Chesterton's belief in the startling nature of the 
universe, see my discussion of the grotesque in chapter four. 
'' Brian Horne, Imagining Evil, (London: Darton Longman & Todd Ltd, 1996), p. 21. 
72 G. K. Chesterton, The Defendant (1901: repr. London. J. M. Dent & Co Ltd. 1918), pp. 69-70. 
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comforted by paradoxes... I need not suggest what a high and strange history a" aited 
this paradox of the best man in the worst fortune. I need not say that in the freest and 
most philosophical sense there is one Old Testament figure who is truly a type: or say 
what is pre-figured in the wounds of Job. "73 Chesterton's argument here hints at a more 
mystical theodicy in which suffering is an honour that allows the protagonist to share in 
the sufferings of Christ and thereby experience something of the Divine. Chesterton 
only makes this suggestion tentatively, aware perhaps of the way in which it threatens 
to confuse our notion of what goodness actually entails. Nevertheless, we find the same 
idea repeated in a separate discussion of the Book of Job: "From it the modern Christian 
may with astonishment learn Christianity; learn, that is, that mystery of suffering may 
be a strange honour and not a vulgar punishment: that the King may be conferring a 
decoration when he pins the man on the cross as much as when pins the cross on the 
" 74 man. 
Another factor behind Chesterton's interest in the mystery of suffering was the hope 
that he found within it. He believed that an acceptance of life's mysteries released us 
from the pressure of having to answer all of life's difficulties. This was one reason that 
led him to embrace Christianity: For mysticism, and mysticism alone, has kept men 
sane from the beginning of the world. All the straight roads of logic lead to some 
Bedlam, to Anarchism or to passive obedience, to treating the universe as a clockwork 
of matter or else as a delusion of the mind. It is only the Mystic, the man who accepts 
the contradictions, who can laugh and walk easily through the world. '"'' Thus 
Chesterton confidently assures us that the mystery contained in the Book q11 Job can 
give hope to individuals struggling with suffering: "Indeed the Book of Job avowedly 
only answers mystery with mystery. Job is comforted with riddles; but he is 
comforted. , 76 
'' Chesterton, "The Book of Job", Selected Essays, pp. 103-4. 
74 Chesterton, "On Long Speeches and Truth", The Illustrated London News (1906, repr. Collected 
11'orks [ "olume 27: The Illustrated London News 190.5-190 7), p. 132. 
'' G. K. Chesterton, "Why I Believe in Christianity" (Repr. The Chesterton Review Vol. 10 No. 4. 
November 1984), p. 372- 
76 Chesterton, The Everlasting Man, p. 98. 
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Although God's answer to Job is mysterious, the fact that he answers at all suggests 
that there is an answer to the problem of suffering, even if Job does not know what it is: 
For when he who doubts can only say `I do not understand', it is true that he who 
knows can only reply or repeat `You do not understand'. And under that rebuke there is 
always a sudden hope in the heart; and the sense of something that would be worth 
understanding. "77 God's response to Job is not that an answer does not exist, but that 
Job is not able to understand it. The recognition of God as an omnipotent, omniscient 
being, allowed Chesterton to trust Him for the things that he did not understand. 
Chesterton wrote: "I believe that mystical providences are philosophically possible: and 
have the less need to dogmatise either way about any detailed occasion. It is only the 
man who does not believe in miracles who need lash himself into an excitement when 
he hears of one. "78 
Integrating The Book Of Job With The Free Will Defence 
The theists' appeal to mystery can easily be seen as an attempt to avoid the real 
problem of suffering. Chesterton's tentative suggestion that suffering is not as terrible 
as it seems (because it allows the individual to experience the Divine) is a prime 
example of this. By declaring suffering to be a mystery that is actually good (if 
properly understood), Chesterton threatens to treat it as an illusion. John Stuart Mill 
was particularly scathing of this approach: "I will call no being good, who is not what I 
mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence 
me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go. "79 
Throughout his writings, Chesterton was quick to avoid any attempt to explain 
everything in terms of mystery. This was clear in chapter five when I noted his desire to 
explain naturally anything that could be explained naturally. Although Chesterton 
Ibid., p. 98. 
78 Chesterton, "Preface", to Baverstock, The Unscathed Crucifix, pp. 8-9. It is important that 
Chesterton's use of the word 'providence' is understood in a similar manner to Aquinas' conception of 
the doctrine. (See my earlier discussion in this chapter. ) 
John Stuart Mill, "Mr Mansel on the Limits of Religious Thought" (1865; repr. in Nelson Pike. ed., 
God and Evil: Readings on the Theological Problem of Evil. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc. 1964). p. 43. 
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believed that mystery was an important and valid part of any theodicy, he recognised 
that it needed to accompany a more reasoned explanation. This was how he understood 
the Book of Job: The refusal of God to explain His design is itself a burning hint of 
1-lis design. "80 Had the Book of Job wanted to suggest that the suffering of the innocent 
was a complete mystery, it would surely have left Job's questioning of God 
unanswered. The fact that God responds to Job is therefore significant: The point of 
what God says, though, is not really much to do with what he says, but lies in his 
saying anything at all. God has made explicit his relationship with Job. and by 
implication with the rest of humanity as well... 81 
Furthermore, the Book of Job defends the right of man to question God. God rebukes 
the assumptions implicit in Job's questions, rather than the questions themselves. As 
Chesterton argued: He [God] is quite willing to be prosecuted. He only asks for the 
right which every prosecuted person possesses; He asks to be allowed to cross-examine 
the witness for the prosecution. , 82 God does not attack the concept of theodicy per se, 
but rather the particular theodicy that Job and his friends present to Him. 83 Chesterton's 
recognition of this can be seen in his admiration of Shakespeare's tragedy. King Lear. 
Chesterton says of Lear: "... he affirms in the face of the most appalling self- 
knowledge, clear and blasting as the lightning, that his sufferings must still be greater 
than his sins. It is possibly the most tremendous thing a man ever said; whether or not 
"84 any man had the right to say it. It would be hard to beat it even in the Book of Job. 
The way in which Chesterton combined the mystery of suffering with mankind's right 
to present a theodicy and question God, is visible in the concluding chapters of The 
Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. Various critics have noted the correlation 
80 Chesterton, "The Book of Job", Selected Essays, p. 100. 
81 Leaman, Evil and Suffering in Jewish Philosophy, p. 22. 
82 Chesterton, "The Book of Job", Selected Essays, p. 99. 
83 Gary Wills fails to grasp this distinction when he discusses the Book of Job in his 
introduction to an 
edition of The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare: "The author of God's speeches 
in the Book c? / Job 
was the first person we know of to realize that the only theology worth 
having is the one that forsxN ears 
theodic,,. " In Gary Wills, "Introduction", to G. K. Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: .4 
Nightmare 
(New York: Sheed & Ward, 1975), p. 12. 
G. K. Chesterton, "The Tragedy of King Lear", in The Spice of Life and Other Essays (Beaconsfield: 
Darwen Finlayson, 1964), p. 56. 
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between the final section of this novel and the Book of Job. 85 In his discussion of The 
Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, Ian Boyd suggests that: "It may be read in the 
light of the dedicatory poem as a kind of extended commentary on the Book of Job... '... 
Stephen Medcalf has also written on the link between the two works, suggesting that 
seven points made in Chesterton's introduction to the Book of Job, "seem to be 
systematically woven into the pattern of the last four chapters of The Alan who 11-as 
Thursday. "87 These are as follows: First, Job asks God what His purpose is, and the six 
detectives ask Sunday the same question. Second, both God and Sunday answer \\ ith 
riddles. 88 Third, both Job and Syme are comforted by the riddles they hear. Fourth. both 
God and Sunday point out the panorama of creation to their questioners. Fifth, Medcalf 
suggest that the secret of both stories is joy. Sixth, both stories suggest that the 
protagonists suffer because they are the best of men rather than the worst of men. 
Finally, both stories link the suffering of the protagonists to the suffering of Christ. 
This final point that Medcalf identifies is particularly interesting in terms of The J1an 
who was Thursday: A Nightmare. Although, Sunday does not represent the Christian 
God, he clearly symbolises something of the Divine in the novel. When Syme asks the 
question, `have you ever suffered? ', he receives the following response: As he gazed, 
the great face grew to an awful size, grew larger than the colossal mask of Memnon, 
85 Gary Wills goes even further than this in his introduction to the novel: "A recent biographer of 
Chesterton says there are `direct references' to the Book of Job in the novel's last scene. Actually. the 
references are everywhere. " In Wills, "Introduction", The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. p. 9. 
Also see the comments by Denis Conlon on the link between the Book of Job and The Man who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare in his introduction to G. K. Chesterton, Collected Works Volume 6: The Man who 
was Thursday, The Club of Queer Trades, Napoleon of Notting Hill, The Ball and the Cross (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), pp. 40-5. 
86 Ian Boyd, The Novels of C. K. Chesterton: A Study in Art and Propaganda (London: Paul Elek Books 
Ltd, 1975), p. 51. 
87 Stephen Medcalf, "Introduction" to G. K. Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: .4 
Nightmare 
(1908; repr. Oxford: World's Classics, 1996), p. xxv. For an earlier comment by Medcalf on the link 
between the two books, see his essay, "The Achievement of G. K. Chesterton" in John Sullivan, ed.. C. K. 
Chesterton: A Centenary Appraisal (London: Paul Elek Books, 1974), p. 105. 
8S In connection with this second point, Gary Wills speculates on the relationship between Sunday's 
escape on the elephant, and God's answer to Job: "Behemoth, in the Bible that Chesterton grew up \% ith. 
was translated on the assumption that he was a hippopotamus. But in the Catholic bible which his brother 
and other friends were using by this time, the beast is something more fitted to the story at this point: an 
elephant. The effrontery of this last apparition is Chesterton's slyest way of establishing that Sunday is 
Job's riddling God. " In Wills, "Introduction", The Man who was Thursday: .4 
Nightmare, p. 13. In k ieww 
of Wills' suggestion, it is interesting to note that Aquinas identified the Behemoth as an elephant. See 
John E. Hartley, The Book ofJob: The New International Commentary on the Old Testament (Michi`gan: 
Eerdmans, 1988), p. 52-3). 
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w\ hich had made him scream as a child. It grew larger and larger. filling the whole "kv, 
then everything went black. Only in the blackness before it entirely destroyed his brain 
he seemed to hear a distant voice saying a common-place text that he had heard 
somewhere, Can ye drink of the cup that I drink of? "'89 This allusion to the suffering 
of Christ, 90 seems to imply that Chesterton thought part of the solution to suffering 
might be found in the way that God identifies with our suffering. 
This has once again become an area of major discussion in contemporary philosophical 
theology. In the aftermath of Jürgen Moltmann (1926-), theologians have asked two 
questions regarding the suffering of God. The first concerns God's ability to suffer: 
The belief that God is a suffering God has become compelling for recent theology. 
Centuries of traditional belief about the impassability and the immutability of God have 
been overturned in our age, though a few pioneers signalled this revolution in our 
concept of God during the upheavals of nineteenth-century thought. "`)' The second 
question follows on from the first - if God can share in our sufferings, does this provide 
an answer to the problem of evil? Paul Fiddes clearly thinks that it does, although a 
number of people would disagree with him on this matter. He declares: "Suffering \\ ill 
always have a dimension of mystery, as the Book of Job assures us, but a great deal of 
light is nevertheless cast by the affirmation that God suffers with humanity. 
While Chesterton's reference to the suffering of Christ in The Man who was Thursday,. 
i Nightmare is interesting, I would suggest that it is a speculative thought rather than a 
serious statement of his theological position. If Chesterton had wanted to make serious 
theological statements on the nature of God in the novel, he would surely have made 
the character of Sunday less ambiguous. In addition, the subject of God's suffering is 
not something that he discusses to any significant degree elsewhere in his writings. 
Finally, it should also be remembered that Chesterton's affinity with Aquinas would 
8" Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 162. 
90 See Mark: 10: 38: "Jesus said. Can you drink the cup I drink...? "' (New International Version). 
' Pail Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 16. 
, Ibid., p. 31. Fiddes not only argues that the suffering of God is a comfort to those that are suffering 
but also that it justifies His decision to give us the fi-ee will that brought evil into the world: "Onl\ the 
fact that God himself suffers can make credible the tracing of suffering to the free will of the creation. 
This alone makes credible the creation of the world as an act of love. " (pp. 4-5). 
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surely have made him reluctant to part company with Aquinas' teachings on the 
immutability and impassability of God. 
The final chapter of The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare finds Svme and his 
companions wrestling with the question of why they had to suffer. In vvie« of the 
obvious autobiographical elements within the novel, 93 the answers that Svme discovers 
to this question can be seen to mirror those discovered by the young Chesterton. The 
answer to suffering that Chesterton discovers in The Man who was Thursdal%: A 
Nightmare, provides us with a paradigm of how the Free Will Defence can be 
combined with the mystery that we find in the Book of Job. Part of the answer clearly 
confirms the Free Will Defence as a theodicy. 94 Syme discovers that this is a world 
where men act freely and live with the consequences of their actions. He even thanks 
Sunday for this freedom: "I am grateful to you... for many a fine scamper and free 
fight. "95 Syme also discovers that the good in the world outweighs the bad, and that the 
cost of man's freedom is worthwhile. This is the `good news' with which he departs 
from the nightmare. At the close of the novel, we read that Syme was, "in possession of 
some impossible good news". 96 This theodicy provides him with the foundation 
required to trust God for that which he does not fully understand. As Chesterton said of 
Job: "Job does not in any sense look at life in a gloomy way... He wishes the universe 
to justify itself, not because he wishes it to be caught out, but because he really wishes 
it to be justified. "97 
Because Syme is confident that there is a sufficient reason to believe that the problem 
of evil has an explanation, he feels able to offer a speculative defence in response to 
other questions concerning evil. Hence his suggestion that humanity has to suffer so 
that it can, "buy the right to say to this accuser [Satan], 'We also have suffered' . "98 
Similarly, although the Free Will Defence can only explain part of the problem of evil 
`'' This is made explicit by Chesterton's dedication to E. C. Bentley at the start of the novel. I have already 
discussed this point in some detail in chapter six. 
94 By this I mean an explanation of evil that is highly probable in terms of theism. 
94; Chesterton, The Alan who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 160. 
96 Ibid., p. 163. 
`'- Chesterton, "The Book of Job". Selected Essays, p. 97. 
98 Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday:. -] Nightmare, p. 162. 
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with any degree of certainty in terms of theism; this provides it with the necessary 
foundation to offer more speculative solutions to other parts of the problem of evil As 
the Free Will Defence moves from theodicy to defence, it needs only to offer solutions 
that are `true for all anyone knows'. In this way, it can be combined with the mystery 
that we find in the Book of Job. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have continued my examination of Chesterton and the Free Will 
Defence by looking at the problem of suffering. The Free Will Defence provides a 
successful theodicy in response to some of the questions that accompany suffering. In a 
world that operates according to numerous causal laws, it can be argued that some 
suffering is the result of chance. Furthermore, the presence of free moral agents in such 
a world, who freely choose to sin, explains a considerable amount of the suffering that 
occurs. This obviously raises the question of how God has acted in response to 
suffering. Christianity argues that Jesus Christ provides the ultimate answer to sin: 
however, despite Chesterton's firm commitment to this belief, we saw that he failed to 
explain it to any significant degree. 
Although the Free Will Defence explains a great deal, it also leaves a great deal 
unexplained. The mystery that accompanies suffering is eloquently expressed in the 
Book of Job, a tale which Chesterton often commented upon. Yet Chesterton held both 
viewpoints: suggesting that the problem of evil could be answered, while also believing 
that suffering was a mystery. At first this appears to be a contradictory position. In 
reality, it is another of the paradoxes for which Chesterton is so well known. 99 The 
coherence of this position can be seen in The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. In 
the face of unexplained suffering, the Free Will Defence turns from being a `theodicy" 
into a `defence'. It respects the mystery of suffering by recognising that we do not 
know all of the answers. At the same time, it is not just wishful thinking, because it 
99 For an interesting discussion of Chesterton and paradox, see Hugh Kenner's study. Paradox in 
Chesterton. 
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maintains its intellectual coherence, and is based on the solid foundation provided by 
the initial theodicy. 
Chesterton recognised that life could only be explained by taking this middle ground 
between reason and mystery. He declared: "The real trouble with this world of ours is 
not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The 
commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. " °° In terms of 
suffering, he adapted the Free Will Defence to provide an explanation that respected the 
numerous problems involved. In doing so, Chesterton heeds the warning given by his 
fictional character, Gabriel Gale: "Oh, I know that people have written all kinds of cant 
and false comfort about the cause of evil; and of why there is pain in the world. God 
forbid that we should add ourselves to such a chattering monkey-house of moralists. " 1o 
110 Chesterton, Orthodoxy, p. 146. 
G. K. Chesterton, The Poet and the Lunatics (1929; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson, 1962). p. 91. 
194 
Chapter 9: In Conclusion 
After establishing my methodological approach in chapter two, I went on to look at 
Chesterton's understanding of the nature of evil in chapter three. It was essential that 
our first question concerning evil related to its nature. Unfortunately, this is a point that 
seems to have been forgotten by many contemporary thinkers writing on the subject. 1I 
began the chapter by looking at the connection between Aquinas and Chesterton. which 
provided a useful focus for the analysis of Chesterton's theology. Chesterton did not 
become a Thomist by reading Aquinas, or any of the other writers in that tradition. 
Instead, he discovered that the philosophical position he had come to as a young elan 
had a strong affinity with Thomism, and it is this that led Chesterton to identify 
increasingly with Aquinas. Having established this connection, we saw how Chesterton 
followed Aquinas (and Augustine) in describing evil as a privation, or deficiency. This 
understanding of the nature of evil was illustrated in the Father Brown stories. 
One of the traditional difficulties of the theory of privation is the problem of how one 
imagines or depicts the `absence of a particular good'. In response to this difficult} . the 
next three chapters went on to consider Chesterton's use of the grotesque as a technique 
for representing evil in his fiction. The subject of the grotesque was introduced in 
chapter four. As the grotesque is notoriously difficult to define, the first part of the 
chapter was given over to looking at the theoretical work that exists on the subject, 
while the second part went on to look at the different ways in which Chesterton 
understood the grotesque. In response to other nineteenth-century thinkers ý, w ho 
focussed on the `beautiful,, Chesterton focussed on the concept of the grotesque. and 
used it as a synonym for the `ugly'. This raised some important theological concerns, 
which were explained by Chesterton's tendency to use words and ideas in their 
broadest possible sense. Chesterton also viewed the grotesque as a technique for 
reawakening wonder. Both uses of the term `grotesque' constituted an attempt to assert 
the -value of existence in an age (i. e. decadence) that had grown tired of it. The third 
am thinking here about a number of philosophers of religion, who discuss the problem of evil NN 
ithout 




function of Chesterton's grotesque was to represent evil. This was further explored in 
the two chapters that followed. 
Chapter five made a distinction between the traditional grotesque (involving an external 
embodiment of evil), and the modern grotesque (involving an internalised evil). 
Although such a distinction is not absolute, it remains a useful means of describing the 
transition that occurred during the nineteenth century in the way that evil was 
represented. By the early-twentieth century, the representation of evil had been largely 
internalised. Chesterton's reputation as a traditionalist would naturally lead us to expect 
him to use the traditional grotesque, despite the period in which he wrote. Yet although 
examples of the traditional grotesque can be found in his work, they are surprisingly 
rare. The rest of chapter five sought to explain this, with reference to Chesterton's 
belief in privation, and his desire to relate to the fears of his age. Chapter six 
subsequently examined the modern grotesque. Chesterton did not think that an 
internalised evil was any less real or terrifying than an external embodiment of evil. In 
explaining this, I took a closer look at the rise of Modernism and the encounter that 
Chesterton had with it during the 1890's. His vision of a terrifying nothingness is 
powerfully communicated in the novel, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightniare, 
which became the focus of my discussion in this chapter. 
Having acknowledged the reality of evil, Chesterton was left with the same 
predicament that has challenged thinkers across the ages: How and why does a loving 
God permit evil to exist in the world? This was the subject of chapters seven and eight. 
In chapter seven, I looked at the Free Will Defence as a possible response to the 
problem of evil. The concept of free will was an important one for Chesterton. as , vas 
the related doctrine of the Fall of man, which throws into high relief the theological 
problem of freedom. Chesterton's use of the Free Will Defence was most explicit in his 
play The Surprise. In this play, Chesterton defended God's decision to give mankind 
the freedom that brought evil into the world. 
Although the Free Will Defence accounts for the origin of evil into the world, it does 
not explain why God allows it to remain. The conclusion of The Surprise begins to 
address this issue. Furthermore, it can be argued that God is unable to prevent every' 
instance of evil without making our free will meaningless. However. this does not alter 
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the fact that God can presumably prevent some of the suffering that exists in the world 
without compromising our free will. The question of suffering was the focus of chapter 
eight. Chesterton's interest in this matter is reflected by his fascination with the Book of 
Job. It was suggested that while the Free Will Defence can be extended to deal with 
many of the questions surrounding suffering, an element of mystery remains. I 
concluded this chapter by suggesting that Chesterton's response to suffering combined 
both mystery and theodicy; and that this integrated approach can be seen in his novel, 
The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. 
In his discussion of Chesterton's alleged optimism, Michael Mason writes: .. His 
innocence was achieved not basically at the cost of experience but through it - as seems 
the case with not a few English artists. There was a real underside of darkness and 
violence to his work; and the horror of everything which he would have associated with 
the devil is, in his artistic vision, none the less sinister for being formulated in the 
bright colours and simple shapes of his `peasant art'. "2 Many of Chesterton's critics 
and biographers have highlighted the effect of his own experiences upon his subsequent 
understanding of evil. Of particular importance is the crisis that he went through during 
the 1890's at the Slade School of Art: `'His time there, the unhappiest and most 
troubled in his life, was of great significance in the development of his thought. A 
number of experiences, both intellectual and emotional convinced him of the reality' of 
evil. ,3 
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to explain how Chesterton's concept of evil 
complements his "cosmic optimism"4 rather than contradicting it. ' I will argue that 
supporting Chesterton's optimism, is a solid metaphysical foundation that takes full 
2 Michael Mason, The Centre of Hilarity (London: Sheed & Ward, 1959), p. 240. 
John Coates, Chesterton and the Edwardian Cultural Crisis (Hull: Hull University Press, 1984). pp. 5- 
6. Chesterton's period at The Slade is a subject that I have already discussed, both in the introduction and 
in my discussion of The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare in chapter six. 
Graham Greene, "G. K. Chesterton" in D. J. Conlon, ed., G. K. Chesterton: A Half Century of' I ie»'s 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 60. 
The word -optimism' can have a number of possible meanings. At times, Chesterton happily accepts 
the term as an accurate description of his particular style of writing. At other times, he attacks sonne of 
his contemporaries for their unthinking optimism. When I use the term in this chapter, I mean aý 
ieý% of 
life that sees a greater amount of good in the world than bad. As this chapter progresses. I will explain 
this further, and show why such an interpretation is appropriate in this context. 
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account of the reality of evil. This is in contrast to the more existential explanations 
offered by some Chesterton critics such as Maurice Evans. Evans writes: "This is the 
Chestertonian answer to the pessimists. If the world seems evil and we cannot 
understand it, we must yet cling to our faith and belief in common things. "6 As the rest 
of this chapter will go on to demonstrate, Evans misunderstands Chesterton on this 
point. 
The Value Of Existence 
When Chesterton emerged from his period of sceptical pessimism, he concluded that 
philosophy should begin by assuming the existence of an objective reality. Any attempt 
to prove the existence of a reality outside of our own thinking was doomed to end in 
scepticism and/or solipsism. Chesterton explained that this was the reason behind 
Aquinas' failure to begin his philosophy by considering this issue: The answer is that 
Thomas Aquinas recognised instantly, what so many modern sceptics have begun to 
suspect rather laboriously, that a man must either answer that question in the 
affirmative, or else never answer any question; never ask any question; never even exist 
intellectually, to answer or to ask. "7 I looked at the affinity between Chesterton and 
Aquinas in chapter three. The primacy of existence (or being) is one area in which the 
two thinkers share a great deal in common. Chesterton recognised the similarity in his 
Autobiography: "But I was all groping and groaning and travailing with an inchoate 
and half baked philosophy of my own... in the form that where there is anything there is 
God... but I should have been amazed to know how near in some ways was my 
"8 Anything to the Ens of St Thomas Aquinas. 
Aquinas thought that existence was something that people intuitively recognised: 
"According to Jacques Maritain and Hans Urs von Balthasar, two leading interpreters 
of St Thomas in the twentieth century, we know being from the most basic human 
Maurice Evans, G. K. Chesterton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), pp. 84-s 
G. K. Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas (1933; repr. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938), p. 176. 
G. K. Chesterton, Autobiogruph. v (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 151. The word 'Ens' is 
normally translated as `being'. 
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experience... This is a fundamental human intuition (immediate knowledge, which no 
one can prove for us because we know it for ourselves)... "9 Another description of this 
fundamental human intuition is what Chesterton liked to call common sense: To this 
question is there anything? ' St Thomas begins by answering `Yes': if he began by 
answering `No', it would not be the beginning, but the end. That is what some of us call 
common sense. " 10 
In his book on Aquinas, Francis Klauder tells us: "Included in the understanding of 
being as existing there is the realization that `to be' is good: it is good (desirable) to 
be. "' 1 Chesterton had a similar understanding of existence. He came to accept the 
essential goodness of existence by recognising that he could not live with an alternative 
conclusion. This can be seen in Manalive, a book which "illustrates the raucous love of 
life which defines the creed of G. K. Chesterton". ' 2 During the trial of Innocent Smith, 
the court recalls his encounter with pessimism while at Brakespeare College, 
Cambridge. When Innocent Smith challenges his own pessimism and that of Dr 
Emerson Eames, a Schopenhauer enthusiast, 13 the reader recalls Chesterton' s own 
struggle at Slade: 
For to him, and nearly all the educated youth of that epoch, the stars were cruel 
things. . . they uncovered the nakedness of nature; they were a glimpse of the iron wheels and pulleys behind the scenes. For the young men of that sad time 
thought that the god always comes from the machine. They did not know that in 
reality the machine only comes from the god. In short, they were all pessimists, 
and starlight was atrocious to them - atrocious because it was true. All their 
universe was black with white spots. '4 
9 Francis J. Klauder, A Philosophy Rooted in Love: The Dominant Themes in the Perennial Philosophy c? 1 
St Thomas Aquinas (Maryland: University Press of America, 1994), p. 10. 
"' Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas, p. 177. In his discussion of Chesterton's philosophy, Quentin Lauer 
tells us: "It would seem that the best way to characterize G. K. Chesterton's thought is to recognise it as 
pre-eminently `common sense, ' which he himself calls `that instinct for the probable'... " in Quentin 
Lauer, G. K. Chesterton: Philosopher without Portfolio (New York: Fordham University Press, 1991). p. 
11. 
Klauder, A Philosophy Rooted in Love, p. 9. 
Thomas C. Peters, Battling for the Modern Mind: A Beginner's Chesterton (St Louis: Concordia 
Publishing House, 1994), p. 29. 
1' For a more detailed look at Chesterton's reading of Schopenhauer. see my comments in chapter si\. 
14 Chesterton, Manalivc'. (1912: repr. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1947), p. 105. 
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Innocent Smith decides to confront Dr Eames for a final showdown. "because I am 
coming to the conclusion that existence is really too rotten. " 1ý Dr Eames' response is 
extremely bleak: "... the vulgar people want to enjoy life just as they want to enjoy gin 
- because they are too stupid to see that they are paying too big a price for it. That they 
never find happiness - that they don't even know how to look for it - is proved by the 
paralysing clumsiness and ugliness of everything they do. Their discordant colours are 
cries of pain. "' 6 Yet when Innocent Smith threatens Dr Eames with death, the professor 
soon changes his mind as to the value of existence. He cannot live with the logical 
conclusion of his professed pessimism. ' 7 
Chesterton's use of colour as a metaphor for the pain of humanity is interesting. In 
chapter two, I noted Chesterton's symbolic use of colour in The Napoleon of'Nolting 
Hill. However, the symbolic use of colour is not peculiar to that book. Chesterton 
regularly used colours to indicate the general mood or happiness of the characters 
within his tales. The brighter and more varied the colours, the greater the level of 
happiness and hope. This idea is verbalised in Chesterton's introduction to Samuel 
Johnson's, The History of Rasselas. Discussing the eighteenth century, Chesterton 
declared: "... some of its very greatest men, like Johnson and even Swift. were 
profoundly religious. But their religion had not enough positive colour and therefore 
not enough positive joy... 18 Chesterton also observed the lack of colour in the work of 
many modernists: 
Just before the war all the arts and philosophies were fading into a sort of 
featureless fog owing to this ceaseless multiplication of mere innovation 
without definition... The artist had lost his original claim on our revolutionary 
sympathy, as well as losing many other things, such as his time, his humility 
', Ibid. p. 106. An earlier version of this incident can be found in "The Man With Two Legs". a story that 
Chesterton wrote during the 1890's. See G. K. Chesterton, Collected Works l olume 14. - 
Short Stork's, 
Fairy Tales, Mystery Stories (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). 
'6 Ibid., p. 107. 
'- In Manalive, Chesterton makes it clear that this intuition of the value of existence is not to 
be confused 
ith Schopenhauer's idea of the will to live (p. 113). People's inability to live with the logical conclusion 
of their beliefs is a theme that Chesterton returns to throughout 
his fiction. One particularly chilling 
example can be found in "When Doctors Agree" in G. K. Chesterton, 
The Paradoxes of Mr Pond (19317). 
Is G. K. Chesterton "Introduction" to Dr. Johnson, The Histori= of Rasselas (Repr. London: J. M. Dent 
& 
Sons Ltd, 1926), p. x. 
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and his sense of humour; but perhaps his most appalling loss is that he has lost 
his original realisation of the existence of red and green. 19 
The recognition that existence is essentially good is the "impossible good newwws*'-" with 
which Syme emerges from the nightmare in The Man who was Thurscdal'. - A Nightmare. 
In Manalive, the transition from pessimism to optimism is symbolised by a change in 
colour. The colours become brighter as the characters begin to discover the joy and 
wonder of life. One example occurs when Innocent Smith and Dr Eames reject their 
pessimism in favour of a new hope in the meaning of life: 
As he [Smith] spoke the sun rose. It seemed to put colour into everything. with 
the rapidity of a lightning artist. A fleet of little clouds sailing across the sky 
changed from pigeon-grey to pink. All over the little academic town the tops of 
different buildings took on different tints: here the sun would pick out the green 
enamel on a pinnacle, there the scarlet tiles of a villa; here the copper ornament 
on some artistic shop, and there the sea-blue slates of some old and steep church 
roof. All these coloured crests seemed to have something oddly individual and 
significant about them... 21 
A few pages later, Innocent Smith reminds Dr Eames of the transformation that he has 
undergone: "What you knew when you sat on that damned gargoyle was that the ý\ orld, 
when all is said and done, is a wonderful and beautiful place; I know it, because I knew 
"22 it at the same minute. I saw the grey clouds turn pink... 
Chesterton's intuitive recognition of the goodness of existence enters into a long 
philosophical tradition that involves Aquinas. 23 As Leo Elders explains: The concept 
of ontological goodness goes back to Plato and Aristotle. " 
24 The idea that being and 
19 G. K. Chesterton, The Coloured Lands (London: Sheed & Ward, 1938), p. 14. (Quoted by Maisie Ward 
in her introduction to this book. ) 
2° G. K. Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare (1908; repr. Oxford: World's Classics, 
I996), p. 163. 
Chesterton, Manulive, pp. 109-10. 
2 Ibid., p. 113. 
For an interesting collection of essays that examine various philosophical positions \ý 
ithin this 
tradition, see Scott MacDonald, ed., Being and Goodness: The Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and 
Philosophical Theology' (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
2' Leo J. Elders, The Metaphysics of Being of St Thomas Aquinas: in a Historical Perspective (Trans. Dr 
John Dudley, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993), p. 113. 
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goodness are necessarily connected is a view that the early church embraced: "Frone the 
early beginnings of Church Christian thinkers held without hesitation that everythinu 
that exists is good. , 25 Christianity argues that all things are created by God. \\ ho is 
good. It is only one small step to the conclusion that, in view of this, existence itself 
must be good. This is the same reasoning that led to the description of evil as a 
privation. 
The fact that existence can be assumed, and that it is essentially good, leads one to a 
embrace an optimistic view of life. This is presumably what Gary Wills means when he 
tells us that, "... Chesterton saw, from an independent standpoint, the existential core of 
Thomas' thought... "26 If existence is fundamentally a good thing, then we have 
something to be grateful for. This sense of gratitude should thus pervade every aspect 
of our lives. Chesterton talked about this philosophy of life as involving a "minimum of 
gratitude". 27 A number of critics have commented upon this, including Montague 
Brown: "In all of Chesterton's writing, there is a spirit of surprise and admiration and 
especially of grateful thanksgiving for the divine gift of existence... "28 
If we have something to be grateful for, then it follows that we should have someone to 
whom we can direct our gratitude. Aidan Nichols suggests that this constitutes a novel 
argument for the existence of God: "According to Chesterton, Joy as a response to 
being is the principal signal of transcendence which human experience offers, the most 
persistent and eloquent of what the sociologist of religion, Peter Berger, has called 
`rumours of angels'. "29 This argument is a variation on the arguments from causality 
that Aquinas offers among his Five Ways for defending the rationality of belief in the 
I Ibid., p. 1 16. Elders gives further details in his book, with examples from Origen to Albert the Great 
(pp. 116-8). Scott MacDonald makes a similar observation in his introductory chapter to MacDonald. ed., 
Being and Goodness, pp. 1-2. 
26 Gary Wills, Chesterton: Man and Mask (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), p. 169. 
Chesterton, -1 utobiographyy, p. 91. 
Montague Brown, "The Philosophical Centre of Chesterton's Orthodoxy", The Chesterton Revieii Vol. 
14 No. 2 (May 1988), p. 219. 
"' Aidan Nichols, "G. K. Chesterton's Argument for The Existence of God", The Chesterton Review Vol. 
12 No. 1 (February 1986). p. 63. 
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existence of God. 30 Chesterton implicitly acknowledges this connection in his book on 
Aquinas when he discusses Aquinas' philosophy of Being: "Looking at Being as it is 
now, as the baby looks at the grass, we see a second thing about it: in quite popular 
language, it looks secondary and dependent. Existence exists; but it is not sufficiently7 
self-existent; and would never become so merely by going on existing. "3 
According to Chesterton, existence also provides the rationale for knowledge. Rather 
than ignoring the intellect, his optimism became the basis for all intellectual thought: 
"[Chesterton's] sense of wonder about nature has, above all, to do with his habitual 
quest not to gape at, or to have, soothing feelings about the world, but rather to 
understand it. Wonder to him is not solely a feeling or a passion, an emotional shock of 
recognition before the world; but it is also a means to knowledge. ' "3 
Remembering The Value Of Existence 
The doctrine of privation enabled Chesterton to combine his belief in the goodness of 
existence with a recognition of the reality of evil. This is how he explained his 
optimism: "What I meant was that our attitude towards existence, if we have suffered 
deprivation, must always be conditioned by the fact that deprivation implies that 
existence has given us something of immense value. To say that we have lost in the 
lottery of existence is to say that we have gained: for existence gives us our money 
beforehand. "33 This argument is vital if we are to understand correctly the way in which 
Chesterton reconciled his optimistic outlook with the evil that he found in the world. 
He did not deny the reality of evil and suffering in the world. He merely pointed out 
that such events were parasitic on the essential goodness of existence. This is the 
See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Part 1, Question 2, Article 3 (Vol. 1, Trans. English 
Dominican Fathers, London: Burns & Oates, 1947), pp. 13-4. 
Chesterton, St Thomas Aquinas, p. 206. 
Richard Harp, "Orthodox Wonder", The Chesterton Review Vol. 17 No. 1 (February 1991), p. ) 4. 
Harp goes on to note that this understanding of the subject is an old one: "Aristotle 
had stated in the 
,I lc. 'tuphv sits. for example, that 
it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to 
philosophise. "' (p. 34. ) 
G. K. Chesterton, "The Philosophy of Gratitude" (1903; repr. The Chesterton Review Vol. 1 No. 
May 1988), p. 177. 
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realisation that Innocent Smith comes to: "Vomiting as he was with revulsion from the 
pessimism that had quailed under his pistol, he made himself a kind of fanatic of the 
joy of life. . . Though not an optimist in the absurd sense of maintaining that life is all 
beer and skittles, he did really seem to maintain that beer and skittles are the most 
serious part of it. ). )34 It is the same argument that Chesterton offers us in the closing 
pages of Orthodoxy: "Man is more himself, man is more manlike. when joy is the 
fundamental thing in him, and grief the superficial. "35 
In The Centre of Hilarity, Michael Mason makes a similar case for understanding 
Chesterton's optimism in this manner. He writes: "Yet his most violent shudder at that 
privation of being which is evil, is always contained within his amazement that there 
should marvellously be anything in existence at all, in the first place, to be deficient in 
being, in the second. "36 Mason continues with this line of thought later on in his book: 
That it is good to be is the primary truth; the other must be reconciled with it as best 
we may. You can exist without suffering, but you cannot suffer without existing; being 
is primary, suffering is secondary, and it is good to be. "37 
Chesterton's realisation of the necessity of locating evil within this particular context, 
did not mean that he ignored it altogether in his fiction. This is a point that I highlighted 
in chapter two when I looked at the way in which Chesterton departed from Samuel 
Johnson's position regarding the depiction of evil in literature. It also explains why 
Chesterton was keen to reject the optimism of contemporaries such as H. G. Wells. 
Chesterton complained of Wells that: "In his new Utopia he says, for instance, that a 
chief point of the Utopia will be a disbelief in original sin... the weakness of all Utopias 
is this, they take the greatest difficulty of man and assume it to be overcome... "38 
'4 Chesterton, Manalive, pp. 141-2. 
G. K. Chesterton. Orthodoxy (1908; repr. London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1927), p. 294. 
Mason, The Centre of'Hilarity,, p. 177. 
Ibid., p. 221. 
g G. K. Chesterton, Heretics (1905; repr. London: The Bodley Head Ltd, 1928), p. 73. 
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Although Chesterton was acutely aware of the brokeness of this world . 
39 he continued 
to emphasise the doctrine of creation. 40 He did so because he believed that a reflection 
of the original creation could still be seen in this world. This is precisely the theological 
position that Olive Ashley explains to Rosamund Severne in The Return of Don 
Quixote: "You must think me mad to be talking so when you suffer; but it's as if I were 
bursting with news - with something bigger than all the universe of sorrow. Rosamund, 
there really is joy. Not rejoicing, but joy; not rejoicing at this or that; but the thing itself 
we only see reflected in mirrors - which sometimes break .1 "4 
The parasitic nature of evil meant that it constantly threatened to blot out the goodness 
of existence. An example of this are instances of horrendous evil, 42 in which the 
suffering is so great, that it distorts our perception of the world and causes us to doubt 
the essential goodness of existence. Such instances are quite rare within Chesterton's 
fiction, leading some critics to conclude that his appreciation of suffering is limited. 
One of the reasons that we do not find this level of suffering in Chesterton's fiction is 
that his portrayal of character is relatively superficial. Detailed suffering requires a 
depth of character to express it, and this is missing from Chesterton's work. As we 
noted in chapter two, Chesterton's characters were symbols that he was not interested 
in developing to any significant degree. 
The other reason that dramatic instances of suffering are absent from Chesterton 's 
fiction is that he was more concerned with everyday situations, in which, people that 
had grown weary of existence, allowed relatively minor evils to dominate their outlook 
on life. Dr Herbert Warner typifies this danger. He is shown to have become so 'VN eary 
of existence, that he unable to rediscover an appreciation of it. Towards the end of 
See chapters seven and eight. 
40 In his introduction to The Defendant, Chesterton went as far as declaring: "Most probably we are in 
Eden still. It is only our eyes that have changed. " G. K. Chesterton, The Defendant (1901; repr. London: 
J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1918), p. 13. 
''G. K. Chesterton, The Return of Don Quixote (1927; repr. London: Darwen Finlayson Ltd, 1963). pp. 
213-4. 
4' The term `horrendous evil' is defined by Marilyn McCord Adams as referring to, -evils the 
participation in (the doing or suffering of) which gives one reason prima facie to doubt whether one's life 
could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to one on the whole. " See Marilyn McCord Adams, 
"Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God" in Marilyn McCord Adams & Robert MerriheýN Adams, 
ed., The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 211. 
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, Vlunalive, he declares: "Among the hundred flowers of futility on both sides I was 
unable to detect any sort of reason why a lunatic should be allowed to shoot me in the 
back garden. "43 For Dr Warner, evil has become primary, and existence secondar% . 
Michael Moon reflects: We have been sitting with a ghost. Dr Herbert Warner died 
"44 years ago. 
It is in an attempt to maintain his appreciation of existence that Innocent Smith acts in 
the way that he does. Michael Moon explains: "His principle can be quite simply 
stated: he refuses to die while he is still alive. He seeks to remind himself. by ec ry 
electric shock to the intellect, that he is still a man alive, walking on two legs about the 
world. "45 This is why Innocent Smith travels all the way around the world - so that he 
can return home and appreciate his family. It also explains his willingness to enter his 
house like a burglar - so that he learns only to covet his own possessions. Innocent 
Smith describes his philosophy of life in the following terms: "I am always trying to 
forget what I know - and to find out what I don't know. "46 
Innocent Smith constantly tries to view existence from a new perspective. This is the 
explanation that he offers for arriving into his house via the chimney: "To enter a 
modern interior at so strange an angle, by so forgotten a door, was an epoch in ones 
psychology. It was like having found a fourth dimension. , 47 Innocent Smith's comment 
can also be read as a description of Chesterton's fantastic literature in general. 48 The 
door (or chimney) symbolises entry into Chesterton's fantastic world. There is an 
interesting parallel here with The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), 
which begins with a chapter entitled "Story of the Door". In Stevenson's novella, the 
door acts as the point of entry into a fantastic world which, as with Chesterton. is 
located firmly in this world. Chesterton thought that one of the roles of the writer was 
to provide `doors' for his readers. As Innocent Smith declares: "I don't deny that there 
4' Chesterton, Manalive, p. 188. 
44 Ibid., p. 188. 
5 Ibid., pp. 184-5. 
40 Ibid., p. 139. 
4 Ibid., p. 137. 
48 See my discussion of the nature of Chesterton's fantastic literature in chapters four and five. 
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should be priests to remind men that they will one day die. I only say- that at certain 
strange epochs it is necessary to have another kind of priests, called poets, actually to 
remind men that they are not dead yet. "49 
Chesterton thought it important to remember the value of existence by seeing the full 
array of colours within it. Once again, this can be illustrated through the character of 
Innocent Smith. When his wife pretends to be different women to help them maintain a 
sense of romance, the names that she takes on are all different colours . 
50 Not onlti does 
Innocent Smith experience a variety of colour in women; he also experiences the same 
in his wine collection. This is the observation made by Arthur Inglewood: "It was only 
then that he observed that all six bottles had those metallic seals of various tints. and 
seemed to have been chosen solely because they gave the three primary and three 
secondary colours: red, blue, and yellow; green, violet, and orange. -'I Innocent Smith's 
arrival at Beacon House helps its inhabitants to see things in all their colour: The 
colossal clearance which the wind had made of that cloudy sky grew clearer and 
clearer; chamber within chamber seemed to open in heaven. One felt one might at last 
find something lighter than light. In the fullness of this silent effulgence all things 
collected their colours again: the grey trunks turned silver, and the drab gravel gold. "ý2 
The idea that colours symbolise the richness of existence is made explicit in 
Chesterton's short story, "The Coloured Lands". At the beginning of the story, Tommy 
is bored with the world in which he lives. By the time the man with the coloured 
spectacles has finished showing Tommy other possible worlds, without the full range of 
colours, Tommy comes to appreciate the value of this world. The story concludes: 
"... Tommy remained staring at the cottage, with a new look in his eyes. "'3 
Chesterton constantly reminds us that regaining wonder does not entail discovering 
new things in the world. To appreciate existence, we must rediscover what is already 
41' Chesterton, Manalive. p. 142. 
"' Ibid., p. 184. 
s' Ibid., pp. 27-8 
Ibid., p. 15. 
Chesterton, "The Coloured Lands", The Coloured Lands, p. 30. 
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there. This is the point that we saw illustrated in "The Coloured Lands". Tommy begins 
to appreciate existence when he sees the same cottage in a new way. Chesterton argues 
that the cause of our weariness with existence lies with us rather than the vv orld. 
Innocent Smith explains: It was not the house that grew dull, but I that grew dull in 
it. "54 As we saw in chapter six, this was the point on which Chesterton differed from 
the Decadents. Chesterton saw that an eternal search for new things would eventually 
become dull: "It is of the new things that men tire - of fashions and proposals and 
improvements and change. It is the old things that startle and intoxicate. It is the old 
things that are young... There is no worshipper of change who does not feel upon his 
neck the vast weight of the weariness of the universe. But we who do the old things are 
fed by nature with a perpetual infancy. "55 In Manalive, Michael Moon observes the 
way in which Innocent Smith derives his excitement from the ordinary and common 
place rather than the new and sensational: "I have a fancy there's some method in his 
madness. It looks as if he could turn into a sort of wonderland any minute by taking one 
step out of the plain road. Who would have thought of that trapdoor? Who would have 
thought that this cursed colonial claret could taste quite nice among the chimney-pots? 
Perhaps that is the real key of fairyland. "56 
It might be instructive at this point to draw a comparison between Chesterton and the 
existentialists. '? Innocent Smith's desire to, "remind himself, by every electric shock to 
the intellect, that he is still a man alive, "58 has a certain similarity to Dostoevsky's 
underground man, a precursor of existentialism: "... it seems to me that the whole 
business of humanity consists solely in this - that a man should constantly prove to 
51 Chesterton, Manalive, p. 155. 
G. K. Chesterton, The Napoleon of Notting Hill (1904; repr. London: Penguin Books, 1987). p. 153. 
56 Chesterton, Manalive., p. 33. 
'7 Obviously a range of different thinkers are included under the umbrella of existentialism (e. g. 
Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Sartre and Camus). In drawing this parallel, I am not suggesting, that Chesterton 
was directly influenced by these writers, as they generally follow Chesterton rather than preceding 
hire. 
Although Kierkegaard's writings are earlier, they were not translated into English until after Chesterton's 
death. For a more detailed analysis of the development of existentialism in the twentieth century. see 
William McBride, ed., The Development and Meaning of Twentieth-Century Existentialism (Neýý York: 
Garland Publishing, 1997). 
51 Chesterton, Manalive, pp. 184-5. 
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himself that he is a man and not a sprig in a barrel-organ! "59 While a comparison can be 
made between Chesterton and the existentialists, it would be wrong to locate 
Chesterton within the existential tradition. (This is the mistake that Michael Mason 
makes in his otherwise fascinating discussion of Chesterton's use of laughter. 60) The 
existentialists rejected the metaphysical enterprise. This is in contradistinction to the 
metaphysical foundation underlying Innocent Smith's actions: "His eccentricities 
sprang from a static fact of faith, in itself mystical, and even childlike and Christian. "6' 
Existentialism begins with nothing and seeks to authenticate our existence, whereas 
Innocent Smith begins with a belief in the value of existence and simply tries to recall 
this belief throughout his life. John Macquarrie is quick to remind us of this crucial 
distinction: "... we should be careful not to be misled by the very different way in 
which existence is understood by Thomism and by modern existentialism. , 62 
Conclusion 
In Manalive, Michael Moon offers us his own thoughts on the joy of Innocent Smith: 
"Speaking singly, I feel as if man were tied to tragedy, and there was no way out of the 
trap of old age and doubt. But if there is a way out, then, by Christ and St Patrick, this 
is the way out. If one could keep as happy as a child... it would be by being as innocent 
as a child... "63 The value of childhood is a recurring theme in Chesterton's writings, 
and a fitting one with which to conclude this thesis. When Chesterton talks about the 
innocence of childhood, he uses the word symbolically; he does not think that they are 
literally without fault. 64 For Chesterton, the innocence of childhood entails an ability to 
appreciate our existence, and be grateful for it: "Sheer wondering joy before the face of 
existence is claimed by Chesterton in the Autobiography as a characteristic feature of 
59 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground (1864; trans. Jessie Coulson, Middlesex: Penguin 
Books, 1972), p. 38. 
60 Mason, The Centre of Hilarity. Mason's existential reading of Chesterton is particularly evident in 
"Chapter 6: Joy at War". 
61 Chesterton, Manalive, p. 142. 
62 John Macquarrie, Existentialism (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 48. 
63 Chesterton, Manalive, p. 187. 
64 In chapter seven we saw that Chesterton firmly believed in original sin. 
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childhood. -)65 This is the same idea that Gabriel Gale articulates in The Poet and the 
Lunatics: "Man is a creature; all his happiness consists in being a creature: or. as the 
Great Voice commanded us, in becoming a child. All his fun is in having a `(litt or 
present; which the child, with profound understanding, values because it is a 'surprise.. 
But surprise implies that a thing comes from outside ourselves; and gratitude that it 
comes from someone other than ourselves. , 66 
During this thesis I have examined Chesterton's concept of evil, and shown hox\ he 
understood it to be a very real problem. At the same time, it is a problem that he wanted 
us to put into perspective. This is something that he believed the child did through fairy 
tales. 67 One feature of fairy tales is that even the most evil characters are eventually 
defeated. This idea was explored in chapters seven and eight when I looked 
Chesterton's understanding of the life and death of Jesus as a solution to suffering. 
Another feature of fairy tales is that they view existence positively, and it this that I 
have focussed upon in this concluding chapter. Chesterton believed that the evil in the 
world was subordinate to the goodness of existence in general: The goodness of the 
fairy tale was not affected by the fact that there might be more dragons than princesses; 
it was good to be in a fairy tale. The test of all happiness is gratitude..., , 68 It is this 
essential goodness that outweighs the evil we find in the world, and explains 
Chesterton's optimistic outlook: 
The world is hot and cruel, 
We are weary of heart and hand, 
But the world is more full of glory 
69 Than you can understand. 
`" Nichols, "G. K. Chesterton's Argument for The Existence of God", The Chesterton Review, p. 64. 
66G. K. Chesterton, The Poet and the Lunatics (1929; repr. London; Darwen Finlayson Ltd. 1962). p. 1) 
1. 
`'' See my discussion of Chesterton and fairy tales in chapter five. 
`'` Chesterton, Orthodoxy. p. 96. 
69 G. K. Chesterton, "The Mortal Answers" in Collected Works I "olume 10: Collected Poetry Part 1 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press. 1994), p. 239. 
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Appendix: Chesterton's Treatment of the Cross 
In his seminal work, The Crucified God (1974), Jürgen Moltmann wrote: The death of 
Jesus on the cross is the centre of all Christian theology. It is not the only theme of 
theology, but it is in effect the entry to its problems and answers on earth. All Christian 
statements about God, about creation, about sin and death have their focal point in the 
crucified Christ. "' If this is so, and Chesterton is seen as a fundamentally orthodox 
Christian, the criticism could be levelled at my thesis that I have failed to do justice to 
this profound soteriological strain in his thought. In chapter eight, for example, I argued 
that Chesterton's treatment of the cross was not prominent in his work, and. in 
particular, I made the suggestion that Chesterton's soteriology could be considered 
inadequate. I based this conclusion not on the assumption that he did not believe in the 
power of the cross, but rather that he rarely chose to discuss the matter explicitly in his 
writings. The aim of this appendix is to consider this issue further with special 
reference to two novels: The Napoleon of Notting Hill and The Man who was 
Thursday: A Nightmare. 
However, before I make my apology for treating Chesterton's theology in the way that 
I have, it should be noted that there is a distinction between Protestant and Catholic 
theology on precisely this issue. In Lutheranism especially, but also in certain types of 
evangelical theology, the cross is seen not only as the fundamental revelation of God in 
creation, but also the source and explanation of the whole scheme of Christian 
theology. It is there that evil is unmasked and defeated. On the other hand, in classical 
Catholic theology, the crucifixion and its salvific content takes its place in a 
constellation of doctrine: Creation, the Incarnation, the Church, and the sacraments. 
It 
is from this latter tradition that Chesterton seems to be writing and expounding his 
theory of evil. 
In chapter three of The Napoleon of Notting Hill, Adam Wayne and Auberon 
Quin 
reveal themselves as the fanatic and the humorist while discussing 
Quin's Charter of 
1 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974). p. 204. 
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the Cities. When Quin tries to explain that it was all a joke, Wayne replies: "I suppose 
you fancy crucifixion was a serious affair? " Quin concurs, but Wayne contradicts him: 
`Then you are wrong, ' said Wayne, with incredible violence. `Crucifixion is 
comic. It is exquisitely diverting. It was an absurd and obscene kind of impaling 
reserved for people who were made to be laughed at - for slaves and provincials 
- for dentists and small tradesmen, as you would say. I have seen the grotesque 
gallows-shape, which the little Roman gutter-boys scribbled on walls as a 
vulgar joke, blazing on the pinnacles of the temples of the world... 
... 
This laughter with which men tyrannize is not the great power you think. 
Peter was crucified, and crucified head downwards. What could be funnier than 
the idea of a respectable old Apostle upside down? What could be more in the 
style of your modern humour? But what was the good of it? 2 
At first it is tempting to see Wayne's description of the grotesque nature of crucifixion 
as a reference to the way in which the grotesque seeks to subvert terror with comedy. 3 
This might lead us to conclude that Chesterton uses the cross to symbolise God's 
ultimate subversion of evil through comedy. However, this is not the main thrust of 
Wayne's argument. Instead, he is putting forward the position that however strange 
processes within creation may seem, they nonetheless serve to induce in us a wonder at 
creation: "These little gardens where we told our loves. These streets where we brought 
out our dead. Why should they be commonplace? Why should they be absurd? "4 Hence 
the distinction between the strange and the deformed that I outlined in chapter four is 
apposite. The grotesque that is being referred to is not the deformed but the strange. 
Thus the crucifixion becomes an instance of strangeness rather than a manifestation of 
deformity, and strangeness itself is seen by Chesterton as part of the created order. 
Indeed, the wonder at creation in all its variety becomes increasingly central as the 
story unfolds. When Quin considers the possibility that the universe might be some 
perverse joke on the part of God, in the same way that the Charter of the Cities was a 
joke on his part, Wayne replies: "Suppose I do not laugh back at you, do not blaspheme 
you, do not curse you. But suppose, standing up straight under the sky, with every 
2 G. K. Chesterton, The Napoleon of Notting Hill (1904; repr. London: Penguin Books, 1987). p. 62. 
See mm discussion of this on pp. 65-7 & 83-7. 
" Chesterton, The Napoleon oj'Notting Hill, p. 62. 
See my discussion of this on pp. 77-82. 
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power of my being, I thank you for the fool's paradise you have made. "" He affirms the 
doctrine of creation by declaring that Notting Hill is good merely by virtue of its 
existence: "There has never been anything in the world absolutel`, like Notting Hill. 
There will never be anything quite like it to the crack of doom. I cannot believe 
anything but that God loved it as He must surely love anything that is itself and 
unreplaceable. "7 
The way in which Chesterton talks about the cross in terms of the doctrine of creation 
can be seen elsewhere in his writings. In The Everlasting Man, he discusses the 
meaning of the cross by way of its design, distinguishing it from not only the cyclical 
wheel of Eastern religions, but also the Hegelian idealism of his own day: 
The cross has become something more than a historical memory; it does 
convey, almost as by a mathematical diagram, the truth about the real point at 
issue; the idea of a conflict stretching outwards into eternity. It is true, and even 
tautological, to say that the cross is the crux of the whole matter. 
In other words the cross, in fact as well as figure, does really stand for the idea 
of breaking out of the circle that is everything and nothing. It does escape from 
the circular argument by which everything begins and ends in the mind. 8 
Here he uses the cross to illuminate his assertion of the reality and value of the material 
world rather than as the isolated instrument of salvation. 
In The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, there appears the suggestion at one point 
that God is to be seen as one who suffers. 9 This raises the question of whether we 
should locate Chesterton's understanding of the cross in this context. The question of 
6 Chesterton, The Napoleon of Notting Hill, p. 155. 
7 Ibid., pp. 154-5. 
8 G. K. Chesterton, The Everlasting Man (1925; repr. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993). p. 134. This 
debate between the cross and the circle - symbolising two different philosophies of 
history - mirrors the 
debate between Michael and Lucifer in the opening chapter of Chesterton's novel, The Ball and the 
Cross. 
`' The concept that God suffers leans toward two alternative theodicies to the one that 
I discuss in 
chapters seven and eight. John Hick's reworking of Iranaeus' soul making theodicy 
involves the 
necessity of suffering for the development of character. This has obvious 
implications for the nature of 
God. To some degree, these have been explored in the process theodicies of thinkers 
like David Ray 
Griffin. (See Griffin, God, Power, and Evil. - A Process Theodicy, 1976. ) Process theologians talk about 
God in terms of becoming rather than being. By describing a God who changes in response to 
his 
creation, they have an inherent obligation to discuss God in terms of a suffering 
God. 
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the passibility of God has been an area of theological controversy in the Christian 
church from the earliest times. 10 In his recent book, Paul Fiddes asserts the intrinsic 
link between the two subjects: "Above all God uses the death of Jesus Christ to define 
himself. As [Wolfhart] Pannenberg declares, `If God is revealed through Jesus Christ. 
then who or what God is becomes defined only through the Christ event', and God 
reveals himself fully as self-giving love in the cross. "" 
In chapter eight of my thesis, I argued that the character of Sunday, in The Man who 
, was Thursday: A Nightmare, was too ambiguous to represent the Christian God. 
Chesterton himself declared that he had never intended to suggest that Sunday was the 
Christian God: 
I have often been asked what I meant by the monstrous pantomime ogre who 
was called Sunday in that story; and some have suggested, in one sense not 
untruly, that he was meant for a blasphemous version of the Creator. But the 
point is that the whole story is a nightmare of things, not as they are, but as they 
seemed to the young half-pessimist of the `90s; and the ogre who appears brutal 
but is also cryptically benevolent is not so much God, in the sense of religion or 
irreligion, but rather Nature as it appears to the pantheist, whose pantheism is 
struggling out of pessimism. 12 
However, Stephen Medcalf has argued that we should treat these comments with 
caution. He claims that describing Sunday in terms of nature is too simple for the 
novel. " 13 Instead, Medcalf believes that Sunday should be taken as a representation of 
the Christian God as depicted in both the Old and New Testament. With reference to 
the second of these, Medcalf focuses our attention on the final words that Sunday utters 
to the members of the Anarchist council: "Can ye drink of the cup that I drink of? '' 4 As 
his argument unfolds, Medcalf suggests that not only does God suffer through the 
cross, but also that God may have chosen to suffer through the act of creation: 
10 The question of God's passibility was discussed briefly on pp. 190-2. 
Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 265. 
2 G. K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936; repr. Kent: Fisher Press, 1992), p. 99. 
Stephen Medcalf, "Introduction" to G. K. Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Vighimare 
(1908; repr. Oxford: World's Classics, 1996), p. xxvi. Medcalf outlines his position in further 
detail in 
this extended introduction to the novel. 
" Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare, p. 162. As Medcalf points out in his notes to 
the novel, this is a reference to Mark 10: 38. 
214 
"Sunday's answer to Syme makes it clear that, certainly in the Passion. possibly in the 
very act of creation, God knows isolation such as Gregory knows. "" 
In considering the question of whether or not God suffers, it is necessary to consider a 
related passage in Orthodoxy that touches upon the same theme: 
Christianity is the only religion on earth that has felt that omnipotence made 
God incomplete. Christianity alone has felt that God, to be wholly God, must 
have been a rebel as well as a king... In this indeed I approach a matter more 
dark and awful than it is easy to discuss; and I apologise in advance if an\ of 
my phrases fall wrong or seem irreverent touching a matter which the greatest 
saints and thinkers have justly feared to approach. But in that terrific tale of the 
Passion there is a distinct emotional suggestion that the author of all things (in 
some unthinkable way) went not only through agony, but through doubt. 16 
This passage adds credence to Medcalf's suggestion that Chesterton believes in a 
suffering God, and, in turn, appears to provide a framework for understanding 
Chesterton's understanding of the cross. As Fiddes reminds us: "A further major reason 
for the theological conviction that God suffers is based on the central place of the cross 
of Jesus within Christian faith. " 17 However, there are three reasons why I believe that 
this extract from Orthodoxy should not necessarily lead us to conclude that Chesterton 
believed in a suffering God. Firstly, the language of this passage is hesitant and 
speculative. He apologises for the "dark" suggestion that he is about to make and 
recognises that it may well be in conflict with the historic position of the church. 
Moreover, when Chesterton does articulate his position, he offers it merely as a 
"suggestion", fully aware of the centuries of intense debate concerning this issue. Yet 
to describe this idea as speculative is not to reject it out of hand, but rather it is to try to 
understand it within the context of Chesterton's developing theology. During this 
period (1908 and earlier), he was still in the process of weighing up various theological 
positions that fell within the general framework of Christian theology. 
' 8 
'' Medcalf, "introduction" to Chesterton, The Man who was Thursday: A Nightmare. p. xxviii 
"' G. K. Chesterton, Orthodoxy (1908; repr. London: The Bodley Head, 1927), p. 254. 
17 Fiddes, The Creative . Suffering of God, p. 25. 
In chapter eight, I drew a similar distinction to the one here between speculation and 
dogma when 
explaining the roles of defence and theodicy in The Man who was Thursday:. Nightmare. 
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The second reason for doubting the suggestion that the mature Chesterton believed in a 
suffering God is the fact that he did not elaborate on the idea in his later writings. In 
response to this significant point, Denis Conlon offers the following observation 
concerning the identity of Sunday: "Possibly he is the God Chesterton found in the 
1890s, far different from the One he worshipped at the time of his death. " 19 
The third reason follows on from the second. Although Chesterton discussed the 
suffering of Christ in later years, he was clearly aware that this was not the same as 
suggesting that God had suffered. He became increasingly aware of the distinction 
between Christ's divine nature and his human nature. This was a distinction that some 
of the early-Church fathers had introduced to deal with problems caused by the 
suffering of Christ. It allowed theologians to argue that when Jesus suffered on the 
cross, it was only his human nature that suffered. As Moltmann explains: "The doctrine 
of two natures in christology attempted not only to make a neat separation between the 
natures of Godhead and manhood, but also to assert their unity in the person of Christ 
and to reflect upon it. "20 
In an essay found in The Thing, Chesterton affirmed his belief in the dual nature of 
Christ. He explained that "Christ, as conceived by the Catholic Church, is himself a 
complex and a combination, not of two unreal things, but of two real things. "21 
Elsewhere, Chesterton's discussion of Aquinas contains an implicit affirmation of the 
dual nature of Christ. This can be found amid a discussion of the way in which Aquinas 
distinguished between the natural and the supernatural while affirming both: "This 
Christian duality had always been implicit, as in Christ's distinction between God and 
Caesar, or the dogmatic distinction between the nature of Christ. But St Thomas has the 
glory of having seized the double thread as the clue to a thousand things: and thereby 
19 Denis Conlon, "Introduction" to G. K. Chesterton, Collected Works volume 6: The Man who was 
Thursday, The Club of Queer Trades, Napoleon of Notting Hill, The Ball and the Cross (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1991), p. 45. 
20 Moltmann, The Crucified God, p. 231. In his book, Moltmann attacks this idea of Christ's dual nature. 
He argues that it resulted from the patristic attempt to establish a philosophical conception of God before 
dealing with the life and person of Christ. 
21 G. K. Chesterton, "What We Think About", The Thing (1929; repr. London: Unicorn Books, 1939), p. 
210. In this essay, Chesterton defends the doctrine of Christ's dual nature against those who consider it 
restrictive. 
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created the only creed in which the saints can be sane. , 22 Ultimately, it is within this 
context that we must view Chesterton's occasional references to the suffering of Christ. 
Although there was a period when Chesterton contemplated the idea that the suffering 
of Christ involved a suffering God, he seems subsequently to have rejected this in 
favour of one of the patristic explanations for the dual nature of Christ. Chesterton 
believed he was echoing Aquinas: "According to Thomas Aquinas, too, the suffering is 
only a suppositum of the divine nature in respect of the human nature which it assumed 
and which was capable of suffering; it did not relate to the divine nature itself, for this 
"23 was incapable of suffering. 
In this appendix, I have sought to elaborate on the suggestion in my thesis that the cross 
is relatively peripheral to the thought of Chesterton. Although references to the cross 
can be found in his writings, they remain scarce: "Compared to his remarks on 
Christmas, Chesterton's comments on Easter - the Passion and the Resurrection - 
occupy little space. "24 The small amount of space explicitly devoted to the cross is 
particularly evident in his theological works, where it receives little attention. 25 In spite 
of this, there were undoubtedly two areas in which Chesterton appeared to elaborate 
upon his understanding of the cross. The first of these involved a reference in The 
Napoleon of Notting Hill to the cross in terms of the grotesque, although closer analysis 
showed that this was not the case and that the novel was more concerned with 
highlighting the wonder of creation. The second area that I considered was the idea that 
the cross symbolises the suffering of God, an idea that has become increasingly popular 
in twentieth-century theology. In particular, Stephen Medcalf has developed an 
interesting argument along these lines in his introduction to The Man who ii'us 
Thursday: A Nightmare. Yet, although Chesterton appears to have entertained this idea 
quite seriously at one point, I argued that it did not make the transition from theological 
speculation to theological dogma in Chesterton's thought. 
2 G. K. Chesterton, "St Thomas Aquinas", The Spectator (27 February 1932; repr. The G. K. Chesterton 
Quarterly, No. 2, Spring 1997), p. 2. 
23' Moltmann, The Crucified God, p. 229. 
2' Stratford Caldecott, Was Chesterton a Theologian? ", The Chesterton Review Vol. 24 No. 4 
(November 1998), p. 474. 
,, These include Orthodoxe, (1908); The Everlasting Man (1925); The Catholic Church and Conversion 
(1927); The Thing (1929); St Thomas Aquinas (1933); and The Well and the Shallows (1935). 
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In chapter eight, I suggested that Chesterton understood the cross as essentially 
symbolic. This leaves us with the question of what exactly was being symbolised. It is 
difficult to be clear about the answer to this question as Chesterton does not provide us 
with sufficient detail. Ultimately, we may be forced to conclude that, for Chesterton, 
the cross symbolised the Christian faith in general, and the second member of the 
Trinity - who came to restore the fallen creation - in particular. This continuing 
emphasis on the doctrine of creation is relayed through an experience that Michael has 
in The Ball and the Cross: "A fierce inspiration fell on him suddenly; he would strike 
them where they stood with the love of God. They should not move till they saw their 
own sweet and startling existence... From the Cross from which he had fallen fell the 
"26 shadow of its fantastic mercy... 




This bibliography does not contain every work that I have consulted during my 
research: it is restricted either to works that are referred to or quoted from in the thesis. 
or to works that were significant in the preparation of the thesis. In the interest of 
simplicity and clarity I have chosen to divide the bibliography into just two sections. In 
the first section, it should be noted that a number of the articles by Chesterton have 
been collected in books (e. g. volumes of the Collected Works). Dividing his books and 
articles into sub-sections would be not be helpful as many of the articles that I have 
referred to are contained within the books listed below. 
The reason for not dividing the secondary material into subject areas is that it is too 
eclectic to justify this sort of approach. In the course of my research, I have covered 
many related subjects involving different disciplines. For example, I have examined 
secondary material from a wide range of literary authors, as well as philosophical and 
theological texts. The second reason for keeping the secondary material in one section 
is that many of the books cover two or more subjects. As a result, dividing the 
secondary material by subject would not enable the reader to discover exactly what 
material had been used without reading through the entire bibliography. 
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